I.D., In Interest of

• Decision Date: 29 November 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 4-89-0885,4-89-0915,s. 4-89-0885
• Citation: 151 Ill.Dec. 94,205 Ill.App.3d 543,563 N.E.2d 1200
• Parties: , 151 Ill.Dec. 94, 1 NDLR P 159 In the Interest of I.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee v. Rosalee Dorsey, Respondent-Appellant). In the Interest of I.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jonathon Carter, Respondent-Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1200

563 N.E.2d 1200

205 Ill.App.3d 543, 151 Ill.Dec. 94,

1 NDLR P 159

In the Interest of I.D., a Minor (The People of the State of

Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee v. Rosalee Dorsey,

Respondent-Appellant).

In the Interest of I.D., a Minor (The People of the State of

Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jonathon Carter,

Respondent-Appellant).

Nos. 4-89-0885, 4-89-0915.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Nov. 29, 1990.

Lynne R. Feldman, Kirtley-Pavia-Marsh, Urbana, for respondents-appellants.

Thomas J. Difanis, State's Atty., Urbana, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Timothy J. Londrigan, Staff Atty., for petitioner-appellee.

Michael Q. Jones, Urbana, guardian Ad litem.

Justice LUND delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 3, 1989, the circuit court of Champaign County entered an order finding the respondent mother, Rosalee Dorsey, and respondent father, Jonathon Carter, to be unfit parents as defined by section 1 of the Adoption Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 1501.) On November 6, 1989, following a dispositional hearing, the court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both respondents and appointing a guardian for I.D. with the authority to consent to her adoption. These appeals followed.

On July 31, 1987, a petition was filed pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 37, par. 801-1 et seq.), alleging that I.D., born March 16, 1985, was an abused minor. After the adjudicatory hearing, the court specifically found that respondent father had sexually abused two older girls at the residence while I.D. was in the residence, and that this conduct created a dangerous environment. The court also found that respondent mother had been advised of this abuse by the victims but, due to her mental limitations, she was unable to deal with and respond to the situation. Thus, she would be unable to protect I.D. if necessary. The court also observed the evidence established that I.D. was greatly delayed in expressive verbalization, and it was the expert's opinion that the environment I.D. lived in had caused much of the delay. Accordingly, the court found I.D. was abused in that the environment she lived in with respondents was injurious to her welfare. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 37, par. 802-3(1)(b).) The court ordered I.D. removed from the home and ordered a long list of remedial measures for the parents, including a course of counseling as recommended by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

On June 25, 1989, a petition seeking termination of respondents' parental rights was filed. In regard to the mother, it was alleged that she is unfit in that she is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to a mental impairment, and that there is sufficient justification to believe that such inability to discharge parental responsibilities shall extend beyond a reasonable time. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(p).) The petition alleged that the father was unfit in that he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the minor from him, within 12 months after the adjudication of abuse; and, alternatively, that he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of that minor within 12 months after the adjudication of abuse. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(m).

The hearing on this petition was conducted on October 3, 1989. Dr. Ronald Matthew, a clinical psychologist and director of the Moultrie County Counseling Center, testified that he conducted an assessment of respondent mother in 1987, which showed she is in the mild-retardation range, with an IQ of 53. This is comparable to a mental age of five or six years old. He believed she would have a difficult time managing herself without supervision. In regard to being a parent, it was his opinion that she would be quite limited, and would be subject to poor judgment and deficiencies in being able to communicate. He was especially concerned with emergency situations or situations other than routine tasks. He believes she could be trained to handle the simple routine matters, but that she is incapable of addressing changing circumstances and that some high-risk situations might occur.

He has reviewed subsequent reports on the mother, and he conducted another interview with her in June 1989. It was his opinion that her intellectual functioning has remained quite static during that time. Further, he believed that there is not a very good prospect for improved functioning with her parenting skills in the future.

