Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands

• Decision Date: 09 May 1944
• Citation: 19 So.2d 234,154 Fla. 554
• Parties: IDEAL FARMS DRAINAGE DIST. et al. v. CERTAIN LANDS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

19 So.2d 234

154 Fla. 554

IDEAL FARMS DRAINAGE DIST. et al. v. CERTAIN LANDS.

Florida Supreme Court

May 9, 1944

On Petition for Rehearing Aug. 1, 1944.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1944.

H. E. Oxford, of Lakeland, and Erle B. Askew, of St Petersburg, for petitioners.

Shackleford Farrior & Shannon, of Tampa, for respondents.

ADAMS, Justice.

The petitioner, a drainage district formed, pursuant to the general drainage law of Florida, Sec. 298.01 et seq. F.S. '41, F.S.A filed a bill to foreclose a lien for drainage taxes. Among other defenses interposed is the three year statute of limitations, Sec. 95.11 F.S.A., upon the theory that the tax is a liability created by statute. The lower court held the defense good and that ruling is before us under Rule 34 of this Court.

The petitioner insists the lower court was in error because: 1. No statute of limitations runs against the right of the sovereign to collect its taxes unless expressly made so; 2. The statute under which the taxes were levied provides that the same shall constitute a lien from the date of assessment until paid, thereby making the tax a perpetual lien until paid; [154 Fla. 556] and 3. The policy, established by the Legislature and the decisions of this Court over a long period of time, with reference to the imposition and collection of taxes, renders inapplicable the provisions of the general statute of limitations to actions brought to enforce the payment of taxes.

In People v. Hulbert, 71 Cal. 72, 12 P. 43, the Supreme Court of California held that a swamp land assessment imposed by the state legislature was a liability created by statute. For purposes material to this case the California statute, under which the drainage liability was imposed, is not dissimilar to ours. The California Court held the foreclosure of city taxes was barred under the same statute. Dranga v. Rowe, 127 Cal. 506, 59 P. 944. The authorities generally hold that where the legislature delegates power to reclaim or improve lands and assess the cost thereof the assessments are obligations imposed by law. Board of Com'rs v. Story, 26 Mont. 517, 69 P. 56; Lemni County v. Boise Livestock Loan Co., 47 Idaho 712, 278 P. 214; Town of Morganton v. Avery, 179 N.C. 551, 103 S.E. 138; Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Bates County, Mo., 216 S.W. 949; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 20 S.Ct. 585, 44 L.Ed. 701.

The law is also generally settled that a statute of limitations will run against a political subdivision. See 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Action, § 395; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County, 9 Cal.2d 624, 72 P.2d 138, 113 A.L.R. 370; and notes following in A.L.R.; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 19, 33 L.Ed. 231; Rosedale School Dist. No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212.

The Legislature of this state, by Sec. 95.02, F.S. '41, F.S.A. provided that the general statute of limitations would not apply to:

'* * * any action by this state, or by any officer or persons in behalf of this state, or to any action by or on behalf of the trustees of the Internal Improvement fund, or the seminary or school fund, or the board of education of the state, or any county or municipal corporation, or school district within this state, or with respect to any moneys or property held or collected by any officer or trustee or his sureties.'

An exception in the application of a statute to certain cases amounts to an affirmation of its application to cases not mentioned. In re Estate of Ratliff, 137 Fla. 229, 188 So. 128; 25 R.C.L. 983, § 230.

It cannot be said that the drainage district is a municipal corporation because it possesses no general power of sovereignty to levy and collect taxes. It is a quasipublic corporation. It makes the assessments and they become binding liens on the property yet they are not levied for governmental purposes. The levy of assessments is for special improvements to the reclaimed area. The district has power to issue bonds to finance the reclamation plan, however, the bond holder may proceed directly to enforce payment of his bonds in the event the supervisors fail, neglect or refuse to enforce payment on the assessed benefits within ninety days after they become delinquent. Sec. 298.45, F.S. '41 F.S.A.

We find the ruling of the circuit court free from error and the order is affirmed and certiorari is denied.

So ordered.

