I.C.R. Co. v. Cash's Administratrix

• Decision Date: 01 November 1927
• Parties: Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Cash's Administratrix.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

221 Ky. 655

Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Cash's Administratrix.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided November 1, 1927.

1. Negligence. — One may allege negligence in general terms and is entitled to show specific acts of negligence under such an allegation.

2. Negligence. — When a party alleges specific acts of negligence, he cannot show general negligence or other specific acts of negligence, but he is confined to the specific negligence alleged.

3. Negligence. — Negligence will never be presumed, but it must be proven either by showing direct acts of negligence or by showing facts from which negligence is inferable.

4. Negligence. — In determining whether negligence has been established by proof of direct acts of negligence or by proof of facts and circumstances rendering negligence inferable, all facts and circumstances established in support of negligence alleged must be considered.

5. Negligence. — "Negligence" is a relative term dependent on the facts and circumstances and it may be defined as a failure or omission to do that which an ordinarily prudent man would do under the same conditions and circumstances, or a failure to abstain from doing that which he would not do.

6. Negligence. — In order for plaintiff to recover for negligence, the evidence must show existence of duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, violation of that duty by defendant, and damage to plaintiff by reason thereof.

7. Negligence. — Person responsible for negligent act is liable to person injured as a result thereof, if the doing of the act would lead an ordinarily prudent person under like conditions and circumstances to anticipate or foresee that the act would result in an injury to some person; but he is not liable, if the ordinary experiences of humanity would not lead an ordinarily prudent person to reasonably anticipate or foresee that injury would result.

8. Negligence. — Where evidence on issue of negligence is equally consistent with existence or nonexistence of negligence or is so unsatisfactory as to require speculation or surmise on part of jury as to how injury occurred, the case is not for the jury, but for the court, which should hold as a matter of law that defendant is not liable.

9. Negligence. — Evidence on issue of obvious danger is sufficient to warrant submission to jury, if reasonable men may differ as to fair inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom.

10. Hospitals. — Evidence held insufficient for jury on issue whether hospital was negligent, on ground that patient, while delirious and not watched, unconsciously left his bed and room on one or more occasions.

11. Hospital. — Mere fact that hospital knew that patient was in delirious condition did not establish that it was negligent in preventing him from jumping out of window.

12. Hospitals. — In action against hospital for death of delirious patient, who jumped from window of room on second floor of hospital, evidence held insufficient to warrant submission to jury on issue whether hospital was negligent in refusing to permit mother of delirious patient to remain in his room with him to protect him from injuring himself.

13. Hospitals. — In action against hospital for death of delirious patient, who jumped from window of room on second floor of hospital, evidence held insufficient to warrant submission to jury on issue whether hospital was negligent in failing to provide competent or sufficient nurses or attendants to care for him or to prevent him from injuring himself; there being at most mere ground for surmise or speculation.

14. Hospitals. — Hospital, sued for death of delirious patient, who escaped from retaining sheet and jumped from window of room on second floor, held not an insurer, but bound only to exercise ordinary care.

15. Hospitals. — In action against hospital for death of delirious patient, who jumped from window of room on second floor of hospital, evidence held insufficient to warrant submission to jury on issue whether hospital used such means as it had at hand to prevent patient's escape.

16. Hospitals. — Hospital might not be held guilty of negligence in leaving window open in room of delirious patient, who escaped from restraining sheet and jumped out of window, if the hospital doctor, who directed that the window be left open, was not negligent in doing so.

17. Hospitals. — In action against hospital for death of delirious patient, who jumped out of window of room on second floor of hospital, evidence held insufficient to warrant submission to jury on issue whether hospital was negligent in leaving the window open.

Appeal from McCracken Circuit Court.

TRABUE, DOOLAN, HELM & HELM, WHEELER & HUGHES and R.V. FLETCHER for appellant.

C.C. GRASSHAM for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE LOGAN.

Reversing.

