Hypolite v. Carleson

• Decision Date: 30 October 1975
• Citation: 125 Cal.Rptr. 221,52 Cal.App.3d 566
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Christina HYPOLITE, a minor, by Bertha Hypolite, her guardian, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Robert B. CARLESON, Director, Department of Social Welfare, State of California, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 36121.

Page 221

125 Cal.Rptr. 221

52 Cal.App.3d 566

Christina HYPOLITE, a minor, by Bertha Hypolite, her guardian, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Robert B. CARLESON, Director, Department of Social Welfare, State of California, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 36121.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Oct. 30, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 1975.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Craig Modlin, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

Robert Chartoff, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, Hayward, Christopher Hamilton, Stanislaus County Legal Assistance, Inc., Modesto, Ralph Santiago Abascal, Marjorie Gelb, David F. Chavkin, J. Kendrick Kresse, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and respondents.

RATTIGAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

One of the two minor respondents commenced this action against appellant Robert Carleson, Director of the State Department of Social Welfare (hereinafter the 'Director' and 'Department,' respectively), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and a peremptory writ of mandate, upon the grounds that the minor had been denied certain public assistance benefits upon the sole basis of a Department regulation which was invalid. After a nonjury trial of the issues joined upon a first amended complaint filed by all of the present respondents, the trial court sustained the regulation and entered a judgment denying respondents any of the relief sought in their first amended complaint. Upon their appeal, Division One of this court held the regulation invalid for lack of conformity with federal statutes and upon constitutional grounds (Hypolite v. Carleson (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 979, 982--987, 108 Cal.Rptr. 751), reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to grant a peremptory writ of mandate. (Id., at p. 987, 108 Cal.Rptr. 751.)

In compliance with the remand, the trial court entered a judgment which ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the Director to set aside his previous administrative decisions which had been reached, adverse to the two minor respondents, upon the basis of the regulation. As the result of proceedings then initiated by respondents, the court entered (1) an 'Order Certifying Class,' which certifies the action to be a class action and identifies the class entitled to relief, and (2) an 'Amended Judgment(,) After Reversal On Appeal(,) Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate.' As amended, the judgment awards the benefits in question to the two minor respondents and other members of the class retroactively from the date the action was commenced, orders a procedure whereby the other members of the class are to be given notice of their entitlement to benefits and their claims therefor are to be processed, and further awards attorneys' fees to counsel for respondents.

On the present appeal, which the Director has taken from the amended judgment, he challenges the post-remand class-action certification in various respects, the retroactive award of benefits in all respects, and the award of attorneys' fees. The questions presented require that we retrace the foregoing summary in further detail, as follows:

Respondent Christina Hypolite, a minor acting through respondent Bertha Hypolite as her guardian, commenced the action on May 15, 1972, against the Director as an individual and in his official capacity. The other respondents joined her as plaintiffs in the aforementioned first amended complaint, which was filed in July, 1972. ¹ In that pleading, all of the respondents 'sought to challenge the exclusion by defendants of certain children from participating in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children program (hereinafter 'AFDC') provided for in 42 United States Code sections 601--610, and Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11200--11488.' ²

Specifically, respondents challenged the validity of the Department's Eligibility and Assistance Standards Regulation 41--450.12 (hereinafter 'the regulation,' or 'EAS § 41--450.12'). The regulation had been adopted by appellant pursuant to his authority, as Director of the Department, to formulate regulations in aid of administering AFDC. (§ 10553, subds. (b) and (d).) It was adopted by way of implementing section 11250, which, as pertinent to the present case, provided: 'Aid, services, or both, shall be granted under the provisions of this chapter, and subject to the regulations of the department, to families with related children under the age of 18 years, except as provided in Section 11253, in need thereof because they have been deprived of parental support or care due to: . . . (b) The divorce, separation or desertion of a parent or parents and resultant Continued absence of a parent from the home for these or other reasons . . ..' (Emphasis added.)