BUFORD, C. J., and TERRELL, CHAPMAN, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

ADAMS, Justice

The Ideal Farms Drainage District, comprising several thousand acres situated in Polk and Hillsborough Counties, Florida, was established by a decree of the Circuit Court of Polk County, Florida, on December 3, 1923, under the several provisions of Chapter 6458, Acts of 1913, Laws of Florida, Sections 298.01 to 298.72, Fla.Stats.1941, F.S.A. The boundaries of this Drainage District were expanded by decrees of the Court from time to time as authorized by statute, so as to embrace greater areas. One of the court decrees was dated May 2 1924, and another on October 13, 1926. While the District is located in the aforesaid counties, only such lands of the District as are situated in Hillsborough County are involved in this suit.

The Board of Supervisors of the District levied maintenance taxes from year to year and installment taxes against the lands of the District. These levies were by the Board, annually, certified to the tax collector of Hillsborough County, Florida, for collections, but none have been paid and the same are now delinquent for the years beginning with the year 1925 to and inclusive of the year 1939 on the lands accurately described for the amounts and years appearing in the bill of complaint.

The District issued and sold bonds and raised money which it is contended was used for the purpose of promoting the drainage program of the district. The benefits accruing to the lands from the drainage program are alleged to approximate a value of $1,000,000. On October 28, 1942, a suit was filed in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, for the purpose of enforcing the payment of the delinquent drainage taxes on the lands situated in Hillsborough County, Florida.

The Chancellor below held that Division (a) of Subsection 5 of Section 95.11, Fla.Stats.1941, F.S.A., was applicable to delinquent drainage taxes. The Section supra, provides that an action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture must be brought within three years. The answer as sustained is, viz.:

'Eleventh These defendants allege that no drainage taxes have ever been paid in the District on lands owned by Maurice Mountz, although the District is purported to have been created for twenty years; that no action has heretofore been brought, or is now pending, save these proceedings on behalf of the drainage district, or on behalf of its bond holders, to enforce the payment of any such taxes; that Section 4647, Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927, Section 95.02, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. exempt certain causes of action from the operation of the limitations defined in Chapter, or Title, where said Section is found, including 'any action by this State * * *, or any County or municipal corporation, or a school district,' but no mention is made of any other sort of taxing district, besides a school district; that as to parties and public entities not mentioned in said Section 4647, C.G.L. 1927, Section 95.02, Florida Statutes 1941, the limitations defined by Chapter 26, Comp.Gen.Laws, Sections 4646 to 4665, F.S.A. §§ 95.01 to 95.23 inclusive, apply; that a drainage district organized under the general drainage law is not a municipal corporation within the meaning of the constitution, or statutes of Florida; that in consequence Section 4663, par. 5, Clause 1, Comp.Gen.Stats., Section 95.11, subsection 5, Fla.Stats.1941, F.S.A. applies to causes of action in favor of the Drainage District, or its bond holders, which constitutes a cause of action 'upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture', and is barred by the three year limitations provided in that section for the reason that a special assessment for drainage purposes is 'a liability created by statute'; that the bond holders may, in the event the Supervisors fail to act for a period of ninety days, institute a suit on their own behalf to collect delinquent taxes, pursuant to Section 1473, Comp.Gen.Laws, Section 298.45, Fla.Stats.1941, F.S.A. or if any coupons go on default they have another remedy under Section 1493, Comp.Gen.Laws. Section 298.51, Fla.Stats.1941, F.S.A. but no such action has been instituted, or is now pending, save these foreclosure proceedings and save the alleged appointment of F. D. Oxford, one of the plaintiffs herein, as Receiver of said alleged District, as alleged in the Bill of Complaint herein, and which allegation is without knowledge of these defendants, and if the said L. D. Oxford is duly qualified and acting Receiver for said Drainage District, then his appointment was pursuant to some action, or suit, filed very recently and immediately preceding the filing of these foreclosure proceedings; that all levies, or purported levies, on account of the alleged bond issue are long since barred by the three year statute of limitations; that the present bond holders, as hereinabove alleged purchased the bonds at the nominal figure of 17 1/2 cents on the dollar, long after said bonds were in default and with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the matters hereinabove alleged; these defendants are entitled to a decree, declaratory, or otherwise, adjudging the lands of Maurice Mountz by operation of the statutes of limitations, free and clear of any claim for the total tax levies and for the instalment tax...