Ible v. Wells Fargo Bank
| Decision Date | 06 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:21-CV-00025-MW-MAF |
| Parties | ISHANNA IBLE, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff, Ishanna Ible, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other various statutes. ECF No. 1. This cause is presently before the Court upon the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, hereinafter referred to as "the Bank." ECF No. 23. The Bank maintains that Plaintiff's complaint is barred due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the complaint does not comply with applicable pleading standards, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. After careful consideration of all of the filings in this case, for the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted; and the case should be dismissed.
The substance of Plaintiff's claims stem from what she believes was an "illegal" foreclosure proceeding in the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Wakulla County, Florida. ECF No. 1, p. 2. The circuit court issued a final judgment in the Bank's favor on August 1, 2018 (ECF No. 23-2); Plaintiff appealed through to the Florida Supreme Court, which ultimately dismissed her case. ECF No. 23-1, p. 1. The appellate court issued a mandate affirming the final judgment. Id. In the instant motion to dismiss, the Bank confirms the foreclosure sale has not been completed due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and resulting moratorium on foreclosures. ECF No. 23, p. 4.
Plaintiff's complaint is no model of clarity. Plaintiff alleges that the Bank is in violation of no less than twenty federal and state statutes (i.e. probate codes, rights of redemption, guardianship, discrimination in lending, fair housing laws, criminal fraud, mortgage fraud, racketeering, and terrorism).1However, Plaintiff provides little in the way of facts. Plaintiff generally alleges the Bank conducted a mortgage fraud scheme with the aid of the Wakulla County Court. ECF No. 1, p. 2. According to Plaintiff, on November 20, 2006, a mortgage-backed insurance policy was "paid out" following the death of Plaintiff's mother, Deanna Baker Ible. Id. Plaintiff provides no additional facts relating to the payout. Three years later, the Estate of Deanna Ible entered into a new mortgage loan with American Home Mortgage Service in the amount of $163,467.25 or $163,409.86. Id., pp. 3, 6.
Plaintiff claims the Bank "repeatedly" violated Fla. Stat. § 895.03, the state's racketeering statute. Id. Plaintiff provides no set of facts outlining what acts or omissions were made by Defendant nor any dates on which they allegedly occurred. Id., 3-6. Plaintiff only generally alleges "cyber threats, threats to her life, loss of investments, loss of business, income, damaged credibility and temporarily lost residence from 2017-2020" and that she "was required to report her local whereabouts," and "threatened with imprisonment." Id., p. 5. She names no person, no dates, nor any specific actions. Plaintiff also complains that the Bank discriminated against her, but she relays no transaction in which she was denied the making of a loan or other financial assistance or the selling, brokering, or appraising of residential property. Id., p. 9.
Plaintiff claims that the state court determined she had no standing to allege mortgage fraud and insurance fraud. Id., p. 5. Plaintiff asks this Court for "monetary relief" for "emotional pain, professional malpractice, loss of security, creation of conflict in domestic/family matters, and business loss." Id., p. 11. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 "a punitive amount" under the FDCPA and additional punitive damages under Florida's negligence statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.73 for a total sum of $306,280.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks a ruling from the Court that would commence a judicial review of all foreclosure and probate cases in its jurisdiction. Id. As a preliminary matter, to the extent this particular request for relief may be construed as a motion to initiate a class action suit, it is due to be denied. It is well settled that a pro se party, like Plaintiff, cannot represent a class or any other individual in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (); FuQua v. Massey, 615 F. App'x 611, 612 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to commence a class action lawsuit should be DENIED.
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id. at 679. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). The factual allegations must adequately "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citations omitted). "The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations therein as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff's complaint is due to be dismissed as a "shotgun pleading" for failure to comply with the pleading standards set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10(b). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 is to ''give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). "Further, the allegations in the complaint 'must be simple, concise, and direct,'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(a), and the complaint must 'state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,' Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)." LaCroix v. W. Dist. of Ky., 627 F. App'x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, although Plaintiff uses numbered paragraphs as directed by Rule 10(b), the complaint is largely a rambling narrative. "A 'shotgun pleading' - one in which 'it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief'—does not comply with the standards of Rules 8(a) and 10(b)." Id. (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit "has repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings." Id. (citing PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010)). Vague pleadings which assert legal conclusions rather than facts violate Rule 8 and are insufficient to proceed.
The Eleventh Circuit has identified four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). The most common type is "a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint." Id. at 1321. Next, is a complaint that is "replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action." Id. at 1322. The third type of shotgun pleading does not separate "into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief." Id. at 1323.
"Fourth, and finally, there is" the pleading which asserts "multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against." Id. "The unifying characteristic . . . is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests." Id.
As narrated above, Plaintiff brings forward multiple claims against multiple defendants and fails to present sufficient facts that would attribute any acts or omissions to a particular cause of action. Similarly, many of Plaintiff's allegations are attributable to no individual nor any specific date. Plaintiff provides a vague statement of facts and alleges more than twenty statutory violations without articulating which facts support each claim. The Court will not perform that task on her behalf. A district court cannot be expected to perform the parties' work for them. Cf. Adler v. Duval Cty....
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