Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes
| Decision Date | 09 June 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. AN-491,AN-491 |
| Citation | 432 So.2d 759 |
| Parties | IDACON, INC., a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. Arthur C. HAWES and Laura R. Hawes, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
William C. Owen and W. Douglas Hall, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Ronald A. Mowrey, Tallahassee, for appellees.
Idacon appeals an order of the trial court granting the motion of Wakulla County State Bank to intervene and set aside a final judgment in favor of Idacon. We find intervention to have been improper in the instant case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Idacon conveyed certain real property in Wakulla County under a contract for deed to Mr. and Mrs. Hawes in January 1979. The Haweses promised to pay $21,710 in monthly installments and provided a mobile home as additional security. Idacon recorded the contract for deed and a financing statement describing the mobile home in the Wakulla County Records, but did not record its security interest in the mobile home with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV) as required by Chapter 319, Florida Statutes to perfect its security interest.
In October 1980, Mr. Hawes borrowed money from the Wakulla County State Bank. The bank intended that the mobile home would collateralize this loan, and the Haweses signed a notice of lien. The bank obtained physical custody of the title to the mobile home by satisfying another creditor who had a lien recorded on the title. No notice of the Idacon lien appeared on the face of the title since Idacon had not filed its lien with DMV. The bank, however, also did not file its lien with DMV. Instead, the notice of lien was placed in the bank's "pending file."
Subsequently, the Haweses defaulted on the Idacon contract, and in July 1981, Idacon instituted foreclosure proceedings in Wakulla County, simultaneously recording a notice of lis pendens on the real property and mobile home. Notices of default were filed against the Haweses, and the court entered summary final judgment in favor of Idacon on September 16, 1981. Pursuant to the judgment, the property, including the mobile home, was sold at a public sale on October 30, 1981. Idacon purchased the property at this sale for approximately the same amount of money as was owed on the Hawes contract. On November 11, 1981, a certificate of title describing the real property and the mobile home was issued by the clerk of court to Idacon.
In October 1981, Hawes became past due on his loan at the bank, and the bank reviewed its file. At this time it was discovered that the notice of lien had not yet been filed with DMV. The bank ultimately sent its notice of lien to DMV, but it also arranged for Hawes to sell the mobile home to a party named Crum. Hawes purported to sell the mobile home to Crum on December 31, 1981, for $4,226.37, the exact amount which Hawes owed the bank. The bank then made a loan to Crum for this identical amount. Thus, according to the bank's records, Hawes' loan was satisfied and Crum was now the owner of the mobile home, subject to a lien in the bank's favor to secure the loan to Crum.
On January 8, 1982, Idacon filed a motion for writ of possession and requested the court to order that Hawes be removed from possession of the property. On February 5, 1982, the bank, having learned of the Idacon judgment and title transfer, filed a motion to intervene and set aside the final judgment in favor of Idacon. Idacon filed a motion for order directing issuance of writ of possession and cancelling lien of record. The trial court entered the order here appealed which grants the bank's motion to intervene and sets aside the final judgment in favor of Idacon.
Based on the foregoing facts, the parties have raised interesting questions concerning the relative priority of creditors with unperfected security interests in motor vehicles. We do not address these questions, however, because in our view the trial court erred in granting intervention after final judgment. It is without question that a trial court has the power to grant intervention in "pending litigation." 1 It is also true that this power lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. In Interest of J.S., 404 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), appeal dismissed, 412 So.2d 467 (Fla.1982); Wong v. Wersebe, 365 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). After final judgment, however, the general rule is that intervention may not be allowed. Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969).
A narrow exception to this general rule was recognized in Wags Transportation System v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So.2d 751 (Fla.1956). In Wags, the court noted that "there...
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US BANK NAT. ASS'N v. Taylor
...also Svadbik v. Svadbik, 776 So.2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (affirming denial of motion to intervene post-judgment); Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (reversing order granting motion to intervene after final judgment of foreclosure had been entered and after judicial s......
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De Anza Corp. v. Hollywood Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 83-916
...So.2d at 344 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hanson Dredging, Inc., 393 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). In Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court repeated the rule and exception set forth in the foregoing opinions of this court and summarized that "Florid......
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Grimes v. Walton County, 91-945
...trial court; and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless shown to have been an abuse of discretion. Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Consistent with the policies which the Rule is intended to advance, the Rule should, in general, be liberally construe......