Hynes v. City of Lakeland

• Decision Date: 04 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-2840,82-2840
• Citation: 451 So.2d 505
• Parties: Michael K. HYNES, Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKELAND, Florida, a Florida municipal corporation, William Bruce Bull, Harold R. MaGee, and Lakeland Flying Service, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 505

451 So.2d 505

Michael K. HYNES, Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKELAND, Florida, a Florida municipal corporation, William Bruce Bull, Harold R. MaGee, and Lakeland Flying Service, Inc., Appellees.

No. 82-2840.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

May 4, 1984.

Rehearing Denied June 6, 1984.

Philip O. Allen of DeVane, Munson & Allen, Lakeland, for appellant.

Mark N. Miller, City Atty., and Ernest M. Jones, Jr. of Jacobs, Valentine, Groseclose, McCarthy & Vining, P.A., Lakeland, for appellees.

RYDER, Judge.

Appellant Michael Hynes, plaintiff below, seeks review of the order granting final summary judgment in favor of appellees William Bull, Harold MaGee, and the City of Lakeland (hereinafter City). We reverse.

On October 21, 1975, appellant became the possessor of the leasehold interest in the property situated directly beneath hangar # 3 located at Lakeland Municipal Airport and also became the owner of the hangar building itself. Appellant acquired these interests pursuant to an October 21, 1975 purchase and sale agreement (hereinafter Agreement) and companion lease (hereinafter Lease) entered into between himself and Lakeland Flying Services, Inc. (hereinafter LFS), a Florida corporation. ¹ Hynes' leasehold estate was carved out of LFS's larger estate which is situated to the south and east of hangar # 3 and also located between hangar # 3 and the airport taxiway that connects with the other taxiways and runways. Part of LFS's leasehold estate in existence when the Agreement and Lease were executed included property designated in an earlier 1962 lease for use as an aircraft access ramp between its hangar (# 2) and the taxiways. This apparently unpaved access ramp is adjacent to a large portion of the eastern border of hangar # 3 according to the diagram attached to the 1965 lease and incorporated by reference into the October 1975 Lease. ² The City is the owner and operator of the airport and is the original lessor of all property involved in this case.

In the October 1975 Agreement, LFS promised to sell to Hynes the structure known as hangar # 3 and also promised to assign to him the leasehold interest in a 1965 lease (which covered the property underlying hangar # 3), including all addendums and the August 29, 1975 extension relating to that lease. ³ In particular, the Agreement provides in part: "From and after the date of closing, the seller shall have joint use of the ramps, runways, taxiways, and other facilities provided for aircraft and the public at the Lakeland Municipal Airport." Another provision states that it "shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their heirs, successors, assigns, and personal representatives." The companion Lease executed thereafter assigned to Hynes the interest in the 1965 lease along with the addendums and the extension and also incorporated by reference the terms and conditions of these documents. ⁴

In October 1980, appellant filed a multi-count complaint against the City and LFS, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. The underlying basis for the suit concerns appellant's claim that, under the October 1975 Agreement and companion Lease, he and his sub-lessees have either express or implied easements over property leased by LFS to move aircraft between hangar # 3 and the public taxiways and to move motor vehicles between hangar # 3 and the public road leading to the airport. After some discovery had occurred, appellant in April of 1982, filed a separate complaint against Bull and MaGee for damages, alleging each individual had intentionally interfered with his advantageous business relationships and each had conspired with the City and the corporation to intentionally interfere with the same business relationships. Bull and MaGee purchased LFS' corporate stock, assets, interests, and obligations in April 1977.

