Hutto v. Ray

• Decision Date: 09 January 1940
• Docket Number: 14996.
• Parties: HUTTO et al. v. RAY.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

6 S.E.2d 747

192 S.C. 364

HUTTO et al. v. RAY.

No. 14996.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 9, 1940

E H. Henderson, of Bamberg, for appellant.

Callison & Smith, of Lexington, for respondents.

FISHBURNE Justice.

Isaac Hutto died in the year 1857, leaving a will which contained the following devise: "My land is to belong to my beloved wife Velier during her life time and all other property and after her death is to be equally divided between my children and after their death to their children and the remaining part of my property at the death of my beloved wife Velier is to be equally divided between my children."

Velier Hutto, to whom a life estate was given under the will, died many years ago. Isaac W. Hutto, a son of the testator, died intestate during the year 1935, leaving surviving him the plaintiffs, who are his children and grandchildren. After the death of the testator, Isaac Hutto, his lands were divided among his children as directed by the will, and in this partition Isaac W. Hutto received the tract of land described in the complaint. Thereafter, on October 10, 1892, he undertook to convey the tract allotted to him to Henry J Zorn, and by successive conveyances this land came into the possession of the defendant, J. M. Ray, who now claims title thereto in fee.

The plaintiffs, who, as stated, are the children and grandchildren of Isaac W. Hutto, contend that under the devise above quoted, Isaac W. Hutto, their ancestor, took only a life estate in the premises in question, and that therefore, his grantee, Henry J. Zorn, acquired the said tract only for the life of Isaac W. Hutto; that upon the death of the latter, in the year 1935, the life estate was terminated, and the interest of Henry J. Zorn, which by successive conveyances had vested in the defendant, J. M Ray, was likewise terminated by the falling in of the life estate. The plaintiffs now claim to be the owners in fee of the tract allotted to Isaac W. Hutto under the will of Isaac Hutto.

The defendant contends that under the devise above quoted, Isaac W. Hutto received either an estate in fee simple or an estate in fee simple conditional.

The lower court held that Isaac W. Hutto received a life estate in the tract of land described in the complaint, and that the plaintiffs in this action took an estate in remainder in fee.

The will was evidently drawn by an unlettered person, but we think no difficulty will be encountered in arriving at the true intent of the testator. Unless the devise should be construed to contain technical words which must be given a technical signification, it is obvious that two life estates were created, the first was given to Velier Hutto, the wife of the testator, and the second to the children of the testator, and after their death the remainder in fee to their children. Four children survived the testator, and to each of them was allotted one-fourth of his real estate. In this case, however, we are concerned only with the tract which was set off to his son, Isaac W. Hutto.

We know of no clearer definition of the rule in Shelley's case than that given by Chancellor Harper in Williams v Foster, 3 Hill, 193, 194: "By the rule in Shelley's case *** it was determined that if an estate of freehold be given to the ancestor, and a remainder be thereon limited to his heirs, or to the heirs of his body, such remainder is immediately executed in possession in the ancestor so taking the freehold, and he takes an estate in fee or in tail, according to the terms of the limitation." Smith v. Smith, 24 S.C. 304, Bannister v. Bull, 16 S.C. 220.

Neither the word "heirs" nor the words "heirs of the body" are to be found in the will. The words used are, "my children and after their death to their children ". The legal construction of the words which we have italicized accords with its popular signification, namely, as designating the immediate offspring; for in all the cases in which it has been extended to a wider range it was either used synonymously with a word of larger import, as "issue", or else the context required such interpretation. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ford, 177 S.C. 40, 180 S.E. 562.

There is nothing in the above clause which requires us to construe "their children" as being equivalent to "heirs" or "issue", or "heirs of the body". On the contrary the will clearly indicates a particular class of persons, and not a line of indefinite descent. See Reeder v. Spearman, 6 Rich.Eq. 88; McLure v. Young, 3 Rich.Eq. 559, 574; Bannister v. Bull, supra.

Under the foregoing authorities, it is clear that a life estate was created in Isaac W. Hutto, with a remainder in fee...