Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Isda

• Decision Date: 28 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 31751.,31751.
• Citation: 143 Idaho 366,146 P.3d 632
• Parties: The IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE, INC., Petitioner-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. The IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Respondent-Appellant-Cross Respondent, and Idaho Cattle Association, Inc., Intervener-Cross-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 632

146 P.3d 632

143 Idaho 366

The IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE, INC., Petitioner-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. The IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Respondent-Appellant-Cross Respondent, and Idaho Cattle Association, Inc., Intervener-Cross-Respondent.

No. 31751.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 2006 Term.

August 28, 2006.

Rehearing Denied November 8, 2006.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant-cross respondent. Brett T. Delange argued.

ACLU of Idaho Foundation, Boise, for respondent-cross appellant. Emil R. Berg argued.

Stoel Rives LLP, Boise, for intervener-cross respondent. Teresa A. Hill argued.

TROUT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a district court decision directing the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA) to disclose the Nutrition Management Plans (NMPs) of certain feedlots to the Idaho Conservation League (ICL). The district court's decision denying ICL's motion to compel the NMPs of certain other feedlots is also being appealed. We conclude the district court correctly interpreted the relevant statutes and affirm its decisions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to federal law, the Idaho Legislature adopted the Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act, which, among other things, requires beef cattle feedlot operators to provide an NMP for their facilities for ISDA's approval. See I.C. §§ 22-4901 through 4910. An NMP is a plan for "managing the amount, placement, form and timing of the land application of nutrients and soil amendments." I.C. § 22-4904(11). Apparently, for several years, those NMPs were prepared, approved by ISDA and then retained in ISDA files, and were routinely provided to ICL and others upon request. Then, in 2004, I.C. § 22-4906 was amended to provide, "Following department review and approval, the plan, and all copies of the plan, shall be returned to the operation and maintained on site. Such plans shall be available to the administrator on request." Immediately after the legislation as amended went into effect, ISDA returned all NMPs to the various feedlot operators and, since that time, has refused to keep any of the plans on site for longer than it takes to approve the plan and return it to the feedlot operator.

ICL made a Public Records Act request to the ISDA to disclose the NMPs for the Sunnyside Feedlot (Sunnyside), Aardema Heifer Lot (Aardema), Conversion, Inc. (Conversion), and Big Sky Heifer Ranch (Big Sky). See Public Records Act, I.C. §§ 9-337 through 350. ISDA responded that it could not provide any of the NMPs for those four entities because the NMPs had been returned to the feedlot operators. ICL then filed this action against ISDA, asking the district court to compel disclosure of the various NMPs. Ultimately, the Idaho Cattle Association was given permission to intervene on behalf of ISDA.

The district court ordered ISDA to disclose the NMPs for Aardema and Conversion, but not for Sunnyside and Big Sky. The court reasoned that because ISDA had authorized access to the NMPs pursuant to I.C. § 22-4906, under I.C. § 9-337(2), ISDA has a duty to disclose the Aardema and Conversion NMPs, even after they were returned to the feedlot owners. As to Sunnyside and Big Sky, however, the district court determined those NMPs need not be produced by ISDA because they had been filed using the Idaho OnePlan computer format, and a statute directs information so submitted is exempt from disclosure. See I.C. § 22-2718(4)(f)¹. ISDA appealed the district court's decision as to Aardema and Conversion, and ICL cross-appealed the court's determination as to Sunnyside and Big Sky. The Idaho Cattle Association intervened to support the district court's decision exempting the Idaho OnePlan documents.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). Only where the language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226, 231, 31 P.3d 248, 253 (2001).

III. DISCUSSION

The issues presented in this appeal include (1) whether NMPs, in general, are subject to the Public Records Act; and (2) whether NMPs submitted through the Idaho OnePlan are exempt from disclosure.

A. NMPs for Aardema and Conversion

ISDA's principal argument is that because ISDA returns the NMPs to the feedlot operators, ISDA need not make those plans available to the public because it no longer has possession of the NMPs. Citing I.C. § 9-338(2), ISDA asserts the public has a right to inspect only records that are in the possession of the custodian of records. ISDA's argument is not persuasive because the focus on who has possession of the NMP misses the mark; the real issue before the Court is whether the NMP is a record subject to examination by the public.

A public record "includes, but is not limited to, any writing containing information relating to the conduct or administration of the public's business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state agency...." I.C. § 9-337[12](11)(emphasis added). Clearly, a document need not be retained by an agency to qualify as a public record. In fact, the only relevant statute using the word "possession" is the provision quoted by ISDA that simply directs the custodian of the records to make available photocopying equipment so the public may exercise its right to copy public records. See I.C. § 9-338(2) ("The right to copy public records shall include the right to make photographs or photographic or other copies while the records are in the possession of the custodian of the records using equipment provided by the public agency ..."). That an NMP is no longer in the ISDA's possession is irrelevant to the question of whether an NMP is a public record. The ISDA cannot seriously contend the NMPs are not used by the ISDA and do not relate to the "conduct or administration of the public's business." In fact, at oral argument, ISDA conceded the NMPs were public records. The only question remaining is whether those records may be examined by the public.

The Legislature has provided that every person has a right to examine any public record and "there is a presumption that all public records in Idaho are open at all reasonable times for inspection except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." I.C. § 9-338(1). A comprehensive list of public records exempt from disclosure is found at I.C. §§ 9-340A through H. ISDA concedes the NMPs are not expressly exempt by statute. Even ISDA, then, does not read the requirement in I.C. § 22-4906 that NMPs are to be returned to the feedlot operators as creating an exemption from disclosure. Thus, the judicial inquiry is at an end: Because the NMPs are public records that are not exempted by statute, they may be examined by the public pursuant to I.C. § 9-338(1).

We are not persuaded by ISDA's attempts to circumvent these statutes requiring public disclosure by its argument that because the NMPs are no longer housed with ISDA, ISDA no longer has a duty to make the records available to the public. A state agency is expressly prohibited from preventing examination of a public record "by contracting with a nongovernmental body to perform any of its duties or functions." I.C. § 9-338(9). This statute indicates a clear policy by the Legislature that the public has a right to view and inspect records relating to the public's business and this right cannot be denied by the expediency of having some other entity conduct the public's business at some other location. Under I.C. § 9-338(1), the public's right to inspect is conditioned solely on whether the document is a public record that is not expressly exempted by statute.

Finally, ISDA argues the district court erred in its application of the term "custodian." A custodian is defined as "the person having personal custody and control of the public records in question. If no such designation is made by the public agency ... then custodian means any public official having custody of, control of, or authorized access to public records ...." I.C. § 9-337(2). ISDA contends the district court erred in finding ISDA had "authorized access" to the NMPs because ISDA had a designated custodian— an ISDA administrator—such that the default custodian provision did not apply. ISDA makes this claim despite its contention that the requested NMPs were not in its designated custodian's personal custody and control, so "the ISDA did not err in failing to produce that which it does not have." This argument is so disjointed as to not even qualify as circular: If the ISDA administrator did not have personal custody and control, then that administrator, by definition, was not a designated custodian. ISDA's concern that if all that is required to subject a document to disclosure is a governmental entity's authority to access a document, the universe of records available for public inspection would be exponentially increased ignores the fact that a document must first qualify as a public record before it even falls within the Public Records Act.

In any event, though there has been much debate about whether an ISDA official was a designated custodian or a default custodian and whether that person needed "possession" of or "authorized access" to the NMPs before the Public Records Act applied, we conclude such discussion is inapplicable to the issues before us. Whether an official is a "designated custodian" or is simply a custodian by virtue of the...