Hylaman v. Midland Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 16 February 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,151 - (262) |
| Parties | IDA M. HYLAMAN v. MIDLAND INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Stearns county to recover $5,500 under a policy insuring Roy W. Hylaman against death. The case was tried before Roeser, J., who when plaintiff rested denied defendant's motion for a dismissal and at the close of the testimony its motion for a directed verdict, and a jury which returned a verdict for $5,703.50. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Accident insurance -- verdict sustained by evidence.
1. The conclusions of the jury, necessarily included in the verdict returned, that the assured in an accident insurance policy met death in a collision with the lumber on a wagon being hauled by a team while he was passing it on a motorcycle, is supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence.
Evidence -- testimony of medical expert.
2. Whether a person could maintain an upright or rigid position for any appreciable time, after receiving such wounds as were shown to have been received by the assured, was a proper subject for the opinion of a medical expert, and the question and answer, as finally obtained, were not objectionable.
Opinion evidence -- discretion of court.
3. Whether considered as an expert or nonexpert, the opinion given by the witness, a doctor, as to the manner in which the wounds he had examined and treated were produced, was not improperly received; the admission of such evidence being largely within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Benton & Morley and Paul Ahles, for appellant.
J. D Sullivan, for respondent.
Plaintiff the beneficiary in an accident insurance policy, recovered for the death of the insured. Defendant appeals from the order denying its blended motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
The first contention is that the evidence does not sustain the verdict, and that no evidence can be produced which would support a recovery such as plaintiff demanded and received. For an annual premium of ten dollars, the company, whose contracts of insurance defendant has now assumed, agreed to pay plaintiff $5,500, in case her son, Roy W. Hylaman, met accidental death while riding upon a bicycle propelled by gasolene and not being used for any business purpose, and in consequence of a collision with any conveyance except another motorcycle. To warrant a recovery plaintiff must therefore prove that the death of the assured resulted in consequence of a collision with another conveyance not a motorcycle while he himself was riding a bicycle propelled by gasolene and not for business purposes. The evidence leaves no room for dispute as to these facts:
Roy W. Hylaman lived at Sauk Center several blocks north of Sauk river and worked as a clerk in a store a few blocks south of the river.
A steel bridge spans the stream. On his motorcycle he started for dinner shortly after 12 o'clock on the day in question. As he approached the bridge a team hauling a load of lumber, going north, was just about entering thereon. The teamster saw Roy coming up behind, and turned the team to the right to give him plenty of room to pass. Roy turned to the left, and in passing the loaded wagon the motorcycle was observed to be not controlled by him, the wheels struck a cement stone close to the foot walk on the left of the roadway and the machine wobbled on until it passed the team some 30 or 40 feet when Roy was seen to fall off, striking on his left side or shoulder. He was picked up unconscious, and died within 40 hours thereafter without having regained consciousness.
The only external wounds were slight contusions on his left arm and shoulder, a scratch on the left side of the face, and a cut over his left eye extending over the bridge of the nose crushing it.
The medical testimony showed that death resulted from a fracture at the base of the skull. There were but two eye witnesses to the accident, Mr. Deyoe, the driver of the team, called by defendant, and Mr. Holman, called by plaintiff, who was some 75 feet away, west of the road and slightly to the south of the bridge. It is readily seen that the vital fact for plaintiff to prove was that Roy actually collided with the conveyance driven by Deyoe and by reason thereof death resulted.
The contention of defendant, urged with great force and earnestness, is that the evidence did not permit the jury to arrive at the conclusion that there was a collision with the conveyance mentioned. Neither of the two witnesses saw Roy come in contact with any object which might have caused the wound which crushed the bridge of the nose or made the cut over the left eye, unless this occurred when he fell from the motorcycle. Both are clear that his body did not strike against any part of the bridge railing or stanchions. Mr. Deyoe states that he did not come within 5 or 6 feet of the wagon. As stated, the wagon was loaded with siding which projected some 4 feet beyond the tail-board.
The theory of plaintiff is that, as Deyoe turned to the right to give Roy more room to pass on the left, the rear of the load swung to the left at the very moment Roy attempted to pass it, so that he collided with the projecting lumber thus causing the wounds on his nose and forehead and fracturing the base of the skull; that the blow so received rendered him incapable of controlling the motorcycle, so that it hit the cement stone on the side; and that the rigidity of the muscles alone, set by the fatal wound, kept him on the machine for the short distance it wobbled on after the injury. The evidence supporting this theory is this: Mr Holman testified that just as the...
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