ID v. Westmoreland School Dist.
Decision Date | 16 March 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 91-155-S. |
Citation | 788 F. Supp. 634 |
Parties | I.D., by his parents and by next friend E.D.; and by next friend W.D.; W.D.; E.D. v. WESTMORELAND SCHOOL DISTRICT. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Gregory R. Van Buiten, Burlington, Vt., for plaintiffs.
Gerald M. Zelin, Salem, N.H., for defendant.
In this civil action, plaintiffs I.D., E.D., and W.D. challenge the individual education plan ("IEP") developed for I.D. by defendant Westmoreland School District. Plaintiffs claim that the IEP: (1) was not promulgated in compliance with procedures established in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Count I); and (2) violates protections guaranteed by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and its implementing regulations (Count II). Currently before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of this Court's August 1, 1991 Order, 788 F.Supp. 632, dismissing Count I of the complaint as untimely, and defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint. The Court considers each motion in turn.
In their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs advance three alternative arguments to support their contention that the Court's previous dismissal of Count I of the complaint was improper: (1) plaintiffs' cause of action accrued when they received notification of the hearing officer's March 11, 1991 decision; (2) the thirty-day statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), see Bow School Dist. v. Quentin W., 750 F.Supp. 546, 550 (D.N.H.1990), should be equitably tolled in these circumstances; and (3) the Court should not retroactively apply the rule that the thirty-day statute of limitations begins to run on the date the hearing officer issues a decision. Having carefully considered each of the above arguments, however, the Court is not persuaded to alter its 8/1/91 Order.
Plaintiffs' first contention is that the thirty-day statute of limitations should begin to run on March 11, 1991, the date they received notice of the hearing officer's unfavorable decision. Defendant responds that a receipt rule is a problematic method of determining when a period of limitations begins to accrue, and is inconsistent with the holding in Quentin W., 750 F.Supp. at 548, 551.
The question of when an action accrues under a federal statute is to be determined by federal law. See e.g., Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir.1991). To determine when the thirty-day limitations period for 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) actions begins to accrue, the Court must consider the "general purposes of the IDEA and of its other provisions, and ... the practical ends which are to be served by any limitation of the time within which an action must be brought." See Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517, 87 S.Ct. 1177, 1185, 18 L.Ed.2d 256 (1967) (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)) (quoting Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62, 46 S.Ct. 405, 406, 70 L.Ed. 835 (1926)); see also Albert v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 905 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir.1990) ( ).
One of the general purposes of the IDEA is to "ensure prompt resolution of disputes regarding appropriate education for handicapped children." See Spiegler v. Dist. of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C.Cir.1989); see also Quentin W., 750 F.Supp. at 550 (). A receipt rule undoubtedly would encourage time-consuming litigation over the question of exactly when the parties received the hearing officer's decision in the mail, thereby delaying resolution of already protracted IDEA cases. Without a Congressional mandate requiring courts to use a receipt rule, therefore, this Court is not willing to institute such a burdensome procedure.1
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the Court's 8/1/91 Order is contrary to well-established precedent. To support their argument, plaintiffs cite case law holding that a federal cause of action accrues for limitations purposes when a plaintiff becomes aware of his/her injury. In each of the cases cited by plaintiffs, however, the court analyzed the accrual question in terms of the plaintiff's alleged underlying constitutional or statutory injury, rather than any right the plaintiff may have had to challenge an adjudication on the merits of his/ her claim. See, e.g., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 255-56, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 502-03, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) ( ); Pauk v. Bd. of Trustees of City Univ., 654 F.2d 856, 861 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1631, 71 L.Ed.2d 866 (1982) ( ); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1368, 67 L.Ed.2d 347 (1981) ( ); Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842, 100 S.Ct. 83, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1977) ( ).
In the instant case, plaintiffs are not asking the Court to determine when the limitations period began to run on their alleged underlying injury, i.e., their alleged failure to receive a free appropriate public education. Instead, plaintiffs are asking this Court to decide when the limitations period began to run for the purposes of challenging the hearing officer's March 11, 1991 determination of whether they were, in fact, injured.
