Hutson v. Herndon, 18132

• Decision Date: 05 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18132,18132
• Citation: 243 S.C. 257,133 S.E.2d 753
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Melrose HUTSON, Respondent, v. Cranel B. HERNDON, d/b/a Herndon Motor Lines, Appellant.

Page 753

133 S.E.2d 753

243 S.C. 257

Melrose HUTSON, Respondent, v. Cranel B. HERNDON, d/b/a Herndon Motor Lines, Appellant.

No. 18132.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 5, 1963.

Bryant & Fanning, Orangeburg, Brown, Jefferies & Mazursky, Barnwell, for appellant.

Blatt & Fales, Barnwell, for respondent.

MOSS, Justice.

Melrose Hutson, the respondent Herein, instituted this action against Cranel B. Herndon, doing business as Herndon Motor Lines the appellant herein, to recover for property damage sustained by her when a tractor-trailer unit, owned by her, and leased to the appellant, and being operated by her husband, B. H. Hustson, was involved in a collision with another tractor-trailer unit owned by her husband, and leased by him to appellant, and being driven by his employer, mitchell Easler, which occurred on March 28, 1962, on U.S.Highway No. 1, south of Fredericksburg, Virginia.

It is undisputed that the respondent is a resident of South Carolina, and is licensed as a motor carrier by the South Carolina Public Service Commission, pursuant to Sections 58-1401 et seq., of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina, as amended, and as such operates under a Class E certificate in and through Barnwell County, South Carolina. It further appears that the respondent is not a licensed common carrier in interstate commerce.

The appellant is a common carrier of freight, holding a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing him to engage in the hauling of freight by motor vehicle in interstate commerce. He maintained offices at several places, including Homestead, Florida.

The record shows that on March 26, 1962, at Homestead, Florida, an agent of the appellant contacted B. H. Hutson and offered him the opportunity to transport two loads of green tomatoes to the City of New York. The tomatoes belonged to a customer of the appellant and he was under contract with such customer to transport the tomatoes to the City of New York. At the time the appellant engaged B. H. Huston to transport the green tomatoes to the City of New York, the said appellant did not have trucks available for such purpose.

After the two trucks were loaded with the green tomatoes, B. H. Hutson, as agent for the respondent, and Mitchell Easler, as agent for B. H. Hutson, executed trip-lease agreements with the appellant, leasing the respective tractor-trailer units, with driver. The appellant delivered a freight bill covering the shipment on each of the tractor-trailer units, addressed to a consignee in the City of New York. Each of said trip-lease agreements contained the provisions hereinafter quoted.

By the terms of the trip-lease agreement, executed by the appellant and the respondent on March 26, 1962, it was provided:

'4. This transfer of equipment under this lease shall take place at Homestead, Florida, an origin point served by the authorizied carrier lessee.

'5. It is understood that the leased equipment under this agreement is in the exclusive possession, control, and use of the authorized carrier lessee and that the lessee assumes full responsibility in respect to the equipment it is operating, to the public, the shippers, and the Interstate Commerce Commission.

'7. The authorized carrier lessee agrees to properly and correctly identify the leased equipment in accordance with I. C. C. requirements, * * *.

'8. The authorized carrier lessee agrees to remove any identifying device on the equipment before relinquishing the possession of the equipment.

'14. The lessor shall surrender full control, possession and management of said equipment to the lessee during the term of this lease which shall start at delivery of equipment and end with delivery of cargo at destination and the lessee shall pay the driver for his services, and shall withhold any withholding or social security tax required by the United States Government.'

The lease agreement contained a further stipulation as to the amount to be paid by the lessee to the lessor for the use of said equipment.

The parties agree that while the tractor-trailer unit belonging to the respondent was being operated over and along U. S. Highway No. I, in the State of Virginia, by her husband, it crashed into the rear of the other tractor-trailer unit belonging to the said B. H. Hutson and being operated by the said Mitchell Easler. This collision, causing damage to the tractor-trailer unit of the respondent, gave rise to this cause of action.

The complaint alleges that the aforesaid collision and the resulting damages sustained by the respondent were caused by the negligence of the appellant through his agents, servants and employees. At the trial of this case, the appellant admitted the specifications of negligence alleged in the complaint but denied that B. H. Hutson and Mitchell Easler were his agents, servants and employees.

This action was tried, by agreement, before the Honorable Steve C. Griffith, Presiding Judge, without a jury. The trial Judge, by order dated March 15, 1963, found for the respondent, holding that the drivers of the tractor-trailer units, for the duration of the leases in question, were the servants of the appellant and that he was liable for their negligent acts.

The only issue raised below and in this Court is whether the drivers of the leased equipment were the servants of the appellant, with respect to the operation of the tractor-trailer units. Stated another way, the sole question for decision is whether the relationship of master and servant existed between the drivers of the tractor-trailer units, covered by the trip-lease agreements, and the appellant, at the time of and in respect to the collision.

At the trial of this case the appellant offered evidence tending to modify or change the terms of the written leases. However, the trial Judge held that the lease agreements were binding on the parties and could not be varied by parol evidence, He further held that the rights of the parties should be determined by a construction of the lease agreements....