In re RC
Decision Date | 02 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 89018., No. 88891 |
Citation | 253 Ill.Dec. 699,745 N.E.2d 1233,195 Ill.2d 291 |
Parties | In re R.C., a Minor (R.W. et al., Appellants, v. D.C., Appellee). |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Karen B. Ksander, Chicago, for appellants R.W. and C.W.
Edward O'Connell, Chicago, for appellant guardian ad litem.
Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for intervenor-appellant James E. Ryan, Attorney General.
Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Suzanne A. Isaacson, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.
Renee Goldfarb, Teresa Maganzini and Nancy G. Kisicki, Assistant State's Attorneys, Chicago, for amicus curiae Richard A. Devine, Cook County State's Attorney.
In this direct appeal, we are asked to review the circuit court's determination that section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 1998)) is unconstitutional. We find the statute constitutional, and accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On the same day that R.W. and C.W. filed their petition, the trial court entered an interim order terminating the father's parental rights and awarding temporary custody to the foster parents until further order. The case encountered numerous procedural delays, including changes of counsel, stays, and an interlocutory appeal. In August 1998, counsel for D.C. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that section 1(D)(p) was unconstitutional and was preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994)). In January 2000 the circuit court entered an order rejecting D.C.'s contention regarding the ADA but finding section 1(D)(p) unconstitutional on its face. The court found that the provision was "facially vague and violates due process[,] facially violates substantive due process[,] facially violates procedural due process[,] and facially violates equal protection."
Petitioners and R.C., through her guardian ad litem, filed a notice of appeal. The circuit court allowed the Illinois Attorney General to intervene in the case, and the Attorney General filed a separate notice of appeal. We have consolidated the appeals, which lie directly to this court because the circuit court declared an Illinois statute invalid. 134 Ill.2d R. 302(a)(1). Additionally, we permitted the Cook County State's Attorney to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioners.
All statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill.2d 341, 351, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 351, 240 Ill. Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191. As the issue is one of law, we review de novo any decision finding a statute unconstitutional. People v. Jung, 192 Ill.2d 1, 248 Ill.Dec. 258, 733 N.E.2d 1256 (2000); People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill.2d 117, 234 Ill.Dec. 389, 703 N.E.2d 1 (1998). It is our duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity if we can reasonably do so. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill.2d 153, 163, 229 Ill.Dec. 533, 692 N.E.2d 306 (1998).
Initially, we note that our appellate court has consistently upheld section 1(D)(p) against these constitutional challenges. See In re B.S., 317 Ill.App.3d 650, 663-64, 251 Ill.Dec. 323, 740 N.E.2d 404 (2000) ( ); In re J.S., 213 Ill.App.3d 126, 156 Ill.Dec. 723, 571 N.E.2d 507 (1991) (statute not vague); In re I.D., 205 Ill.App.3d 543, 548-50, 151 Ill.Dec. 94, 563 N.E.2d 1200 (1990) ( ). No panel of the appellate court has ruled to the contrary. The circuit court noted J.S. and I.D. in its memorandum order but refused to follow this authority. As we have repeatedly held, this is error. "It is the absolute duty of the circuit court to follow the decisions of the appellate court." In re A.A., 181 Ill.2d 32, 36, 228 Ill.Dec. 905, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998); see also People v. Harris, 123 Ill.2d 113, 128, 122 Ill. Dec. 76, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988) (). If a circuit court "entertains genuine doubt about the continued vitality of a reviewing court decision," the proper manner in which to proceed in a complex or protracted case is to rule in accordance with existing law and to enter a Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding or certify the question for interlocutory appeal under Rule 308 (134 Ill.2d R. 308). Because of our system of precedent the circuit court is not, however, free to disregard binding authority. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill.2d 533, 539-40, 178 Ill.Dec. 745, 605 N.E.2d 539 (1992).
However, we note that the decisions in B.S. and I.D. were based on the premise that the appropriate standard of scrutiny for evaluating due process and equal protection challenges to section 1(D)(p) was the "rational basis" test. B.S., 317 Ill. App.3d at 663, 251 Ill.Dec. 323, 740 N.E.2d 404; I.D., 205 Ill.App.3d at 549, 151 Ill. Dec. 94, 563 N.E.2d 1200. The decision in J.S. merely quoted the analysis of the I.D. court. See J.S., 213 Ill.App.3d at 131, 156 Ill.Dec. 723, 571 N.E.2d 507. As we shall later discuss, the fundamental nature of the rights inherent in the parent-child relationship compel the conclusion that the statute must instead withstand strict constitutional scrutiny. This matter is deserving of clarification, and accordingly we shall review the circuit court's decision, addressing in turn each of the constitutional infirmities D.C. raises.
First, D.C. contends that section 1(D)(p) is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to define the term "parental responsibilities." A vagueness challenge is actually a contention that the statute violates the due process clause, because due process requires that a statute "`give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.'" Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill.2d 434, 442, 233 Ill.Dec. 782,701 N.E.2d 1056 (1998), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972). A legislative act which is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that the courts are unable, by accepted rules of construction, to determine with any reasonable...
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