Hyde v. Hyde
| Decision Date | 13 February 1978 |
| Citation | 562 S.W.2d 194 |
| Parties | Joseph R. HYDE, III, Appellant, v. Eleanor Lentz HYDE, Appellee, W. K. West, Jr., Divorce Referee, of Shelby County, Tennessee, Appellant. 562 S.W.2d 194 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Lucius E. Burch, Jr., Burch, Porter & Johnson, Memphis, for plaintiff.
W. K. West, Jr., Memphis, Divorce Referee of Shelby County, Tenn., for appellant.
Appellant, Divorce Referee of Shelby County, appeals from a declaratory judgment validating, "for reasons of equity and comity", a divorce awarded by a court in the Dominican Republic.
On November 21, 1974, Eleanor Lentz Hyde was awarded a decree of divorce by the Court of First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. She appeared in person and was represented by an attorney. Joseph R. Hyde, III, was not personally present but was represented by his attorney in fact, by virtue of a power of attorney filed with the Court. These appearances fully satisfied the laws of the Dominican Republic with respect to jurisdiction of divorce actions. The divorce was granted on the ground of incompatibility of temperaments, making life together unbearable. Both parties to the marriage are residents of Memphis, and were residents of Memphis at the time of the divorce.
Joseph Hyde filed this suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County on November 4, 1976, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Dominican Republic decree was valid, or in the alternative, seeking a divorce. He alleged that prior to October, 1974, the parties were preparing to file suit against each other in the courts of Shelby County, Tennessee, but they effected an agreement settling their property rights and providing for the support of their minor child; that they were then confronted by the prospect of an extensive delay before a divorce could be obtained due to the backlog of divorce cases in Shelby County. Being desirous of returning to the status of unmarried people, after an investigation, both parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court and obtained a no fault divorce, believed in good faith to be valid.
Eleanor Lentz Hyde answered, admitting those allegations and insisting that comity be granted and the foreign decree, but in the alternative, also counterclaiming for divorce. Thus, in the Tennessee courts, both parties assert the validity of the foreign decree, neither raises any question as to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court over the parties or the subject matter for the purpose of the 1974 proceeding, and they continue to assert that each is bound by the 1974 property settlement agreement. The Divorce Referee appeared in the action to contest the validity of the Dominican Republic decree. The Chancellor granted summary judgment for plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action, and the Divorce Referee perfected a direct appeal to this Court.
Because the decree for which recognition is sought is that of a foreign nation, the sole question here is whether Tennessee will grant comity to the divorce. We have not found any case in which Tennessee courts have considered the question of what effect, should be given a judicial decree from a foreign nation, but the courts of this state have recognized the doctrine of comity in cases where the rights of parties under the laws of other states were at issue, and recognition was not obligatory under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127 (1953); Phillips v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 183 Tenn. 266, 191 S.W.2d 554 (1946); Finley v. Brown, 122 Tenn. 316, 123 S.W. 359 (1909); Lewis v. Woodfolk, 61 Tenn. 25 (1872); Lisenbee v. Holt, 33 Tenn. 42 (1853).
The rule of comity to be gleaned from these cases is that, where the law of another jurisdiction is applicable, Tennessee will enforce the substantive rights which litigants have under the laws of the other jurisdiction if such rights are not contrary to the policy of Tennessee. Id.
Resting as it does on the non-obligatory discretion of the forum, comity defies both precise definition and uniform rules of practice. The oft-cited case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895), which contains a thorough examination of the basic principles of comity, defines it as follows:
" 'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
(S)peaking of the difficulty of applying the positive rules laid down by the Continental jurists, . . . (Mr. Justice Story) says that 'there is indeed, great truth' in these remarks of Mr. Justice Porter, speaking for the supreme court of Louisiana: " (citation omitted). 159 U.S. at 163-165, 16 S.Ct. at 143, 40 L.Ed. at 108-09.
Thus, comity is a discretionary doctrine and may be granted or withheld depending on the particular facts, laws and policies present in an individual case.
In this case, the public policy of this state as reflected by its grounds and jurisdictional requirements for divorce are the issues to be examined in determining the propriety of granting comity.
The majority of states do not grant comity to divorces rendered in foreign jurisdictions where neither spouse was actually domiciled, even where both parties voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the rendering court. See Annotation, 13 A.L.R.3d 1419 (1967).
New York, on the other hand, recognizes foreign divorce decrees valid under the laws of the nation rendering them where the plaintiff spouse appeared personally and the defendant spouse voluntarily appeared through attorney, even though neither party was domiciled therein the Anglo-American legal sense, and the grounds on which the foreign divorce was granted were not recognized in New York. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1965). Granting comity in the instant case will not require that we go as far from the majority rule as the New York courts have gone.
The public policy of a state is to be found in its constitution, its statutes, and the decisions of its courts. Primarily,...
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