Hutchison v. Board

• Decision Date: 07 June 1952
• Citation: 30 Beeler 223,194 Tenn. 223,250 S.W.2d 82
• Parties: HUTCHISON et al. v. BOARD. HUTCHISON et al. v. BOARD et al. 30 Beeler 223, 194 Tenn. 223, 250 S.W.2d 82
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 82

250 S.W.2d 82

HUTCHISON et al. v. BOARD.

HUTCHISON et al. v. BOARD et al.

30 Beeler 223, 194 Tenn. 223, 250 S.W.2d 82

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 7, 1952.

Paul White and Heathcock & Elam, Union City, Cecil Sims, Nashville, for appellants.

Weakley & Weakley, Dyersburg, for appellees.

NEIL, Chief Justice.

The appeal in these consolidated causes involves the construction of two deeds duly executed by W. W. Hutchison to his son, R. A. Hutchison. The deeds are similar in all respects except as to the names of the defendants, who now claim title in fee to both tracts of land.

The provisions of said deed are as follows:

'for and in consideration of the sum of five dollars and the further consideration of love which I bear my son, R. A. Hutchison, I, W. W. Hutchison, have bargained and sold, and by these presents to transfer and convey unto the said R. A. Hutchison and to his lawful children born to him now and who shall hereafter be born unto him after him, two certain tracts', etc.' (here follows a description of the two tracts.)

Immediately following the legal description and part of the premises of this deed appears the following language:

'It is my intention herewith to provide for my son, R. A. Hutchison, and his lawful children after him. These lands conveyed are subject to homestead and dower for the wife of my son, R. A. Hutchison, at his death and as long as she may remain the widow of R. A. Hutchison, but in the event said widow should marry again, then all homestead and dower shall cease and the same revert to the legal bodily heirs of R. A. Hutchison.'

Thereafter follows the following language:

'To have and to hold the said tract or parcel of land, with the appurtenances, estate, title and interest thereto belonging, to the said R. A. Hutchison and his lawful bodily heirs after him heirs and assigns, forever.'

'And I, W. W. Hutchison, do covenant with the said R. A. Hutchison and his bodily heirs after him that I am lawfully seized and possessed of said land in fee simple, have a good right to convey it, and the same is unincumbered.'

'And I, W. W. Hutchison, do further covenant and bind myself and my heirs and representatives to warrant and forever defend the title to said land to the said R. A. Hutchison and his lawful children after him heirs against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.'

The original bills in these causes were filed by the children of R. A. Hutchison, alleging that they are the bodily heirs and heirs at law of the said R. A. Hutchison deceased and are the joint owners of the lands in question; that the deeds from W. W. Hutchison to their father conveyed only a life estate to the latter with the remainder interest to them. The bills allege that the defendants are in possession of the lands and claim a fee simple title by and through a deed executed by R. A. Hutchison and wife to their predecessor in title who have conveyed to these defendants by deeds of record. It is alleged that said deeds are a cloud upon their title and that they have never made a conveyance of said lands. The prayer for relief is that a decree be entered removing the cloud upon the title and adjudging the complainants to be the owners of said lands in fee simple.

The defendants demurred upon the following grounds: (1) the deed which is made an exhibit to the bill shows on its face that a fee simple title was conveyed by W. W. Hutchison and not a life estate; (2) that the complainants have no interest in the lands; (3) that defendants have been in adverse possession of said lands for more than 7 years under a registered assurance of title, purporting to convey an estate in fee; (4) that complainants are estopped by their silence to assert any claim against the defendants; (5) that they are not entitled to a receiver.

The chancellor overruled each ground of the demurrer. A written opinion was filed with the record in which the chancellor held that it was the intention of the grantor, W. W. Hutchison, as shown by the language of the deed to convey to his son, R. A. Hutchison, a life estate with remainder in fee simple to his children.

An appeal was prayed and granted to this Court. The assignments of error embrace the several grounds of the demurrer to which we have made special reference.

The principal question presented for consideration is whether or not R. A. Hutchison was given a life estate with remainder to his children or a fee simple with the children taking no interest whatever, or do they take as tenants in common?

In construing the deed, the pertinent parts of which are quoted in this opinion, we are concerned solely with the grantor's intention as gathered from the language of the deed and surrounding circumstances. His intention must be ascertained from the language of the entire instrument. In following this settled rule of construction the chancellor made the following pertinent and correct observation:

'In search for the intention of the grantor no preference is given to the premises over the habendum because of position or form, and the estate granted in the premises may be enlarged, qualified or diminished in the habendum clause.

"The paramount rule of construction to which all others are subservient is that the intention of the grantor is to be decided by consideration of the words he used. And as a corallary, to reach the intention it is proper to consider the entire instrument without regard to technical parts or divisions of the deed.' Templeton v. Stong, 182 Tenn. , 594, , citing N[ashville] C. & St. L. R. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661 , Lockett v. Thomas, 179 Tenn. 240 ; McCord v. Ransom, 185 Tenn. 677 ; Thompson v. Turner, 186 Tenn. 241 ; Quarles v. Arthur , 231 S.W.2d 591.

'This principle of law of interpretation is well settled by a long array of authorities.

"If clauses or parts of a deed are conflicting or repugnant, the intention is gathered from the whole instrument, instead of from particular clauses, and if it is the clear intent of the grantor that apparently inconsistent provisions shall all stand, it will be given that effect if possible, and the technical rules of the common law as to the division of deeds into formal parts will not prevail as against the manifest intent of the parties, as shown by the whole deed.' 16 Am.J., Sec. 235; Quarles v. Arthur , 231 S.W.2d , 591.'

In construing the language of the deed the chancellor expressed the opinion that it was written 'by a person not versed in legal terms and not experienced in drafting legal instruments and this is a 'surrounding circumstance' that the court should consider.' The appellants earnestly question this expression as being unsound. We decline to make any elaborate response to this argument other than to say that there is much to sustain the view of the chancellor. The draftsman of the deed in question was most certainly lacking in knowledge of any of the technical rules of conveyance. Nor can it be said that he understood the legal effect of the expressions used in preparing the deed.

Under modern rules of construction of deeds the courts are not required to give a technical meaning to words unless the grantor clearly intended that such words were used in a technical sense. We think the clear intention of the testator to convey a life estate to R. A. Hutchison appears in the opening sentence in paragraph 2, quoted above, as follows: 'It is my intention here to provide for my son, R. A. Hutchison, and his lawful children after him.' The last two words must be interpreted as meaning that the children are given a vested remainder interest; in other words a right of possession upon the death of R. A. Hutchison. But it is argued that the grantor considered the welfare of his grandchildren (complainants herein) believing the son would use the land for their benefit. The original bill, however, makes the charge...