Iddings v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson County School Dist.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1951
• Docket Number: No. 32365,32365
• Citation: 155 Ohio St. 287,44 O.O. 294,98 N.E.2d 827
• Parties: , 44 O.O. 294 IDDINGS et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 287

155 Ohio St. 287

98 N.E.2d 827, 44 O.O. 294

IDDINGS et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. et al.

No. 32365.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 25, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Under the provisions of Section 4831-1, General Code, where a county board of education, as therein authorized, creates a new local school district from one or more local school districts or parts thereof, such action of the county board shall not take effect if a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory included in the newly created district and voting at the last general election shall within 30 days from the time such action is taken file with the county board of education a written remonstrance against such action.

2. The temonstrance, authorized by the provisions of Section 4831-1, General Code, is not effective unless signed by a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory included in such newly created district who catually voted at the last general election.

3. The provisions of Section 4831-1, General Code, prescribing the time for filing a remonstrance and the number and qualifications of remonstrators required to invalidate the action of a county board of education creating a new local school district from one or more local school districts or parts thereof, are not violative of either the Constitution of the state or of the United States.

On May 12, 1948, the Jefferson County Board of Education adopted a resolution to create a new local school district from the territory theretofore comprising the Port Homer Local School District and the Saline Local School District. On June 10, 1948, there was duly filed with the county board a written remonstrance against the creation of the new school district. The remonstrance contained the signatures of 705 qualified electors residing in the combined districts.

Thereafter the county board of education found and determined that the remonstrance was insufficient in that it did not contain the signatures of at least 330 qualified electors who voted in the territory constituting the newly created school district at the 1947 general election. It is agreed that 659 qualified electors residing in the territory included in the newly created school district voted in the 1947 general election. The county board named the new district 'Saline Local School District,' appointed a five-member board and directed an audit of the books of the former districts.

Suit was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County to enjoin further proceedings in the creation and establishment of the new local school district. Issue was made by petition, amended answer and reply.

Following hearing thereof the court found the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief prayed for.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law and fact resulted in a like finding and judgment.

The cause was thereupon duly appealed to this court.

Yonkee & Murphy and John W. Porter, all of Steubenville, for appellants.

Samuel Freifield, Steubenville, for appellees.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

The action of the county board of education involved in this case is authorized by Section 4831-1, General Code, which became effective September 25, 1947. That statute specifically authorizes a county board of education to 'create a new local school district from one or more local school districts or parts thereof'. The statute provides, however, that 'Such action of the county board of education shall not take effect if a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory included in such newly created district voting at the last general election shall within thirty days from the time such action is taken file with the county board of education a written remonstrance against it.'

It is conceded that substantially less than a majority of the remonstrators voted in the 1947 general election. That fact gives rise to the principal question of law presented, that is, whether the words, 'voting at the last general election', constituted a specific qualification of the signers of the remonstrance and, therefore, that the remonstrance to be effective must be by a majority of electors who actually voted in the newly created district at the last general election, as contended by the defendants, or whether that language should be construed merely 'as fixing the method or establishing the yard stick whereby it can be determined to a mathematical certainty actually the number of qualified electors (remonstrators) that are necessary to constitute a majority,' as contended by the plaintiffs.

It has been so frequently stated as to become axiomatic that the meaning and intent of a legislative enactment are to be determined primarily from the language itself. The plain provisions of a statute must control. If there is no ambiguity therein there is no occasion to construe or interpret. To construe or interpret what is already plain is not interpretation but legislation, which is not the function of courts. When the meaning is plain from the language employed, an attempt to construe it only tends to make ambiguous that which is simple and clear. The statute provides that to be effective the remonstrance must be by a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory and then goes further...