Hutchinson v. Taft

• Decision Date: 14 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. S-09-0067.,No. S-09-0028.,S-09-0028.,S-09-0067.
• Parties: Gerald D. HUTCHINSON, Trustee of the Vera J. Hutchinson Revocable Trust Dated October 28, 1999, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Cara J. TAFT, Trustee of the Taft Living Trust Dated August 19, 1983, and Barbara Jo Harney Cockrell and Roberta Anne Harney Causey, co-Executrices of the Estate of Leon Thomson Harney, Appellees (Defendants). Gerald D. Hutchinson, Trustee of the Vera J. Hutchinson Revocable Trust Dated October 28, 1999, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Cara J. Taft, Trustee of the Taft Living Trust Dated August 19, 1983, and Barbara Jo Harney Cockrell and Roberta Anne Harney Causey, co-Executrices of the Estate of Leon Thomson Harney, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

222 P.3d 1250

2010 WY 5

Gerald D. HUTCHINSON, Trustee of the Vera J. Hutchinson Revocable Trust Dated October 28, 1999, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Cara J. TAFT, Trustee of the Taft Living Trust Dated August 19, 1983, and Barbara Jo Harney Cockrell and Roberta Anne Harney Causey, co-Executrices of the Estate of Leon Thomson Harney, Appellees (Defendants).

Gerald D. Hutchinson, Trustee of the Vera J. Hutchinson Revocable Trust Dated October 28, 1999, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Cara J. Taft, Trustee of the Taft Living Trust Dated August 19, 1983, and Barbara Jo Harney Cockrell and Roberta Anne Harney Causey, co-Executrices of the Estate of Leon Thomson Harney, Appellees (Defendants).

No. S-09-0028.

No. S-09-0067.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

January 14, 2010.

Representing Appellant in Case No. S-09-0028: Matthew H. Romsa, John M. Kuker and James M. Peterson of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Romsa.

Representing Appellees in Case No. S-09-0028: James R. Salisbury of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Gerald D. Hutchinson's predecessors in interest (the Hutchinsons) leased property owned by Josephine Taft. After leasing the property for about ten years, the Hutchinsons ceased making the lease payments but continued to use the property. When a trustee of the Taft Living Trust and co-executrices of the estate of one of Josephine Taft's heirs (the Tafts) later listed the Taft property for sale, the Hutchinsons filed a claim to quiet title to the property in them on the theory of adverse possession.

[¶ 2] During a trial to the court, the Hutchinsons presented their witnesses and rested. The Tafts moved for judgment on partial findings. The district court granted the motion and entered a judgment and order for the Tafts. On appeal, the Hutchinsons claim the district court erred in granting the motion for judgment on partial findings, denying admission of an exhibit and denying their motions to amend the findings or for a new trial. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] The Hutchinsons present the issues for this Court's review as follows:

I. Did the Trial Court [err] in granting Appellees' Rule 52(c) motion?

II. Did the Trial Court [err] in denying admission of Appellant's Exhibit 9?

III. Did the Trial Court [err] in denying Appellant's motion to amend the findings and motion for a new trial?

Although stated differently, the Tafts present essentially the same issues.

FACTS

[¶ 4] Josephine Taft took title to the Taft property in 1931. Darrold and Vera Hutchinson purchased the Hutchinson property in 1961. The Hutchinson property surrounds the Taft property on the north, east and south sides. The same year the Hutchinsons purchased their property, they entered into a lease agreement with Josephine Taft in which they agreed to pay her $50 per year in exchange for use of her property. From that time forward, the Hutchinsons used the Taft property primarily for grazing and some farming.

[¶ 5] Josephine Taft died in 1967 and her two heirs inherited the property as tenants in common. The Hutchinsons continued to use the Taft property and paid the rent until the early 1970s. Between 1970 and 1975, they stopped paying the rent but continued to use the property.

[¶ 6] In 1992, Darrold Hutchinson conveyed his interest in the Hutchinson property to his wife, Vera, who later conveyed all of the property to Gerald Hutchinson, trustee of the Vera J. Hutchinson Revocable Trust. In 1996, Josephine Taft's heirs died, and their respective interests in the Taft property were distributed to their spouses, Cara J. Taft and Leon Thomson Harney. Through these deaths and conveyances, the Hutchinsons, and their third party lessees, continued to use the Taft property primarily for grazing and some farming.