Subsequently, the case was removed to federal court by LFS and the City; however, the federal court remanded the matter back to state court after dismissing the one count of the complaint which alleged a federal cause of action. A second amended complaint was filed in state court against LFS and the City. This amended complaint contained the same counts and claims as the initial complaint plus an additional count. ⁵

In Count I, appellant essentially alleged that LFS breached the October 1975 Agreement and companion Lease with him by refusing, beginning in the summer of 1977, to allow him or his sub-lessee at the time "the right of ingress or egress" for both aircraft and motor vehicles across express easements provided for by these agreements which adopted the terms and conditions of the original 1965 lease. In Count II, appellant alternatively sought, in accordance with section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (1979), to establish implied easements by "way of necessity" over property leased to LFS in order that he be able to beneficially use the leasehold estate (hangar # 3) conveyed to him by LFS. With respect to Count III, appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief to define and protect his express easements or the alternative "ways of necessity." He also requested that the trial court enjoin both LFS and the City from interferring with his right of access between hangar # 3 and the airport taxiways and runways and between hangar # 3 and the public road adjoining the airport.

In Count V, appellant sought damages against the City and claimed it breached the terms of the 1965 original lease and extension, the rights of which had been assigned to him by the October 1975 Agreement and Lease. In particular, appellant alleged the City breached the agreements by leasing to LFS in July of 1980 property over which he had either express or implied easements. Finally, as for Counts VI and VII, appellant sought damages against LFS and the City for intentional interference with his advantageous business relationships and for conspiracy to intentionally interfere with those same relationships.

Sometime between the filing of the second amended complaint and June 23, 1982, LFS apparently filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy and was no longer subjected to the state proceedings. ⁶ On July 28, 1982, an amended complaint for damages was filed against Bull and MaGee. This complaint alleged that Bull and MaGee intentionally interfered with his advantageous business relationships by physically obstructing access to his leasehold; threatening to physically obstruct his access; and informing third persons that neither he nor his assignees have rights of access to hangar # 3 when in fact they were aware that the rights inuring from the 1965 lease and extension had been assigned to him.

After discovery was completed, the trial court, on September 27, 1982, set a trial date of November 27, 1982. However, on November 16, appellees Bull and MaGee moved for summary judgment based upon the pleadings, depositions, exhibits filed, and Bull's affidavit. Between November 18 and December 10, the parties discussed the contents of a pretrial stipulation. On December 10, a stipulation was filed, although that stipulation did not include any agreed-upon facts.

Thereafter, and prior to entry of the trial court's order granting the motion for summary judgment, the parties orally stipulated that the court and not a jury would determine whether either express or implied easements existed in appellant's favor. Although that stipulation was not recorded, both parties have indicated to us that the stipulation did not address the question of "when the trial court could rule upon the easement questions." Nevertheless, on December 10, after the summary judgment hearing (which was also unrecorded), the trial court entered an "Order for Final Summary Judgment." ⁷ In that order, the court made the following pertinent findings:

2. The parties stipulated before the Court that the determination of whether the Plaintiff had an express or implied easement would be for the Court to decide and would not be submitted to a jury.

3. The plaintiff relies upon the language contained at Paragraph 2 of an October 21, 1975 Agreement for Sale and Purchase and the language contained in a document, dated October 15, 1975, that purports to be a corporate resolution as the source of his entitlement to an express easement. Neither the contract nor the purported resolution clearly expresses the intention of the parties to create an express easement as further evidenced by the testimony of Robert C. Branson, Arthur Jones and Stanley Pivariski, parties to the October 21, 1975 transfer, neither do either of the documents clearly define the scope and extent of the alleged easement, and neither were executed with the formalities required for the grant of an easement.

4. As a matter of law, from the facts as established by the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, there is no implied easement, as defined by 704.01(1), Florida Statutes, available to the plaintiff over lands leased to the defendant, LAKELAND FLYING SERVICE, INC., inasmuch as 704.01(1), Florida Statutes, does not provide for aircraft access to and from public runways.

On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in determining the easement questions at the summary judgment stage and in ruling that (1) the 1975 purchase and sale agreement and related documents do not create any express easements and (2) section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981), does not provide for a "way of necessity" for aircraft access to and from public taxiways and runways.

We hold the trial court first committed error in deciding the easement issues prior to the time appellant had an opportunity to present his case-in-chief before the court. The oral stipulation, according to both parties and the language of the trial court's order, simply stated the trial court and not a jury would determine whether express or implied easements existed in appellant's favor. The stipulation...