I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park South Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1963
• Citation: 189 N.E.2d 812,12 N.Y.2d 329,239 N.Y.S.2d 547
• Parties: , 189 N.E.2d 812 I. H. P. CORP., Respondent-Appellant, v. 210 CENTRAL PARK SOUTH CORP. et al., Appellants-Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 547

239 N.Y.S.2d 547

12 N.Y.2d 329, 189 N.E.2d 812

I. H. P. CORP., Respondent-Appellant, v. 210 CENTRAL PARK SOUTH CORP. et al., Appellants-Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 28, 1963.

Copal Mintz, New York City, for respondent-appellant.

Sylvan D. Freeman, Brooklyn, for appellants-respondents.

BURKE, Judge.

The principal law question on these cross appeals is whether the Supreme Court committed reversible error in awarding exemplary damages as incidental to injunctive relief.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged a 'plain and concise statement of the material facts' (Civ.Prac.Act, § 241) and '(a) demand of the judgment to which (it) suppos(ed) (itself) entitled' (Civ.Prac.Act, § 255). The facts alleged were that plaintiff was the lessee in possession of the street level floor in the building of one of the defendants; that all of the defendants caused the premises to be broken into at night on two occasions during which certain damage was done to the leasehold; that each time barriers were placed on the means of access to bar plaintiff from the premises, all with the purpose of harassing plaintiff into surrendering its valuable lease; that similar acts will occur in the future unless restrained by the court. The relief requested was an injunction and treble damages. The note of issue repeated the request for injunction, and '$5,000 plus exemplary damages besides injunction'.

Defendants challenge the propriety of the award, not as a matter of the law of damages but rather on the procedural ground that 'the function of a court of equity goes no further than to award compensatory damages as incidental to injunctive relief: it may not assess exemplary damages.' Defendants' position, aside from the right to a jury trial, which we think is waived here, is based on an erroneous concept of the court system of this State. We have one court of general jurisdiction which administers all of New York law, be that law of legal or equitable origin. Therefore, defendants are mistaken when they suggest that a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York cannot apply a particular principle of New York law to a case before him for decision where that principle is properly applicable to the facts as determined. The court in Dunkel v. McDonald (272 App.Div. 267, 70 N.Y.S.2d 653, affd. on other issues, 298 N.Y. 586, 81 N.E.2d 323), which the Appellate Division overruled in reaching its conclusion in this case, mistook the issue in stating that 'The court has no power in an action in equity to award exemplary or punitive damages. * * * The function of a court of equity goes no further than to award as incidental to other relief, or in lieu thereof, compensatory damages; it may not assess exemplary damages' (272 App.Div., p. 272, 70 N.Y.S.2d, p. 658). This, as we have said, presupposes a court intrinsically limited to granting remedies solely equitable in historical origin. There is no such court in this State.

No amount of authority in other State should persuade us that Judge Cardozo was wrong when he said in Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. Andersen & Co. (239 N.Y. 285, 294, 146 N.E. 381, 384): 'The whole body of principles, whether of law or of equity, bearing on the case, becomes the reservoir to be drawn upon by the court in enlightening its judgment'. Maitland expressed the same view when he predicted that 'The day will come when lawyers will cease to inquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity or a rule of common law; suffice it that it is a well-established rule administered by the High Court of Justice.' (Maitland, Equity (1909), p. 20.) Needless to say, we have accepted Maitland's and Judge Cardozo's understanding of the consequences of the merger.

Of course, we are obliged to preserve inviolate 'Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision' (N. Y. Const., art. I, § 2). It is to this sole remaining jurisdictional distinction between law and equity that we now turn.

Assuming that defendants had a constitutional right to a jury trial of the issues of fact supporting the award of exemplary damages (an assumption which is not free from uncertainty see Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 129 N.Y. 274, 29 N.E. 315, 15 L.R.A. 287; Jamaica Sav. Bank v. M. S. Investing Co., 274 N.Y. 215, 8 N.E.2d 493, 112 A.L.R. 1485; but see Hudson v. Caryl, 44 N.Y. 553; Cogswell v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 105 N.Y. 319, 11 N.E. 518; City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406), it is clear that...