[¶ 7] In July of 2003, the Tafts listed their property for sale. The Hutchinsons filed a complaint to quiet title to the property in them, claiming they had adversely possessed the property since the early 1970s when they stopped paying rent. The Tafts denied the claim. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the respective motions and set the matter for a bench trial.

[¶ 8] On the day of trial, the parties presented opening statements and the Hutchinsons presented their witnesses and rested their case. The Tafts moved for judgment on partial findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(c), which provides:

(c) Judgment on partial findings.—If during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. That party against whom entry of such a judgment is considered shall be entitled to no special inference as a consequence of such consideration, and the court may weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts. Such a judgment shall be supported by findings as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule.

In support of the motion, the Tafts asserted the Hutchinsons had not shown that their possession of the Taft property was adverse. After hearing argument from both parties, the district court granted the motion.

[¶ 9] The district court subsequently entered a judgment and order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52(c). The Hutchinsons filed motions for a new trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59 and for amendment to the district court's findings or additional findings. After a hearing, the district court denied the motions. The Hutchinsons timely appealed the district court order to this Court.

DISCUSSION

1. Order Granting Motion on Partial Findings

[¶ 10] The Hutchinsons contend they met their burden of showing adverse possession; therefore, the district court erred in granting the Rule 52(c) motion. Citing Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 (Wyo.1999) and Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo.2002), they assert that they were required to show, and did show, that from the early 1970s when they stopped paying rent to the present their possession of the Taft property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, hostile and under claim of right or color of title. Furthermore, the Hutchinsons assert they proved that they enclosed the Taft property in a fence and that evidence alone was sufficient under Wyoming law to establish adverse possession.

[¶ 11] The Tafts respond that the district court correctly granted their motion because the Hutchinsons did not prove their use of the property was adverse, rather, the evidence showed that their use continued to be permissive even after they stopped paying rent. The Tafts point to evidence presented during the Hutchinsons' case showing they: used the Taft property as tenants pursuant to a lease allowing them to graze livestock and farm; never paid the taxes on the property; made no substantial improvements to the property; executed a disclaimer in 1964 acknowledging that they were tenants of Josephine Taft and claimed no other right to the property; had notice when the Tafts entered into oil and gas leases for the property in 1989 and did not assert that they owned the property; and had notice and did not assert ownership when in 2003 the Tafts negotiated and sold part of the property to the State of Wyoming for purposes of widening the county road and converting it to a state highway.

[¶ 12] Like Rule 50(a)(1) allowing the entry of judgment as a matter of law at the close of a plaintiff's case in a jury trial, Rule 52(c) allows the district court to enter judgment during a bench trial after a party has presented all of his or her evidence and it is clear under controlling law the claim cannot be maintained. We review an order granting judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)(1) de novo, giving no deference to the district court's decision. Conner v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, Natrona Co., 2002 WY 148, ¶ 8, 54 P.3d 1274, 1279 (Wyo.2002). It is appropriate that we review a district court's Rule 52(c) order granting judgment on partial findings under the same standard. We view the plaintiff's evidence as true and afford it all favorable and reasonable inferences. Mountain View/Evergreen Improv. and Serv. Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d 529, 531 (Wyo.1996). When the plaintiff's proof has failed in some aspect, the motion is properly granted; when the plaintiff's proof is overwhelming or when the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the motion is properly denied. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 795 (Wyo. 1989), citing Fuller v. Fuller, 606 P.2d 306, 307-308 (Wyo.1980).

[¶ 13] As the Hutchinsons state, to prove that they adversely possessed the Taft property, they were required to show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the Taft property and that such possession was hostile, under claim of right or color of title and continued for the statutory ten year period. Kimball, 993 P.2d at 305. Absent a clear showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession and the burden shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession. Id. If, however, a claimant's use of the property is shown to be permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse possession. Id. at 306.

[¶ 14] The Hutchinsons concede that initially they used the property permissively as tenants pursuant to the lease granted by the Tafts and, in accordance with the lease, paid rent of $50 per year from 1961 until the early 1970s. For that period of time, they do not contend their use of the property was adverse. Th...