Hutmacher v. State, Bd. of Nursing
| Decision Date | 20 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 36207-1-I,36207-1-I |
| Citation | 81 Wn.App. 768,915 P.2d 1178 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Deborah HUTMACHER, Respondent, v. The STATE of Washington, BOARD OF NURSING, Appellant. |
Superior Court, King County; No. 94-2-09821-7, Hon. Nancy Holman, Judge.
Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, Jerald R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, for appellant.
Mark L. Fleming, Fleming Law Office, Seattle, for respondent.
The Board of Nursing appeals an order setting aside the Board's disciplinary action against Deborah Hutmacher. The Superior Court concluded that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not commence an adjudicative proceeding within a 90-day statutory time limit. The Board claims that the time limit is inapplicable because the Board commenced an adjudicative proceeding on its own initiative. We agree and reverse.
On November 6, 1991, Hutmacher illegally obtained medication by removing drugs from the emergency room of Virginia Mason Hospital. The Board issued a Statement of Charges against her nursing license on November 9, 1992. In her answer of November 27, 1992, Hutmacher chose not to contest the charges but requested a settlement conference with the possibility of a hearing.
From December 21, 1992 to August 11, 1993, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a settlement. In letters of June 3, and August 11, 1993, 1 the Board withdrew its settlement offer and stated that it would set a hearing to resolve the matter. On November 12, 1993, the Board informed Hutmacher that her hearing would be held on December 13, 1993.
At a prehearing conference, Hutmacher argued that the Board lost jurisdiction over her case by failing to commence a hearing within the 90-day period that followed her answer. Hutmacher relied on RCW 34.05.419, which provides:
After receipt of an application for an adjudicative proceeding, other than a declaratory order, an agency shall proceed as follows:
(1) ... within ninety days after receipt of the application ... the agency shall do one of the following:
(a) Approve or deny the application, in whole or in part, on the basis of brief or emergency adjudicative proceedings....
(b) Commence an adjudicative proceeding in accordance with this chapter; or (c) Dispose of the application in accordance with RCW 34.05.416[.]
The Presiding Officer ruled that Hutmacher's November 27, 1992 answer constituted an application and therefore triggered the Board's 90-day window to commence an adjudicative proceeding. See RCW 34.05.419. The officer then reasoned that the definition of "adjudicative proceeding" includes exchanges of discovery and that the parties' settlement negotiations constituted discovery which fell within the 90-day window provided by RCW 34.05.419(1)(b). Thus, the officer concluded that the Board had timely commenced an adjudicative proceeding.
Hutmacher appealed the officer's ruling to Superior Court. The court ruled that the Board lost jurisdiction over Hutmacher's case by failing to take any action within 90 days of her answer.
The question of whether the Board had jurisdiction over Hutmacher's case is reviewed de novo. Sullivan v. Dept. of Transportation, 71 Wash.App. 317, 321, 858 P.2d 283 (1993), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1018, 871 P.2d 600 (1994). The Board argues that it had jurisdiction pursuant to RCW 34.05.413(1), which allows the Board to commence an adjudicative proceeding at "any time." 2
An adjudicative proceeding is defined as "a proceeding before an agency in which an opportunity for hearing before that agency is required by statute...." RCW 34.05.010(1) (emphasis added). "An adjudicative proceeding commences when the agency or a presiding officer notifies a party that a prehearing conference, hearing, or other stage of an adjudicative proceeding will be conducted." RCW 34.05.413(5). Thus, an adjudicative proceeding is not limited to the formal hearing itself, but also contemplates other stages of proceedings affecting the rights of an individual under the administrative scheme. See generally William R. Anderson, The 1988 Washington Administrative Procedure Act--An Introduction, 64 Wash. L.Rev. 781, 789 (1988).
Here, the Board notified Hutmacher that it would be adjudicating her case by serving the Statement...
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...81 Wn.App. 768, 915 P.2d 1178 (1996), when it determined the May 24 Statement of intent served as a "charging document." We disagree. In Hutmacher, the Board of Nursing moved to remove nurse's license after she illegally obtained drugs. 81 Wn.App. at 770. The Board issued a "Statement of Ch......
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