HUTSON EX REL. ESTATE OF HUTSON v. SUREDDI, 95349.
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
| Citation | 2002 OK CIV APP 28,41 P.3d 993 |
| Docket Number | No. 95349.,95349. |
| Parties | Tim HUTSON, as the Duly Appointed and Acting Representative of the ESTATE OF Raymond HUTSON, Deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Koteswar Rao SUREDDI, M.D., and Durant HMA, Inc., d/b/a Medical Center of Southeastern Oklahoma, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2001 |
41 P.3d 993
2002 OK CIV APP 28
v.
Koteswar Rao SUREDDI, M.D., and Durant HMA, Inc., d/b/a Medical Center of Southeastern Oklahoma, Defendants/Appellees
No. 95349.
Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.
July 24, 2001.
Rehearing Denied December 10, 2001.
Certiorari Denied February 20, 2002.
John C. McMurry, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Robert H. Mitchell, Michael Belanger, Robert H. Mitchell & Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellee Koteswar Rao Sureddi.
John R. Paul, Leah McCaslin Kinsey, The Paul Law Firm, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant/Appellee Durant H.M.A., Inc.
Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Tim Hutson, appeals an order of the trial court granting a new trial to Defendant, Koteswar Rao Sureddi (Dr. Sureddi). The two issues on appeal in this medical malpractice action are whether the trial court abused its discretion in (1) granting a new trial to Dr. Sureddi, and (2) refusing to grant a new trial as to all parties and all issues. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial as to Dr. Sureddi, but did abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial as to all parties and all issues. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Hutson filed suit against Dr. Sureddi and Durant HMA, Inc. (Hospital), alleging negligence in their treatment of Hutson's Father, Raymond Hutson. A jury trial was held in the matter, resulting in a verdict in favor of Hospital and against Dr. Sureddi. The jury set the amount of damages at $900,000. The journal entry of judgment on the jury verdict was filed on May 8, 2000. Dr. Sureddi filed a motion for new trial on May 17, 2000, alleging, among other things, irregularity in the proceedings of the jury. Dr. Sureddi claimed that the failure of one juror to give full and truthful answers during voir dire required that the court grant a new trial. Specifically, Dr. Sureddi alleged that, during voir dire, the jury foreman (Juror) failed to acknowledge that he knew Dr. Sureddi and that Dr. Sureddi had previously treated Juror as a patient in the emergency room. In his affidavit, which was attached to the motion for new trial, Dr. Sureddi attested:
On the second day of jury deliberations in the small courtroom, I was much closer to the jurors and believed that one of the jurors, Mr. Wakefield, looked familiar. . . . Following the verdict, I reviewed the record of Mr. Wakefield from the Medical Center of Southeastern Oklahoma, and discovered that I had indeed treated Mr. Wakefield in the emergency room where he had been brought in by a member of the Achille Police Department. . . . The nature41 P.3d 995of the contact was such that Mr. Wakefield may well be prejudiced against me.
On that same day, Dr. Sureddi filed an application for an order to disclose medical and mental health records and an order of confidentiality. Attached to the application was a sealed appendix containing the emergency room records of Juror.
¶ 3 The trial court entered an order on May 26, 2000, which ordered the medical records relating to Dr. Sureddi's motion to be disclosed to the attorneys of record. The court further ordered that the records remain confidential and "not be disclosed except that the attorneys may inform their clients of the general nature of the contents as they pertain to the Motion for New Trial.. . ."
¶ 4 In his response, Hutson opposed the motion for new trial, asserting that no juror misconduct occurred, but if such misconduct did occur, a new trial was not in order because Dr. Sureddi delayed reporting his familiarity with Juror. Hutson also filed a motion to strike the appendix of medical records filed by Dr. Sureddi. In this motion, Hutson asserted that Juror's medical records were obtained contrary to Oklahoma law.
¶ 5 A hearing was held on the motion for new trial on July 6, 2000. The following exchange regarding the potential jurors' relationship with Dr. Sureddi, which took place during voir dire, was read into the record:
THE COURT: Any of you know Dr. Sureddi? Raise your hands high, if you would.
JUROR SMITH: By name.
THE COURT: Well —
JUROR SMITH: By name.
THE COURT: Okay, just raise your hand so we can get your — get your names. Ms. Wakefield, you know him. Mr. Jackson. Ms. Crawford. And Ms. Smith. And Cornelison.
JUROR CORNELISON: I just know him, I don't —
THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else? Okay, Mr. Wakefield?
JUROR WAKEFIELD: I'm Wakefield, you got her name wrong.
THE COURT: I'm sorry, I did. Mixed Ms. Langham and Mr. Wakefield up. Okay. Everybody get all those names?
The trial judge concluded, "I find from my examination of all the affidavits, and I remember and so forth that Mr. Wakefield did — he did not raise his hand. Except perhaps maybe to call attention to my error in misnaming — calling his neighbor by his name." The trial court sustained Dr. Sureddi's motion for new trial, reasoning that:
I am convinced that since the plaintiff reported he knew he raised his hand and did not question him about Dr. Sureddi, I think the plaintiff certainly would have had he known that he had — had treated him, for whatever he treated him of. . . . I'm also going to speak for the record, this juror played such a critical role in this nine to three decision by being the foreman, that I — that's one of the key reasons I think this case must be retried in all fairness to the defendant.
At the hearing, Hutson asserted that any order granting a new trial should be applicable to all parties and all issues.
¶ 6 Dr. Sureddi filed a motion to settle the order sustaining the motion for new trial and submitted a proposed order memorializing the trial court's decision to grant him a new trial. Hutson opposed the proposed order because it limited the new trial to Dr. Sureddi. Hospital responded to Dr. Sureddi's motion to settle and argued that the trial court should grant a new trial as to Dr. Sureddi only because Hospital did not seek a new trial as to the judgment in its favor. It asserted that there were two verdicts rendered by the jury, and the motion for new trial filed by Dr. Sureddi only applied to the verdict rendered against him.
¶ 7 The trial court announced its order on August 16, 2000, sustaining Dr. Sureddi's motion to settle the order sustaining his motion for new trial. However, the trial court did not grant a new trial as to Hospital, stating that it had "the authority to grant a new trial to only one of multiple joint and several tortfeasors." In its written order, filed September 11, 2000, the trial court cited Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn. v. Masterson, 1996 OK 99, 928 P.2d 291, and Stillwell
¶ 8 From this grant of a new trial in favor of Dr. Sureddi, Hutson appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 9 A trial court is vested with broad legal discretion in granting or denying a new trial, and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears the court erred in some pure simple question of law or acted arbitrarily. Poteete v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1974 OK 110, ¶ 24, 527 P.2d 18, 22. A much stronger showing of abuse of discretion is required to reverse an order of a trial court granting a new trial than to reverse an order denying a new trial. Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn. v. Masterson, 1996 OK 99, ¶ 16, 928 P.2d 291, 294; English v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 OK CIV APP 5, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1136, 1142.
ANALYSIS
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Dr. Sureddi a new trial.
¶ 10 Hutson's first contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. Oklahoma law provides that:
A new trial is a reexamination in the same court, of an issue...
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