I.M. ex rel. C.C. v. Northampton Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 12 June 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–30214–KPN.
• Citation: 869 F.Supp.2d 174
• Parties: I.M., by and through his Parents and next friends, C.C. and M.M., Plaintiffs v. NORTHAMPTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS and The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Division of Administrative Law Appeals, Bureau of Special Education Appeals, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

869 F.Supp.2d 174

I.M., by and through his Parents and next friends, C.C. and M.M., Plaintiffs

v.NORTHAMPTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS and The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Division of Administrative Law Appeals, Bureau of Special Education Appeals, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–30214–KPN.

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

June 12, 2012.

Catherine Merino Reisman, Reisman Carolla Gran LLP, Haddonfield, NJ, Peter L. Smith, East Longmeadow, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Alisia E. St. Florian, Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP, Quincy, MA, James S. Whitcomb, Office of Attorney General, Western Massachusetts Division, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS' CROSS–MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT ONE (Document Nos. 17, 26, and 29)

KENNETH P. NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

C.C. and M.M. (“Plaintiffs”) initiated this action on behalf of their son I.M. against the Northampton Public Schools (“NPS”) and the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (“BSEA”) challenging the BSEA's finding that NPS provided him with a free appropriate public education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1440 et seq. Plaintiffs also pursue a claim against NPS under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“ADA”). Presently before the court is Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Count One, the ADA claim, and on Count Three, the IDEA claim. NPS, for its part, has moved to dismiss Count One and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on Count Three. The BSEA itself opposes Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Count Three. Plaintiffs' complaint, it should be noted, initially included a Count Two, but that claim has since been withdrawn.

The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction. See28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the reasons which follow, the court will grant NPS's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (Document Nos. 26 and 29) and, in turn, will deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Document No. 17), thereby entering judgment for both NPS and the BSEA.

I. The Statutes in Play

A. The IDEA

The purpose of the IDEA is to ensure “that all handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public education,” i.e. a “FAPE.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA envisions a collaboration between school officials and parents to develop an individualized education program (“IEP”), which is “[t]he primary vehicle for delivery of a FAPE” and must be “individually designed to suit a particular child.” D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2012) (internal quotations omitted). Although a student is not entitled to the maximum educational benefit possible, “an IEP must be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit.” Id. The IDEA also includes procedural safeguards for the student and his or her parents, including a hearing in front of an impartial hearing officer and the right to judicial review of that decision in federal court. See20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g). The burden of persuasion lies with the party challenging the appropriateness of an IEP.

B. The ADA

The ADA prohibits any entity that receives federal funds from discriminating against an individual based on his or her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See Calero–Cerezo v. United States DOJ, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). Among other things, the ADA was enacted to “assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).

II. Background

I.M., who at the time of the administrative hearing before the BSEA was ten years old, has been diagnosed with dystonic quadriplegic cerebral palsy in the severe range, cortical visual impairment, and apraxia of speech; his disability for purposes of the IDEA is not contested. I.M. attended Leeds Elementary School in Northampton until April of 2010, at which time his parents withdrew him and thereafter applied for his placement at the Perkins School for the Blind in Watertown, Massachusetts. The instant action reflects ongoing disagreements between Plaintiffs and NPS about I.M.'s individualized education plans (“IEP”), specifically the plan formulated in November of 2010.

The BSEA's decision of June 3, 2011, which affirmed the adequacy of the November 2010 IEP, is best understood in the context of events that transpired in the year leading up to its formulation, including two BSEA decisions that preceded the decision currently at issue. Those two decisions, which were never appealed to court, have been included in the administrative record and are described below.

A. The September and November 2010 BSEA Rulings

After withdrawing I.M. from the Northampton Schools in April of 2010 and while his application for enrollment at Perkins was pending, Plaintiffs developed a home education program where I.M. was taught for two and one-half hours each day by his mother, in addition to receiving related services from specialists at Boston Children's Hospital. (Administrative Record “A.R.” at 653.) Shortly before that withdrawal, Plaintiffs filed with the BSEA a Motion for Interim Placement, whereby they sought public funding for the home-based program. On September 1, 2010, the BSEA denied the motion because Plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the IEP developed and implemented by NPS for the 2009–2010 school year was inappropriate. (A.R. at 654.) As mentioned, that ruling (hereafter the “September Ruling”) has not been appealed to this court.

