Hyde v. Buckalew
| Decision Date | 15 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1601,85-1601 |
| Parties | Richard B. HYDE, Mary E. Hyde, Tracy M. Blasch and Randall W. Blasch, Appellees, v. William E. BUCKALEW and Schanno Transportation, Inc., Appellants. William E. BUCKALEW and Schanno Transportation, Inc., Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Gregory T. Racette of Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher, P.C., Waterloo, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Catherine L. Winslow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Iowa.
Joseph P. Zwack and Leo A. McCarthy, Dubuque, for appellees Richard B. Hyde Mary E. Hyde, Tracy M. Blasch, and Randall W. Blasch.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, WOLLE, and NEUMAN, JJ.
A two-vehicle collision near New Hampton in Chickasaw County spawned law suits in both Chickasaw and Dubuque Counties involving several claims and cross-claims. During pretrial proceedings the district court dismissed a cross-petition against the State of Iowa filed by defendants in the Dubuque County action and also denied a motion for consolidation of the two lawsuits. We granted defendants' application for interlocutory appeal from those rulings. We reverse the district court's dismissal of the cross-petition and remand the case for further proceedings, including reconsideration of the motion to consolidate.
On February 5, 1984, during a snowstorm, a southbound truck driven by William E. Buckalew and leased by Schanno Transportation, Inc. (collectively referred to as defendants) collided with a car that had become stuck in snow while southbound on a highway in Chickasaw County. Inside the car at the time of the collision were its driver Richard E. Hyde and passengers Mary E. Hyde and Tracy M. Blasch. Randall W. Blasch and James Rochford were outside the Hyde vehicle attempting to push it out of the snow. The Hydes, Blasches, and Rochford all contend they were injured in the collision. The Hydes and Blasches (collectively referred to as plaintiffs) were residents of Dubuque County and commenced their personal injury action against defendants in Dubuque County District Court in June of 1984. Rochford, who was not an Iowa resident, subsequently filed a separate personal injury action against defendants in Chickasaw County District Court. Neither Rochford nor the plaintiffs made claims against each other.
Defendants, residents of Minnesota and Illinois, asserted counterclaims against the plaintiffs in their answers in both lawsuits. Defendants then filed and served cross-petitions against the State of Iowa in both the Dubuque County and Chickasaw County cases, seeking judgments for indemnity and contribution based on the alleged negligence of the State in maintaining and inspecting the highway. The State initially filed answers in both lawsuits generally denying the substantive allegations of the cross-petition without raising any issue of jurisdiction or venue. Thereafter the State in the Dubuque County action filed alternative motions (1) to dismiss the defendants' cross-petition for lack of jurisdiction and (2) to consolidate the Chickasaw and Dubuque County actions for trial in Dubuque County. Defendants resisted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs resisted the motion for consolidation. We review first the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss, then its refusal to consolidate the two actions.
Iowa Code section 25A.4 (1983), the statutory provision on which the State's motion to dismiss was based, provides in pertinent part:
The district court of the state of Iowa for the district in which the plaintiff is resident or in which the act or omission complained of occurred, or where the act or omission occurred outside of Iowa and the plaintiff is a nonresident, the Polk county district court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any suit or claim as defined in this chapter. However, the laws and rules of civil procedure of this state on change of place of trial apply to such suits.
The parties disagree on whether the word "plaintiff" in the statute refers only to the original plaintiffs in the lawsuit or may also refer to parties, like the defendants here, who as third-party plaintiffs seek indemnity or contribution from the State. We need not resolve that ambiguity in this case. The first question we must answer is whether the portion of this statute relied on by the State--the language identifying locations where district courts may hear state tort claims--circumscribes the jurisdiction of the district court or is merely a venue provision which the state may waive. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss without addressing the difference between jurisdiction and venue. It noted that the State's motion to dismiss "appears to rest on questionable foundation" but concluded that the issues raised by the cross-petition in the Dubuque County action could as well be resolved in the Chickasaw County action. We deem the distinction between jurisdiction and venue crucial to a correct disposition of the motion to dismiss. We conclude the issue characterized by the State as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction is really a question of venue which the State waived by filing its answer before protesting that defendants had chosen the wrong forum.
Iowa Code chapter 25A, the Iowa Tort Claims Act, grants only a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and the State may be sued in tort only to the extent provided in that chapter. Iowa Code § 25A.4 (1983); see Balster v. State, 360 N.W.2d 788, 789 (Iowa 1985); Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 1980). The issue whether the legislature intended to waive its sovereign immunity with respect to a particular type of claim is a matter of jurisdiction, the power of the court to hear and adjudicate a particular class of cases, and the State may raise that issue by motion to dismiss at any stage of the proceeding. State v. Ryan, 351 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Iowa 1984); In re Marriage of Carlson, 338 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Iowa 1983); Kernodle v. Commissioner of Insurance, 331 N.W.2d 132, 133 (Iowa 1983); Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 303 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1981).
Venue, on the other hand, is ordinarily not jurisdictional but refers to the place where the cause sued upon should be tried. Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980). Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 175(a) specifically provides in part:
An action brought in the wrong county may be prosecuted there until termination, unless a defendant, before answer, moves for its change to the proper county.
See Countryman v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 357 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Iowa 1984); 1 Vestal & Willson, Iowa Practice, § 9.46, at 61 (1983); see generally, 1 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice Rules Pamphlet § 12.8 (1986); 77 Am.Jur.2d Venue § 47 (1975 & Supp.1986).
For two reasons we believe the language of section 25A.4 concerning the location of the court which should "hear, determine and render judgment on any suit or claim" limits venue but not jurisdiction of the district court.
Section 25A.4 explicitly provides in its second sentence:
However, the laws and rules of civil procedure of this state on change of place of trial apply to such suits.
One rule of civil procedure concerning change of place of trial which that sentence incorporates by reference is the above-quoted portion of rule 175(a) which in essence requires a defendant "before answer" to move for a change of venue to the proper county, the objection otherwise being waived. We construe section 25A.4 to give Iowa district courts (as distinguished from federal courts) exclusive jurisdiction over state tort claims, but we treat the place of trial as a matter of venue governed by section 25A.4 and by other "laws and rules of civil procedure," including rule 175(a).
This construction of section 25A.4 is consistent with the construction federal courts have placed upon federal statutes governing tort claims against the United States. We have frequently turned to federal law in construing Iowa Code chapter 25A because our statute is modeled after the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Feltes v. State, 385 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 1986) (); Adam v. Mount Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 340 N.W.2d 251, 252 (Iowa 1983) ().
It is apparent that the language of Iowa Code section 25A.4 concerning the places for trial of state tort claims is borrowed from 28 United States Code section 1402(b) (1981), one of several federal venue statutes, which provides:
Any civil action on a tort claim against the United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of this title [the provision conferring jurisdiction on federal courts] may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.
Federal courts have consistently held that this language limits venue but not jurisdiction of the federal district court. See, e.g., Upchurch v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 736 F.2d 439, 440 (8th Cir.1984); ...
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