Icon Benefit Adm'rs Ii, L.P. v. Mullin

• Decision Date: 11 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 05–11–00935–CV.,05–11–00935–CV.
• Citation: 405 S.W.3d 257
• Parties: ICON BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS II, L.P., American Administrative Group, Inc., and HealthSmart Preferred Care, II, L.P., Appellants v. Joella MULLIN, Stanley Self, Andrea Davenport, Lee Ann Dumbauld, Scott Snider, Leisa Hutcheson, David Miller, and City of Lubbock, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

405 S.W.3d 257

ICON BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS II, L.P., American Administrative Group, Inc., and HealthSmart Preferred Care, II, L.P., Appellants

v.Joella MULLIN, Stanley Self, Andrea Davenport, Lee Ann Dumbauld, Scott Snider, Leisa Hutcheson, David Miller, and City of Lubbock, Appellees.

No. 05–11–00935–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

June 5, 2013.

Rehearing Overruled July 11, 2013.

Mary–Olga Lovett, Greenberg Traurig, Houston, Stephen Carlin, Penelope Brobst Blackwell, Peter Lacina, Dallas, for Appellants.

James Lawrence Wharton, Jones, Flygare, Brown & Wharton, P.C., Christopher Bradley Slayton, Lubbock, Christopher Don Parker, Peterson Farris Byrd & Parker, Amarillo, for Appellees.

Before Justices FRANCIS, LANG, and EVANS.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice EVANS.

ICON Benefit Administrators II, L.P., American Administrative Group, Inc., and HealthSmart Preferred Care, II, L.P. (collectively ICON) filed this appeal challenging the trial court's order denying their postjudgment motion to enforce a pretrial protective order. By their motion, ICON sought to prevent the City of Lubbock and certain individual City employees (collectively the City) from publicly disclosing an audit concerning ICON'S administration of the City's health care plan in response to open records requests made under the Texas Public Information Act. In response to the parties' dispute regarding the proper procedural mechanism for our review of this case, we conclude the trial court's ruling on the postjudgment motion to enforce a pretrial protective order is not subject to a direct appeal and that the proper procedural vehicle to challenge it is by petition for writ of mandamus. At the request of the City and the City employees, and in the interest of judicial economy, we treat this appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Because the trial court's order permitting disclosure of the audit contradicts the plain meaning of its earlier protective order, we further conclude the order denying ICON'S motion was a clear abuse of the trial court's discretionand conditionally grant mandamus relief.

BACKGROUND

From 2004 through 2006, the City contracted with ICON to provide third-party administration and a “preferred provider” organization for the City of Lubbock's self-funded health care plan. In 2008, ICON filed suit in Dallas County against certain City employees alleging the City employees made defamatory statements about ICON's administration of the City's health care plan.¹ The City employees filed a counterclaim asserting, among other things, abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Although the City and HealthSmart were not parties to the Dallas lawsuit, they were involved in a separate ongoing arbitration proceeding with ICON and AAG concerning the administration of the City's health care plan.

While both the lawsuit and the arbitration were pending, the City hired Sally Reaves to conduct an audit of the administrative services ICON performed for the City's health care plans. The City employees sought pretrial discovery in the Dallas lawsuit of certain information for the Reaves's audit work. In response, ICON moved for, and was granted, a protective order in July 2009. Among other things, the protective order defined certain categories of “Protected Materials” and restricted the use and disclosure of “Protected Materials” and “all information derived therefrom.” The protective order was later expanded to enable the City, as a non-party, to obtain access to the “Protected Materials” for use in the arbitration and HealthSmart became a beneficiary of the protective order. The City acknowledged in oral argument it became bound by the protective order and to that extent subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court in Dallas.

The parties eventually settled the Dallas lawsuit and the trial court signed an order dismissing the case in November 2010, before Reaves completed her audit. At the time of the settlement, the parties disputed whether the forthcoming Reaves Audit could be used in the ongoing arbitration proceeding. In a meeting in October 2010, the arbitrator ruled that the City could use the forthcoming Reaves Audit to which ICON and HealthSmart agreed. The arbitrator signed a substantially identical protective order to the Dallas trial court's protective order.