While plaintiffs are entitled to contest the hearing officer's decision under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2),2 nothing in that section of the statute confers upon plaintiffs a new cause of action. Rather, § 1415(e)(2), merely gives plaintiffs the right to challenge the unfavorable decision. Cf. Bireline, 567 F.2d at 263 ().
The right to bring an action under § 1415(e)(2) is analogous to the right a litigant in federal court has to appeal an unfavorable order of a district court.3 Under Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a litigant who is aggrieved by a district court order must file notice of his/her appeal "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from ...." Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1513 n. 5 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting Rule 4(a)(1), Fed.R.App.P.) (emphasis in original).
Further, the accrual rule in the statute of limitations borrowed by the Court in Quentin W. provides that the thirty-day limitations period for appeals of administrative hearings in New Hampshire begins to run on the date the administrative agency enters a decision. See RSA 541:6.4 While neither Rule 4(a)(1) nor RSA 541:6 are controlling in this action, they bolster the Court's conclusion that the thirty-day limitations period began to run on March 11, 1991. The Court is not persuaded, therefore, to apply a receipt rule to reinstate Count I of plaintiffs' complaint.5
Plaintiffs also assert a retroactivity argument in their motion for reconsideration. Essentially, plaintiffs contend that the general rule favoring retroactivity, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), should not be applied here because they were not on notice that the thirty-day limitations period began to run on the date that the hearing officer issued his decision. According to plaintiffs, applying the accrual rule as outlined in the Court's 8/1/91 Order would produce "substantial inequitable results." The Court disagrees.
"When the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata." Beam, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2448. Moreover, where the rule of law in question "antedates the events on which the dispute turns, the court merely applies a rule already decided, and the litigant has no basis on which to claim exemption from that rule." See id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2443.
In Quentin W., the Court held that the most analogous state statute of limitations for actions brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) was the thirty-day limitations period in RSA 541:6. See Quentin W., 750 F.Supp. at 550. To determine the point at which the thirty-day period began to run, the Court in Quentin W. clearly relied upon the date "the hearing officer issued her decision ... ." See id. at 548; see also id. at 551 (). Thus, the Court in Quentin W. applied the accrual rule to the parties before it in that case.
As the November 9, 1990 decision in Quentin W. predated the March 11, 1991 hearing officer's decision in this case, plaintiffs have "no basis on which to claim exemption from" its holding. See Beam, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2443.6 Accordingly, plaintiffs retroactivity argument is without merit.7
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Eric L. By and Through Schierberl v. Bird
...their disabilities; and (4) the program, activity, or benefit is funded by federal financial assistance. See I.D. v. Westmoreland School District, 788 F.Supp. 634, 639 (D.N.H.1992). Defendants concede that the defined subclass of disabled children are in fact "disabled" within the meaning o......
-
Colon v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20
...that unreviewed state administrative IDEA hearings have no preclusive effect on the federal court system); I.D. v. Westmoreland School District, 788 F.Supp. 634 (D.N.H. 1992)(same). Defendant CIU 20 further argues in response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment that, while the Th......
-
Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Board of Edu. of Albuquerque
...Sch. Dist., 888 F.Supp. 674, 680 (E.D.Pa.1995), aff'd on other grounds, 78 F.3d 859 (3rd Cir.1996); and I.D. ex rel. E.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 788 F.Supp. 634, 641 (D.N.H.1992)). Application of preclusion doctrines to such unreviewed rulings by administrative tribunals would produce ......
-
Borough of Palmyra, Bd. of Educ. v. F.C.
...alleged that child was denied access to free, appropriate education, she stated a claim under Section 504); I.D. v. Westmoreland School Dist., 788 F.Supp. 634, 639 (D.N.H.1992). Section 504's implementing regulations require that preschool, elementary, and secondary schools "shall provide a......