Cheryl Hutton, case coordinator for the Developmental Services Center, testified that respondent mother has been receiving services with them since 1988. She currently works 26 hours per week in the workshop. She lives in one of the agency's apartments and receives services from their program staff. They teach her domestic things such as cooking, cleaning, and monitoring of her money. She is also involved in educational programs and has recently learned to tell time. She now gets herself up, makes lunch, catches the bus, and gets to work on time. It is their goal that she eventually learn to live independently, although they will continue to offer support services for as long as they are needed. They are hopeful respondent will be able to move out without so much support by August 1990.

Cassandra Woolfolk is a therapist at the Champaign County Mental Health Center. She testified she met with respondent father and the DCFS caseworker on February 15, 1989, to set up a counseling program. Since there was a waiting list, an appointment could not be made immediately. A letter was sent to him advising him of his appointment time. She did not hear from him again.

Larry Brannon is the counselor respondent father was to meet. The original appointment was for March 20, 1989. Respondent failed to call to cancel the appointment or to appear. Brannon had no contact from that date until August 7, 1989, at which time respondent called to set up a meeting. The appointment was scheduled for August 14, 1989. Respondent failed to call or cancel. Respondent called later seeking an appointment, but Brannon was on vacation. Both Brannon and Woolfolk were aware that respondent had difficulty reading, but respondent had advised there was someone who would read the mail to him.

Sharyne Wilson-Pendleton is the DCFS worker who has been involved with this case the entire time. She stated the initial client-service plan developed on July 30, 1987, for respondent father included a requirement that he participate in counseling. At that time, he was also supplied with the address and phone number of the Champaign County Mental Health Center. On January 22, 1988, a review meeting was held, and he was again admonished as to the counseling requirement. At the June 1988 and January 1989 reviews, this goal was again emphasized. In November 1988, respondent father was granted immunity from any prosecution based on any comments made during his counseling, to encourage him to comply. She also met monthly with respondent, at which time she further advised him of the need to begin his counseling. He did not attend any counseling.

In January 1989, he told her that he had been too busy to attend. Wilson-Pendleton then telephoned the mental health center for him to find out when Woolfolk would be available. This information and the phone number for the mental health center were given to respondent. In February 1989, he told her he had not gone to counseling due to conflicts. The final case review was on July 26, 1989. At that point, respondent indicated that he had attempted to call Woolfolk, but that he was too busy to attend counseling. Wilson-Pendleton then dialed the phone for the mental health center so that respondent could talk with Brannon. However, Brannon was not in.

Wilson-Pendleton testified that respondent mother was cooperative in complying with the services supplied to her. However, it was Wilson-Pendleton's opinion, due to respondent mother's limited functioning ability, that she is unable to care independently for I.D. She observed there is no support from family members who could assist her in day-to-day care.

The court, after hearing arguments, concluded the burden had been met and found both parents unfit for the reasons alleged. A dispositional hearing was held on November 6, 1989. At that time, the court terminated the parental rights of both parents and appointed a guardian for I.D. with authority to consent to an adoption. Both the mother (No. 4-89-0885) and the father (No. 4-89-0915) appealed, and the appeals have been consolidated.

Respondents' first argument is that the statutory provision under which the mother was found unfit is unconstitutional. Section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act provides that a parent is unfit if there is an "inability to discharge parental responsibilities supported by competent evidence from a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist of mental impairment, mental illness or mental retardation * * * or developmental disability * * * and there is sufficient justification to believe that such inability to discharge parental responsibilities shall extend beyond a reasonable time period." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(p).) Respondents simply assert, without much citation or argument, that this provision is violative of the due-process and equal-protection provisions of the constitution.

Our supreme court has frequently emphasized that there is a strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional. (People v. Roos (1987), 118 Ill.2d 203, 209, 113 Ill.Dec. 81, 84, 514 N.E.2d 993, 996; People v. Greene (1983), 96 Ill.2d 334, 338, 70 Ill.Dec. 856, 858, 450 N.E.2d 329, 331.) Accordingly, the one who asserts otherwise has the burden of clearly establishing the constitutional...