The Reaves Audit was submitted to the City in March 2011 while the arbitration was still on-going. The following month, the City received open record requests for the Reaves Audit pursuant to the Texas Public Information Act. The City's public information officer notified ICON of these open record requests and also sought an advisory opinion from the Texas Attorney General as to whether the Reaves Audit was subject to disclosure pursuant to the Act.

In light of these developments, ICON filed a motion to enforce the protective order in the dismissed Dallas lawsuit to prevent the public disclosure of the Reaves Audit. ICON argued that because the Reaves Audit contains information from, and is derived from, “Protected Materials,” the protective order prohibits disclosure to the public of the Reaves Audit. The City employees filed a response in their individual capacities and a motion to clarify that included a request for a declaration that disclosure of the Reaves Audit was not prohibited by the protective order. They also submitted a copy of the Reaves Audit to the trial court for in camera review. The City filed a separate response on its own behalf and on behalf of the City employees in their official capacity.

The trial court held a hearing on the motions on June 16, 2011. On July 14, 2011 the trial court signed an order declaring that disclosure of the Reaves Audit was not prohibited by the terms of the protective order and denying the motion to enforce. ICON brought this appeal challenging the trial court's July 14 order.

ANALYSIS

I. Mandamus, not Appeal, is the Proper Procedure for Appellate Review.

Before analyzing the merits of ICON'S arguments with respect to the trial court's order, we must first address the proper procedural vehicle for raising such complaints. ICON argues it can directly appeal the trial court's postjudgment order denying its motion to enforce because it: (1) operates as a final judgment, disposing of all parties and issues in the case, (2) denies a request for injunctive relief, and (3) relates to the sealing or unsealing of court records. The City, on the other hand, argues that review of the order can only be had by petition for writ of mandamus and urges us to construe this appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus applying the standard of review applicable to mandamus proceedings. See In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 298 n. 1 (Tex.2006) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). We agree with the City and conclude Ford is controlling here.

In Ford, two vehicle manufacturers sought a writ of mandamus to vacate a pretrial court order declaring certain documents non-confidential under a provision in a pretrial protective order. Id. at 296. The supreme court noted that an appeal is inadequate when the trial court erroneously orders the production of confidential information or privileged documents. Id. at 298. The supreme court also indicated that mandamus was the only procedural option available to the vehicle manufacturers because “the underlying dispute is over, having already gone to trial and final judgment, so the instant controversy—whether the [plaintiffs] (or their counsel) can pass around the Volvo materials—can only be resolved by mandamus.” Id. at 298 n. 1. The case before us fits squarely into the status articulated in Ford: the underlying lawsuit has been concluded and now we must review the trial court's decision whether the public disclosure of the Reaves Audit is prohibited by the pretrial protective order. ICON provides no compelling reason why Ford does not control this case and require review by mandamus.

In reaching our conclusion, we necessarily reject ICON'S contention that the mandamus procedure applied in Ford only because the order was rendered before the final judgment. Other than a few, mostly statutory exceptions, appeals are taken only from final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). Generally, only one final judgment shall be rendered in any cause except where it is otherwise specifically provided by law, such as in certain probate and receivership proceedings. SeeTex.R. Civ. P. 301; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. In this case, the final judgment was the trial court's November 2010 order dismissing with prejudice all claims and counterclaims raised by the parties. Because the July 14 order is not a final judgment or an appealable order under any statutory exception to the general rule that only a final judgment may be appealed, we conclude our review of the trial court's order must be by petition for writ of mandamus. See In re Ford, 211 S.W.3d at 298 n. 1.

In support of its contention that the order before us can be appealed directly, ICON cites Garcia v. General Motors Corporation, 786 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, writ withdrawn). Like here, Garcia was an appeal from a postjudgment order enforcing a pretrial protective order. Id. at 13. The San Antonio court set aside the order concluding the trial court lacked plenary jurisdiction without addressing the issue of whether the order was subject to a direct appeal. Id. at 14–15. Accordingly, we do not view Garcia as persuasive authority on the issue before us.

In determining that the order before us cannot be appealed as a final judgment, we decline ICON'S invitation to equate the trial court's order denying its motion to enforce with a family code protective order, which we have held is directly appealable. See Cooke v. Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). As ICON acknowledges in its brief, the order in this case and a protective order under the family code involve different objects of protection. B...