IBP, Inc. v. Burress
| Decision Date | 05 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-1887.,07-1887. |
| Citation | 779 NW 2d 210 |
| Parties | IBP, INC., Appellee, v. Lee BURRESS, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Jason D. Neifert of Max Schott & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Timothy A. Clausen and Sharese Manker of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.
Pigs give us bacon and ham. They can also give meat packers brucellosis. Lee Burress contracted brucellosis while working at IBP, Inc.'s meat-packing plant. He did not discover he had the disease until six years after he left IBP's employment. Soon thereafter, he filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner determined brucellosis was an injury, not an occupational disease. The commissioner affirmed. The district court reversed, concluding Burress suffered from an occupational disease, not an injury. The court of appeals reversed the district court. Because Burress contracted brucellosis from a traumatic event, it is an injury, and his claim for benefits was properly brought under Iowa Code chapter 85 (2009).1 Nonetheless, because the commissioner relied on an erroneous date to trigger the commencement of the ninety-day period for giving notice of a claim under chapter 85, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand to the commissioner for a new determination of the issue of Burress' compliance with the ninety-day notice requirement.
Lee Burress worked at IBP, Inc.'s meat-packing plant from 1987 until 1997. During his first few years working there, Burress worked as a jowl and side shaver, a hog sticker (killing the hog by sticking a knife in its throat), and a head dropper (cutting the head off the hog). These positions involved significant contact with hogs and hog blood. On at least one occasion, Burress cut his finger while dropping heads. During his final eight years at IBP, Burress worked in the trolley room, where he was responsible for running automated carts to various places within the plant. Although he did not have much contact with hogs in this position, he would occasionally come into contact with hog blood. During these eight years, he cut his finger and elbow and sustained a superficial puncture wound to his face. Burress stopped working for IBP in September 1997.
In July 2003, Burress began experiencing hip pain. The source of the hip pain was unclear. Burress underwent hip surgery in September 2003 and developed an infection that lasted for several months. In December 2003, Burress was diagnosed with brucellosis with osteomyelitis. On April 13, 2004, Burress alerted IBP of a potential claim by letter. In December 2004, Dr. William Nauseef explained by letter that Burress contracted brucellosis from hog blood, with skin abrasions being the most common "portal of entry."
On January 3, 2005, Burress filed a workers' compensation petition alleging he had developed "chronic infection, hips, bone" as a result of his "contact with blood products and tissue from slaughtered hogs." In its answer to the petition, IBP alleged the claimed injury is an occupational disease, not an injury, under Iowa Code chapter 85A, and, therefore, recovery is barred under section 85A.12.2
Following a hearing, the deputy commissioner determined "since it is most likely Burress contracted brucellosis as a result of trauma, the injury is an injury under chapter 85, not an occupational disease." The deputy commissioner also found Burress did not become "aware of the probable compensable character of his condition until sometime in early December of 2004," and his petition was filed within two years, as prescribed by chapter 85. The deputy commissioner awarded Burress permanent partial disability benefits.
IBP filed an application for rehearing, which the deputy commissioner denied. On intra-agency appeal, the commissioner affirmed and adopted the deputy commissioner's arbitration decision with one modification, that Burress met the definition of being permanently and totally disabled and was thus entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
IBP filed a petition for judicial review raising four issues: (1) whether the agency erred in determining Burress' brucellosis was an injury, (2) whether the agency erred by holding Burress complied with the statute of limitations and the ninety-day notice provision in Iowa Code section 85.23, (3) whether the agency improperly adjusted Burress' benefits from permanent partial to permanent total disability, and (4) whether the agency erred in assessing a penalty against IBP.
The district court reversed the agency's decision, concluding Burress suffered from an occupational disease, not an injury. The court determined Burress failed to file his petition within one year after the last exposure, as required by Iowa Code section 85A.12. Burress appealed.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which reversed the district court's decision, finding the commissioner's determination Burress had suffered an injury was supported by substantial evidence. IBP appealed.
We review the commissioner's legal findings for correction of errors at law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (m); Perkins v. HEA of Iowa, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Iowa 2002). "Our task is to determine whether the district court, acting in its appellate capacity in these judicial review proceedings, applied the law correctly." Noble v. Lamoni Prods., 512 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Iowa 1994). We are bound by the commissioner's findings of fact so long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f); Excel Corp. v. Smithart, 654 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 2002). Under Iowa Code section 17A.19(10), "a reviewing court may reverse the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record or characterized by an abuse of discretion." Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).
"Substantial evidence" means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). An abuse of discretion occurs when the commissioner's exercise of discretion is "clearly erroneous or rests on untenable grounds." Waters, 674 N.W.2d at 96.
Today we must determine whether the brucellosis Burress contracted is an injury or an occupational disease. The legislature has set forth two workers' compensation schemes: one for injuries under Iowa Code chapter 85 and one for occupational diseases under chapter 85A. In order to qualify for workers' compensation benefits under chapter 85, the employee must demonstrate "(1) the claimant suffered a `personal injury,' (2) the claimant and the respondent had an employer-employee relationship, (3) the injury arose out of the employment, and (4) the injury arose in the course of the employment." Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 220 (Iowa 2006). Comparatively, to recover under chapter 85A, "the disease must be causally related to the exposure to harmful conditions of the field of employment," and "those harmful conditions must be more prevalent in the employment concerned than in everyday life or in other occupations." McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 190 (Iowa 1980).
If Burress suffers from an occupational disease, his claim is barred by the statute of repose. See Iowa Code § 85A.12 () However, if his brucellosis is an injury, his claim is not barred by the statute of repose, but instead subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 85.26. See Iowa Code § 85.26(1); see also Swartzendruber v. Schimmel, 613 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2000) ().
Thus, whether Burress' brucellosis is an injury or an occupational disease is a key issue. Section 85A.8 defines occupational disease:
Occupational diseases shall be only those diseases which arise out of and in the course of the employee's employment. Such diseases shall have a direct causal connection with the employment and must have followed as a natural incident thereto from injurious exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment. Such disease must be incidental to the character of the business, occupation or process in which the employee was employed and not independent of the employment. Such disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have resulted from that source as an incident and rational consequence. A disease which follows from a hazard to which an employee has or would have been equally exposed outside of said occupation is not compensable as an occupational disease.
Although section 85A.8 defines occupational disease, chapter 85 does not adequately define the term "injury." Under section 85.61(4)(b), the word "injury" "shall not include a disease unless it shall result from the injury and ... shall not include an occupational disease as defined in section 85A.8."
Our case law has filled the gap and explained the differences between an occupational disease and an injury.
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