Iannarelli v. Morton, 71-1647.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-1647.,71-1647.
• Citation: 463 F.2d 179
• Parties: Thomas IANNARELLI, Appellant, v. Rogers B. MORTON, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

463 F.2d 179 (1972)

Thomas IANNARELLI, Appellant, v. Rogers B. MORTON, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, et al.

No. 71-1647.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted June 5, 1972.

Decided July 10, 1972.

Thomas Iannarelli, pro se.

Robert E. Kopp, Walter H. Fleischer, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Louis C. Bechtle, U. S. Atty., for appellees.

Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, GIBBONS and MAX ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) June 5, 1972.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff was dismissed as an employee of the National Park Service. His dismissal was based on three separate charges of misconduct. On review, the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") sustained the decision of the Park Service as to all three grounds. Plaintiff then commenced this suit in the district court challenging his discharge and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The district court limited its inquiry to procedural error and, finding none, denied the relief requested. On appeal this Court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the intervening decision in Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969). Charlton authorized substantive court review of Commission action when, as here, the plaintiff directly challenges a Commission finding of fact.

Jurisdiction was retained in this Court pending the district court's disposition of the case on remand. The court there determined that, while the second and third charges were supported by substantial evidence, the first charge was unsubstantiated since it involved the element of specific intent and the record lacked any finding by the Commission that plaintiff possessed such intent. The district court, 327 F. Supp. 873, remanded the case to the Commission for further findings as to (a) whether plaintiff in fact possessed the specific intent necessary under the first charge; and, if not, (b) whether the second and third charges were sufficient of themselves to justify plaintiff's dismissal.

Plaintiff here appeals the remand by the district court to the Commission. His only contention requiring discussion is that the terms of this Court's order remanding the case to the district court did not permit that court further to remand the case to the Commission. We need not decide this contention since, having retained jurisdiction, we are free to treat the district court's action as a...