Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy

• Decision Date: 22 March 2005
• Citation: 870 A.2d 766,582 Pa. 114
• Parties: Michael S. HUTCHISON, Jr., by Mary J. HUTCHISON, Parent and Natural Guardian, Appellants v. Father Francis LUDDY, St. Therese's Catholic Church, Bishop James Hogan and Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

870 A.2d 766

582 Pa. 114

Michael S. HUTCHISON, Jr., by Mary J. HUTCHISON, Parent and Natural Guardian, Appellants v. Father Francis LUDDY, St. Therese's Catholic Church, Bishop James Hogan and Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Re-Submitted September 29, 2004.

Decided March 22, 2005.

Thomas L. Cooper, Pittsburgh, Richard M. Serbin, Altoona, for, Michael S. Hutchison, Jr., by Mary J. Hutchison, Parent and Natural Guardian, Appellants.

Louis C. Long, Carl A. Eck, Pittsburgh, for St. Therese's Catholic Church, Appellee.

Philip Joseph Murren, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, Appellee Amicus Curiae.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.

OPINION

Justice CASTILLE.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision affirming in part and reversing in part the order of the trial court which, in pertinent part here, refused to set aside a jury award of punitive damages for a claim arising out of negligent supervision. The Superior Court held, as a matter of law, that punitive damages are unavailable on a claim sounding in negligent supervision under Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. We disagree with the Superior Court's conclusion that punitive damages are never available for claims of negligent supervision. Accordingly, we vacate the order below and remand this matter for a determination of whether, under the appropriate standard discussed herein, the evidence in this case was legally sufficient to warrant the trial court's award of punitive damages.

Michael Hutchison, described as mildly retarded with a low I.Q., first met Catholic priest Fr. Francis Luddy in 1976, when Luddy became his priest and religious teacher in Altoona, Pennsylvania.¹ Approximately one year later, when Michael was ten to eleven years old, Luddy began sexually molesting him and the molestations continued on a frequent basis until Michael's family moved to Ohio in August 1982. Approximately six months later, when Michael was fifteen, he ran away from his new home in Ohio and returned to a hotel in Altoona to speak with Luddy about problems he was experiencing at home. Michael testified that he specifically requested that they not engage in any sexual activity. Nevertheless, Luddy visited Michael, spoke with him, sexually molested him and then gave him $200. A similar encounter occurred in 1984 when Michael was seventeen.

Michael, by his mother, Mary J. Hutchison (collectively, appellants), brought the instant action in June of 1987. In addition to Luddy, appellants named as defendants the parish to which Luddy had been assigned (St. Therese's Catholic Church), as well as Bishop James Hogan and the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown (the Diocesan Parties).² The complaint alleged causes of action for, inter alia, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress by Luddy. The complaint against the Diocesan Parties sounded in negligent retention and supervision.

An eleven-week jury trial commenced on January 31, 1994. The jury returned its verdict on April 21, 1994, finding, in relevant part to this appeal, that the Diocesan Parties had knowledge that Luddy was molesting children; that they were negligent in their retention and supervision of Luddy; that they engaged in a pattern and practice of ignoring allegations of pedophilic behavior among priests; and that their negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about harm to Michael. The jury awarded appellants a total of $519,000.00 in compensatory damages. The jury also found that the conduct of all the defendants was outrageous, and therefore awarded appellants punitive damages totaling $1,050,000.00 — fifty thousand dollars against Luddy personally and one million dollars against the Diocesan Parties premised upon the supervision claim.

The Diocesan Parties filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied. The Diocesan Parties then appealed to the Superior Court, raising ten issues.³ On September 4, 1996, a divided Superior Court panel vacated the judgment against the Diocesan Parties, on grounds that appellants had failed to establish negligent supervision liability pursuant to Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.⁴ Hutchison v. Luddy, 453 Pa.Super. 420, 683 A.2d 1254, 1255-56 (1996) (Plurality Opinion by Brosky, J., with Tamilia, J., concurring in result). Given this finding, the plurality opinion did not reach any other issues. The Honorable Kate Ford Elliott dissented, noting that she would have affirmed the jury's verdicts regarding liability and compensatory damages against the Diocesan Parties because the evidence showed that they knew of Luddy's pedophilic behavior and should have known of the necessity to control that behavior. Id. at 1257-60 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting). Judge Ford Elliott would have reversed the award of punitive damages, however, because she concluded that, while the conduct of the Diocesan Parties may have been "inept, exhibited a complete lack of understanding of the disease of pedophilia, and constituted gross negligence," there was insufficient evidence to prove that the conduct was "malicious, wanton or based on an evil motive." Id. at 1260-61.

