Ictsi Or., Inc. v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union

• Decision Date: 05 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:12-cv-1058-SI
• Parties: ICTSI OREGON, INC., Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION; and International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 8, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

442 F.Supp.3d 1329

ICTSI OREGON, INC., Plaintiff,

v.INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION; and International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 8, Defendants.

Case No. 3:12-cv-1058-SI

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed March 5, 2020

Jeffrey S. Eden, Amanda T. Gamblin, Michael T. Garone, Richard K. Hansen, and Andrew J. Lee, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt PC, 1211 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1900, Portland, OR 97204; Peter Hurtgen, Curley, Hurtgen & Johnsrud LLP, 4400 Bohannon Drive, Suite 230, Menlo Park, CA 94025. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff ICTSI Oregon, Inc.

Susan J. Harriman, Dan Jackson, Brook Dooley, and Philip J. Tassin, Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP, 633 Battery Street, San Francisco, CA 94111; Robert A. Shlachter, Timothy S. DeJong, and Lydia Anderson-Dana, Stoll Berne PC, 209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500, Portland, OR 97204. Of Attorneys for Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse Union and International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 8.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

After a ten-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $93,635,000 in favor of Plaintiff ICTSI Oregon, Inc. ("ICTSI") and against Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse Union ("ILWU National") and International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 8 ("Local 8") (collectively, "ILWU"). The jury also determined that ILWU National was solely responsible for 55 percent of ICTSI's damages and Local 8 was solely responsible for 45 percent. The jury found that both Defendants had engaged in illegal secondary boycott activities, in violation of § 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 187. The Court received the jury's verdict and discharged the jury but deferred entering judgment.

International ocean-going shipping of commercial containers forms the background of this lawsuit. Along the West Coast, members of local unions affiliated with ILWU National typically perform the work of loading and unloading commercial containers on and off ocean-going vessels. They do this under a coastwide contract between ILWU National and Pacific Maritime Association ("PMA"). PMA's members include shipping companies and terminal operators.

Some ocean-going containers are refrigerated. These containers are known as "reefers." During the time a reefer is onshore at a port terminal, either before the reefer is loaded onto a vessel or after it has been unloaded, it must be connected to a source of electrical power to maintain refrigeration, and it must be monitored. The job of plugging, unplugging, and monitoring refrigerated containers is called a "reefer job," and the work is known as "reefer work." Under the West Coast contract between ILWU National and PMA, when control over assigning reefer work rests with a PMA-member terminal operator, that work must be assigned to local members of ILWU National.

ICTSI is a PMA-member terminal operator. In 2010, ICTSI arrived in Portland, Oregon and leased Terminal 6 (the container terminal) from the Port of Portland (the "Port"). For a long time before, the Port controlled the reefer work at Terminal 6 and assigned the reefer jobs to electricians who were local members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW"), not to local members of ILWU National. In February 2011, the Port transferred management of Terminal 6 operations to ICTSI, but the Port retained control over the assignment of reefer work under the Port's lease agreement with ICTSI. The Port continued to assign the reefer work to local members of the IBEW, but ILWU wanted the reefer work assigned to its local members. Thus began the reefer dispute at the Port of Portland.

As shown by the evidence presented at trial, ILWU engaged in work stoppages, slowdowns, "safety gimmicks," and other coercive actions with at least one substantial motivating factor being to compel ICTSI to put pressure on the Port to have the reefer work done by ILWU members. This could include pressuring the Port to assign the work to ILWU members or to transfer control over the assignment of the reefer work at Terminal 6 to ICTSI. As long as the assignment of reefer work at Terminal 6 remained under the control of the Port, the Port could continue to assign the reefer jobs to members of the IBEW, rather than to members of ILWU. If, however, the Port transferred control over the reefer work at Terminal 6 to ICTSI, then under the coastwide contract between ILWU National and PMA, ICTSI would have to assign the reefer work to members of ILWU. The controversy between ICTSI and ILWU leading to this lawsuit began in May 2012 and continued until March 2017, when ICTSI ended its operations at Terminal 6.

ILWU has moved for judgment as a matter of law, remittitur, or new trial. For the reasons explained below, the Court will not disturb the jury's thoughtful and well supported findings on liability and causation. When, however, the Court considers the portion of IWLU's motion that seeks a new trial on damages and the Court exercises its obligation to consider all the evidence as the Court views that evidence, the Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the evidence does not support a damage award of $93.6 million. The Court also finds that an award of $19,061,248 is the maximum amount sustainable by the proof. As a result, if ICTSI agrees to accept that lower figure, the Court will enter judgment in that amount. Otherwise, the Court will grant a new trial limited to damages. ICTSI will have two weeks from the date of this Opinion and Order to inform Defendants and the Court of ICTSI's decision.

STANDARDS

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment as a matter of law is proper if "the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict." E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc. , 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); see also Weaving v. City of Hillsboro , 763 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a motion for judgment as a matter of law must be granted if "the evidence and its inferences cannot reasonably support a judgment in favor of the opposing party"). Because a motion under Rule 50(b) is a renewed motion, "a party cannot properly ‘raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law that it did not first raise in its Rule 50(a) pre-verdict motion.’ " Go Daddy , 581 F.3d at 961 (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham , 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) ).

A court reviews properly raised arguments challenging the factual sufficiency of a jury's verdict for substantial evidence. That means that "the jury's verdict must be upheld if there is ‘evidence adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion.’ " Id. at 963 (quoting Pavao v. Pagay , 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) ); see also Weaving , 763 F.3d at 1111 (noting that substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[,] even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence" (quotation marks omitted)). In ruling on a motion under Rule 50(b) based on a ground not asserted in a motion under Rule 50(a), a court is "limited to reviewing the jury's verdict for plain error, and should reverse only if such plain error would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice." Go Daddy , 581 F.3d at 961 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "This exception, however, permits only extraordinarily deferential review that is limited to whether there was any evidence to support the jury's verdict." Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp. , 259 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Patel v. Penman , 103 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 1996) ).

In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd. , 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, the Court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or "substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury." Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside , 723 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. New Trial

Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may "on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). " Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion for new trial may be granted." Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. , 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). "Rather, the court is ‘bound by those grounds that have been historically recognized.’ " Id. (quoting Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc. , 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) ). "Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims ‘that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’ " Id. (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan , 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940) ); see also Shimko v. Guenther , 505 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2007).

Unlike a motion (or renewed motion) for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, when considering motion for new trial under Rule 59 the Court is not limited to viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Experience Hendrix , 762 F.3d at 842. Rather, the Court "can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses." Id. "The district court also is not limited to the grounds a party asserts to justify a new trial, but may sua sponte raise its own concerns about the damages verdict." Id.

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