The context of the regulation (i.e., the full body of EAS § 41--450) defined the term 'continued absence' as used in section 11250, subdivision (b). It provided that 'continued absence' existed 'when the natural parent is physically absent from the home' of a child and when '(b)oth parents are physically out of the home and their whereabouts are not known.' The regulation itself, however (i.e., § EAS 41--450.12), provided to the contrary where the parents maintained a home together but apart from the child. ³

Among several causes of action separately stated in their first amended complaint, respondents alleged the regulation and as follows: At pertinent times, each of the minor respondents (Christina Hypolite and Michael Jensen) resided in California with a grandparent-guardian (respondents Bertha Hypolite and Rollan Eller, respectively). The parents of each lived together elsewhere. Consequently, each minor had been denied AFDC benefits, on the basis of the regulation, by administrative action taken by the Director. Each was eligible for the benefits except for the effect of the regulation. The grandparent-guardian of each had accordingly challenged the Director's administrative action by requesting 'fair hearings' pursuant to section 10950 et seq. After a hearing in each case, the Director had reached a 'fair hearing decision' adverse to each minor. ⁴

Upon the basis of these and other allegations in their first amended complaint, and in the prayer thereof, respondents sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the regulation was invalid; an injunction restraining the Director from enforcing it; a peremptory writ of mandate which, as prayed, would have required him to pay AFDC benefits, retroactively from June 17, 1968, 'to plaintiffs and all members of their class'; and 'reasonable attorney's fees' and costs.

In addition to the just-quoted reference to a 'class' in its prayer, other passages of respondents' first amended complaint unmistakably indicated that they intended to maintain a class action. ⁵ Despite this fact, they undertook no pretrial proceedings addressed to its certification as such or to the composition of the alleged class. The Director did not challenge its propriety as a class action by demurrer or motion, nor did he raise such challenge in his answer, which he filed in July, 1972. ⁶ Consequently, the cause was tried (also in July, 1972) without the trial court having considered its class-action features in any respect.

The court entered its original judgment in the Director's favor on August 2, 1972, denying all relief sought by respondents in their first amended complaint. The decision by Division One of this court, reversing the judgment and remanding the cause to the trial court with directions to grant a peremptory writ of mandate, was filed on June 18, 1973. (Hypolite v. Carleson, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d 979, 108 Cal.Rptr. 751.) The Director's petition for a hearing by the California Supreme Court was denied on August 16, 1973. (Id., at p. 987, 108 Cal.Rptr. 751.) His petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on February 19, 1974. (Swoap v. Hypolite, 415 U.S. 934, 94 SCt. 1449, 39 L.Ed.2d 492.)

On January 4, 1974, ⁷ having received the remittitur which had meanwhile issued from this court, the trial court entered a 'Judgment(,) After Reversal On Appeal(,) Granting Peremptory Writ Of Mandate.' This judgment vacated the one which had been reversed on appeal, enjoined the Director from enforcing the regulation, ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing him to set aside his administrative decisions adverse to respondents Christina Hypolite and Michael Jensen (see fn. 3, Ante), and provided that the court retained 'jurisdiction over the issues of petitioners'-plaintiffs' (i.e., the present respondents') claim for retroactive class relief, costs and attorney's fees.'

On March 28, respondents noticed a motion for amendments of the January 4 judgment to provide for the payment of (1) AFDC benefits for Christina Hypolite and Michael Jensen retroactively from May 15, 1972 (the date the action was originally commenced by Christina), and (2) attorneys' fees to or for both minors.

On May 8, respondents filed a 'Notice Of Motion For Certification Of Class,' supported by various documents in which they asserted, among other things, that 'with the issue of class retroactivity still outstanding . . . the Court must first determine whether this is a certifiable class action.'

On June 11, after a hearing, the trial court filed a memorandum decision (an 'Opinion Memorandum,' hereinafter quoted) in which it pronounced its determinations favorable to respondents on both motions. On June 14, and applying explicit provisions of the memorandum decision in both instances, the court filed an 'Order Certifying Class' and an 'Amended Judgment(,) After Reversal On Appeal(,) Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate.'

The pertinent text of the 'Order Certifying Class' is...