Robert Cash was an employee of appellant residing in Paducah, Ky. He was stricken with a serious case of pneumonia, and, upon his application, he was admitted for treatment to the hospital at Paducah conducted by the Illinois Central Hospital Department. At the time he was admitted he was seriously ill. He was placed in a private ward and two special nurses were assigned to his case, a day nurse and a night nurse. He received medical attention from the doctors, whose duty it was to give such attention to patients in this hospital. In spite of the attention he received he grew worse. On one occasion, two or three days before his death, he left his bed and went to a toilet on the same floor in the rear of the building. He was admonished about having done this and promised that he would not do it again. He went to the hospital on Tuesday, February 23, 1926, and on Friday, following, the disease had progressed until he became delirious. About 10 o'clock on Friday night he was wildly delirious and left his bed. It required the combined strength of Dr. Buenafa, an interne in the hospital, and several nurses, to return him to his bed. A restraining sheet was then placed on him by the interne and the nurses. This was to prevent his moving about on the bed or from again getting out of the bed. The restraining sheet is made of strong cloth, with holes for his arms and legs, and straps for fastening under the bed, so that the patient may be securely held in place. After the restraining sheet had been placed on him and a sedative administered by a hypodermic injection, he became quiet and apparently slumbered. The special nurse, Miss Roundtree, was left in charge of him, and from time to time the interne and other nurses called at her room and saw the patient apparently sleeping quietly. This condition continued for about an hour when he suddenly aroused, freed himself from the restraining sheet, so frightening his nurse that she screamed, but before others could come to her assistance he leaped over the screen between the window and his bed and immediately jumped through a second story window, which was open at the time, and fell to the pavement below, thereby sustaining serious injuries.

Other nurses hastened to the room and finding him gone they went immediately to him where he was lying on the pavement under the window. He was picked up and carried into the waiting room and there examined by the doctors before he was returned to his room. The restraining sheet was again placed on him and the next morning an hour or more prior to his death he succeeded in partially releasing himself from the sheet. He died on the morning of Saturday, February 27, 1926. He was 26 years of age and a fireman for appellant. He was a man of great strength and his weight is placed by different witnesses at from 180 pounds to 200 pounds.

His wife, Georgia Cash, was appointed administratrix of his estate, and she instituted this suit against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, Virgil Powell and Will T. Dowdall. She alleged in her petition that the appellant owned and operated a hospital in Paducah, Ky., for compensation and profit to itself, and that Virgil Powell and W.T. Dowdall were physicians and surgeons in charge of, managing, controlling, and directing the maintenance and operation of the hospital. She alleged that Robert Cash at the time of his death was entitled to the care and attention while in the hospital necessary to protect him from injury to himself. It is denied by appellant that it operates the hospital, and it is alleged that the hospital is operated by the Illinois Central Hospital Department, a separate organization, and that the hospital is purely a charitable institution.

For the present we will lay these questions to one side and first ascertain whether there is liability, assuming that appellant operates and controls the hospital and that it is not a charitable institution. If appellant is not responsible, although it might be established that the hospital is not a purely charitable institution, and although it might be established that appellant owns, operates, and controls the hospital, it will not be necessary for us to determine these questions.

The negligence alleged in the petition will be considered carefully as the case has been fully developed on all points by the able counsel representing both sides. Nothing seems to have been overlooked. The acts of negligence set out in the petition may be summarized as follows:

(1) That Robert Cash "was critically and seriously ill, and, while there, became delirious, and, when not watched and cared for by attendants, would leave his bed and unconsciously leave the room, and on one or more occasions prior to the time of his death, of which the defendants had knowledge, had done so. Defendants each and all knew of her decedent's delirious and probable violent manner and condition prior to his fall and thereat."

(2) That the hospital authorities "had been importuned to allow the relatives of decedent to stay with and aid in the care and attention necessary to protect him from injury to himself, but each and all of the three defendants refused...