In any event, after Perkins accepted I.M. in April of 2010, NPS sent Plaintiffs a Placement Consent Form, which they signed and, in doing so, generally consented to I.M.'s “residential school” placement at Perkins. (A.R. at 258.) Plaintiffs, however, indicated on the form that, while they “accept [ed] placement,” they did not accept the “denial of transportation” and requested a meeting. (Id.) The “denial” to which Plaintiffs referred was NPS's decision to provide transportation for I.M. to and from Perkins in accordance with the school vacation calendar but not on a daily or weekly basis.

Unhappy with NPS's decision, Plaintiffs again sought relief from the BSEA, this time by filing an interim request for reimbursement of expenses incurred in providing daily round-trip transportation. (A.R. at 658.) Plaintiffs' request was filed on September 3, 2010, and a hearing was held on October 15, 2010. On November 30, 2010, the BSEA denied Plaintiffs' request (hereafter the “November Ruling”). The BSEA found that the parties had agreed to residential placement for I.M. and that Plaintiffs' unilateral decision to transport him on a daily basis was not entitled to funding given their failure to demonstrate that, absent such transportation, I.M. would not receive an appropriate education. (A.R. at 661.) That ruling, too, has not been appealed to this court.

B. I.M.'s 2010–2011 Individual Education Plan

When Plaintiffs signed the Placement Consent Form in the spring of 2010, they also agreed that a special education team would convene to develop a new IEP for the 2010–2011 school year after I.M. began attending Perkins. (A.R. at 210.) Thus, I.M. started at Perkins on September 8, 2010, with the education plan from the 2009–2010 school year in place, with the understanding that a team would craft a new I.E.P. after Perkins had time to develop a better understanding of I.M.'s needs. (A.R. at 134–35.)

The IEP team convened on November 21, 2010. Plaintiffs, Robert Hair (Education Director for Perkins), and Nathan Ziegler (Director of Special Education for NPS) attended the meeting, as did thirteen other teachers and specialists, among them a developmental specialist, a social worker, a speech language pathologist, an occupational therapist, and a physical therapist. (A.R. at 238.) The details of the resulting IEP are discussed at length in the hearing officer's decision. (See A.R. at 137–139.) Suffice it to say for present purposes, Plaintiffs, at the time of the team meeting, did not raise any concerns about the proposed IEP or seek to make any changes. (Id. at 139.) On January 4, 2011, however, Plaintiffs did not accept the allocation of the 32.5 hours of services set forth in the IEP, maintaining, among other things, that “speech language supports need to be increased.” (Id. at 259.) In addition, Plaintiffs refused I.M.'s placement, claiming that “there is little to no appreciable documentation, recommendation as to why I.M. needs a residential placement.” (Id.)

C. I.M.'s Perkins Experience

Although Plaintiffs, Perkins, and NPS all understood in early September of 2010 that I.M. would be a residential student at Perkins, Plaintiffs, as indicated, initially transported him there on a daily basis. (A.R. at 135.) To be sure, there is some dispute about exactly when Perkins was ready to accommodate I.M. as an overnight student; as best as the court can tell from the record, however, Perkins was ready even by Plaintiffs' standards on September 30, 2010, when a bed for I.M. was set up and the residential Cottage was staffed. (A.R. at 137.) I.M. then began spending two nights a week at Perkins, although Plaintiffs continued to transport him back and forth on other days. (A.R. at 224.)

Given the roughly two-hour drive between Northampton and Perkins, I.M. was sometimes late for school, and this tardiness appears to have affected his progress and the delivery of certain services to him. (A.R. at 135.) For example, in a November progress report, Karen Brody, a speech language therapy teacher, noted that I.M. had attended “only three of his scheduled individual sessions” and “consistently misse[d]” his Thursday morning class. (A.R. at 228.) I.M.'s tardiness and absences also delayed the implementation of his communication device (the “ECO”), which the Perkins staff was reorganizing in an effort to...