Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee

• Decision Date: 18 April 2013
• Docket Number: B242002
• Citation: 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 678,215 Cal.App.4th 682
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: HYUNDAI SECURITIES CO. LTD., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. IK CHI LEE, Defendant and Appellant.

215 Cal.App.4th 682

155 Cal.Rptr.3d 678

HYUNDAI SECURITIES CO. LTD., Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.IK CHI LEE, Defendant and Appellant.

B242002

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Filed April 18, 2013

Reversed and remanded.

See 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Enforcement of Judgment, § 464 et seq.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Alan S. Rosenfield, Judge. Reversed and remanded. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC456484)

Kim, Park, Choi & Yi, Tony K. Kim, Daniel Kang, and Michael Schillaci, Culver City, for Defendant and Appellant.

Lim, Ruger & Kim, Los Angeles, Richard M. Ruger, Lisa J. Yang, and George T. Busu for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MOSK, J.

INTRODUCTION

We hold that a proceeding under California's “Uniform Foreign–Country Money Judgment Recognition Act” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1713–1724 (the Act)) ¹, is an action and subject to the requirements applicable to all actions. Because the trial court in this case recognized the foreign-country money judgment upon a petition rather than upon a duly noticed motion for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or trial, we reverse the judgment.

3. As to procedures for other special proceedings, see, e.g., sections 1067 et seq. (writs), sections 1230.010–1268.720 (eminent domain).

The Act is contained in Code of Civil Procedure Part 3—Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature. Section 22 defines an action as “an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.” Section 23 defines a special proceeding as “[e]very other remedy.” (See People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 536, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 328, 123 P.3d 604.) Generally, with respect to special proceedings, the Legislature has set forth specific procedures, but the only procedure specified for recognition of a foreign-country money judgment is that it be raised by filing an action. Thus, whether recognition of a foreign-country money judgment is an action or special proceeding, we believe the Legislature intended the procedures for actions to be applicable to proceedings to obtain such recognition.

Requiring the procedures applicable to actions for recognition of a foreign-country money judgment makes sense. Such actions are comparable to any claim for a money judgment. (See Umstetter, Enforcing Foreign Judgments: In Search of a Treaty to Locate Assets Abroad (2007) 3 S.C.J. of Int'l L. & Bus. 85, 89 [Uniform Foreign Money–Judgments Act “basically codifies the common law”] ); Sung Hwan Co., Ltd. v. Rite Aid Corporation (2006) 7 N.Y.3d 78, 817 N.Y.S.2d 600, 850 N.E.2d 647, 650; Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric, Inc. (2001) 281 A.D.2d 42, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 [“codifies common-law principles applicable to recognition of foreign country judgments”]; but see Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman (D.Mass.1987) 665 F.Supp. 73, 77 [Uniform Foreign Money–Judgments Recognition Act revises and supersedes common law].) Proceedings under the Act may involve disputed issues of fact. For example, if the foreign law cannot be determined, a factual determination may be required. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Judicial Notice, § 29, p.; 136; Estate of Arbulich (1953) 41 Cal.2d 86, 90, 257 P.2d 433 [“how the foreign country has construed and applied ... statutes is a question of fact”]; but see Evid.Code, § 310, subd. (b)); Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Redstar Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 697, 701, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 224. Another issue of fact relevant here may be whether the foreign judgment has been satisfied in whole or in part.

There is nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicating special procedures for recognition, other than specifying that recognition of a foreign-country money judgment must be raised by an action. (See Stats. 2007, ch. 212, p. 2543 [enacting Sen. Bill No. 639 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) ].) The comment to the Uniform Foreign–Country Money Judgments Recognition Act states that section 6 of the Uniform Act—which section is section 1718 in the California statute—“rejects the use of any registration procedure.” (13 (Part II) Uniform Laws Annotated Supp., supra, at p. 33.) The comment points out that the “truncated procedures” used in connection with sister-state judgments are appropriate because “there is a strong presumption of fairness and competence attached to a sister-state judgment that justifies use of a registration procedure.” ( Ibid.) “Unlike the limited grounds for denying full faith and credit to a sister-state judgment, this Act provides a number of grounds upon which recognition of a foreign-country judgment may be denied.... The existence of these grounds for nonrecognition reflects the fact there is less expectation that foreign-country courts will follow procedures comporting with U.S. notions of fundamental fairness and jurisdiction or that those courts will apply laws viewed as substantively tolerable by U.S. standards than there is with regard to sister-state courts.” ( Ibid.) ⁴ The comment further states, “While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment may be raised, it is not intended to create any new procedure not currently existing in the state or to otherwise effect existing state procedural requirements. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought under Section 6 must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to that type of action.” ( Id. at p. 34.) Thus, in this action, state procedures must be followed.⁵

Hyundai asserts that we acquiesced in a truncated or summary proceeding in Societe Civile Success i o n Richard Guino v. Redstar Corp., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th 697, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 224. That case preceded the enactment of the Act, and there is no indication that the issue of the procedure was raised. Moreover, it is not clear what proceedings occurred. There, the defendant brought a “Motion to Challenge Judgment” ( id. at p. 700, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 224). There were “hearings, supplemental submissions, and a motion for reconsideration.” ( Id. at p. 701, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 224.) The only issue was whether the French judgment was final, conclusive, and enforceable, a matter we determined as a matter of law. Thus, in effect, the matter could be resolved on the pleadings.

As the Act requires an action, and does not provide for any procedures other than those procedures applicable to actions, a plaintiff, in order to obtain recognition of a foreign-country money judgment must proceed in accordance with the normal procedures applicable to actions and not by way of a motion or petition to recognize the foreign-country money judgment. The Code of Civil Procedure specifies the procedures for an action. (§§ 190 et seq., 307 et seq.) Section 437c, subdivision (a) states, “Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding ....” (Italics added.) “The summary judgment provision has various detailed requirements, such as a 75–day notice period prior to the hearing (§ 437c, subd. (a)), a separate statement setting forth undisputed facts with citation to the supporting evidence (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1)), and others. The trial court may not employ special procedures that circumvent the procedures required by statute. ( Magana Cathcart McCarthy v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 106, 116, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 109 [“courts are not free to ignore the Legislature's procedural requirements for the convenience of the parties....”]; People v. Silva (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 538, 549, 170 Cal.Rptr. 713 [“Where a statute requires a court to follow a particular procedure, an act beyond those limits is in excess of the court's jurisdiction”]; see also Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 626.)

If Hyundai wishes to have its contentions dealt with summarily, it must do so by way of a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings (§ 438). If it does not succeed in a summary judgment motion or a judgment on the pleadings, the issues will require a trial.

Because we are reversing and remanding the matter on procedural grounds, we do not reach other issues raised, including the...