This Court granted allocatur and affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. Like the Superior Court, this Court was unable to reach a majority consensus except as to mandate. Madame Justice Newman filed the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court ("OAJC"), which was joined by then-Chief Justice Flaherty. The OAJC found that the Superior Court properly dismissed all claims against St. Therese's because its involvement with Luddy had ended prior to the incidents in question. The OAJC found, however, that the jury's compensatory damages verdict against Bishop Hogan and the Diocese was legally sustainable on the basis of negligent supervision liability under Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The OAJC thus vacated the Superior Court's order insofar as it entered judgment in favor of Bishop Hogan and the Diocese, and remanded the matter to the Superior Court for consideration of the numerous additional issues raised but not decided in the Diocesan Parties' appeal. See Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1052 (OAJC by Newman, J.). Four Justices concurred only in the result. Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Cappy filed a Concurring Opinion emphasizing the standard of review and disassociating himself from the OAJC's criticism of Superior Court's exclusive focus upon Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the sole basis for recovery. Mr. Justice Nigro noted his concurrence in the result without opinion. Mr. Justice Saylor filed a separate Concurring Opinion, which was joined by then-Justice (later Chief Justice) Zappala, stating that he joined in the result, but was unable to join the OAJC's characterization of the Diocesan Parties' conduct as reckless and abhorrent because the question of punitive damages was for the Superior Court to determine, in the first instance, upon remand. Finally, this Justice dissented, opining that the governing law precluded any finding of liability against the Diocesan Parties on the facts as presented.

On remand, the Superior Court filed another published opinion disposing of the remaining claims. The panel ultimately reversed the award of punitive damages against the Diocesan Parties and entered judgment non obstante veredicto in the Diocesan Parties' favor on punitive damages, but otherwise affirmed the trial court. The panel majority appeared to consider the question of punitive damages on the Section 317 claim in conjunction with appellants' argument that the court should recognize a cause of action sounding in the intentional failure to supervise clergy. The panel noted that Pennsylvania courts have not yet recognized such a separate cause of action sounding in intentional conduct and, as an intermediate appellate court, it was not inclined to enunciate and approve such a doctrine. The panel then noted that the cause of action governed by Section 317 is based upon ordinary negligence. In addition, the panel noted, it is settled that more than ordinary negligence must be shown in order to prove an entitlement to punitive damages. In the panel majority's view, because the Section 317 cause of action sounds in ordinary negligence, it cannot form the basis for an award of punitive damages. See Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 837 (Pa.Super.2000).⁵

This Court granted review again, this time to consider the question of whether the Superior Court properly determined that a negligent supervision claim sounding under Section 317 can never support an award of punitive damages.⁶ The broad question of whether punitive damages may ever be appropriate under this cause of action is one of law as to which this Court's review is plenary. Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995).

Appellants argue that the Superior Court erred in finding as a matter of law that a negligent supervision claim based upon Section 317 cannot support a claim for punitive damages. Appellants argue that, under Pennsylvania law, there is no proscription against awarding punitive damages for torts that sound in negligence. To the contrary, punitive damages are appropriate for torts sounding in negligence when the conduct goes beyond mere negligence and into the realm of behavior which is willful, malicious or so careless as to indicate wanton disregard for the rights of the parties injured. Brief for Appellant, 18 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1979); Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson, Inc., 402 Pa.Super. 101, 586 A.2d 416 (1991)). Appellants thus argue that punitive damages are proper if the factual circumstances of a particular case reveal conduct that has passed into the level of outrageous conduct, even if mere ordinary negligence is all that was required to sustain a separate claim for compensatory damages.

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