Hynes v. Pullman Co. (In re State Indus. Comm'n)

• Decision Date: 30 April 1918
• Citation: 223 N.Y. 342,119 N.E. 706
• Parties: HYNES v. PULLMAN CO. In re STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

223 N.Y. 342

119 N.E. 706

HYNES

v.PULLMAN CO.

In re STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 30, 1918.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Proceeding by Dennis E. Hynes for workmen's compensation, opposed by the Pullman Company, employer. From an order of the Appellate Division (166 N. Y. Supp. 1099), unanimously affirming an award of the State Industrial Commission in favor of claimant, the employer appeals. Reversed and claim dismissed.

Pound and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting.John Godfrey Saxe, of New York City, for appellant.

Merton E. Lewis, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondent.

ANDREWS, J.

On May 5, 1916, Dennis E. Hynes wounded his finger with a tack while engaged as a car cleaner. He continued his work until May 11. By that time his finger and arm had become infected, but he reported to his employer in good faith that he had rheumatism. He later underwent several operations. He did not give written notice of the accident until July 28th. Under these circumstances the commission finds that the employer was not prejudiced by the failure to give notice ‘for the reason that there was no one present when the accident occurred, and therefore the employer could obtain no affirmance nor denial of the fact of the accident, and for the further reason that as soon as evidence of infection appeared, Hynes was under the care and attention of a duly authorized medical practitioner.’

[1][2] This court has already said that the written notice required by section 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) is not a mere formality to be dispensed with as a matter of course. The act is definite as to the powers of the commission. It may make no award in the absence of the notice unless for some reason it could not have been given, or unless the employer has not been prejudiced by the failure to give it. The burden rests upon the claimant who has been guilty of the default to show the facts and secure a finding that entitles him to an award. Matter of Bloomfield, 119 N. E. 705.

Where, as here, the notice might have been given and is not, the ultimate fact upon which the award must rest is that the employer is not prejudiced. If such a general finding, supported by any evidence, is made, doubtless all the appellate courts are bound by it. The commission has a large and undefined discretion. This the Legislature intended to confer upon it. We may not assume that it will abuse its power. Unless it is honestly satisfied, after weighing all the probabilities, that no prejudice has been suffered, its duty will be to uphold the statutory bar.

[4][5][6] If such a finding is made and is unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, the question as to whether it is supported by any evidence is not before this court. But no such finding has been made in the case before us. The facts are given upon which the ultimate conclusion is made to rest. Whether these facts support the conclusion is a question of law. We do not think that they do. For more than two months the employer was not warned of the alleged accident or its alleged results. For that time he was deprived of the opportunity of investigating the claimant's story and of determining for himself the sequence of events, and whether the septicaemia from which the claimant suffered did, in truth, result from the scratch. The logic of the commission seems to be as follows: Because the claimant tells the truth as to his accident; because no one was present to...