Iden v. Mondrian Hotel, B207387 (Cal. App. 1/7/2009)

• Decision Date: 07 January 2009
• Docket Number: B207387.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: KIMBERLY IDEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MONDRIAN HOTEL — LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

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KIMBERLY IDEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MONDRIAN HOTEL — LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

B207387.

Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One

January 7, 2009

Not to be Published in the Official Reports

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC369628, Jane Johnson, Judge. Reversed.

Law Offices of Hutchinson & Snider and Robert B. Hutchinson for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Thomas A. Delaney, Steven S. Streger and Alexandra M. Wilcox for Defendant and Respondent.

WEISBERG, J.^*

SUMMARY

A hotel patron sued the hotel after she was injured tripping on some luggage a bellman left in a doorway in her suite. The hotel obtained summary judgment on the grounds the obstruction was not a dangerous condition, and even if it was, the danger was open and obvious. The patron contends factual disputes render the grant of summary judgment erroneous. We agree, and reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Early in September 2006, appellant Kimberly Iden (Iden), her husband, and their friends, Faye and Erick Fernandez, flew to Los Angeles to celebrate Iden's 40th birthday. The trip was a surprise gift from Iden's husband, who chartered a private jet to fly the couples to Los Angeles from San Jose, and arranged for a limousine to meet them at the airport. The two couples planned to share a suite at respondent Mondrian Hotel (hotel) for one night. The group arrived at the hotel in the early afternoon. They spent several hours eating lunch at the hotel restaurant and lounging by the pool, while their room was readied. When the room was ready, the couples headed to their suite, a bright, well-lit room with large windows, white furniture and light colored carpeting and walls. The suite has a combined living and dining (common) area, with a separate bedroom and bath.

A few minutes after the group arrived at their suite, a hotel bellman delivered at least seven pieces of luggage. All the bags were black, and the pieces ranged in size from a small computer bag, to a garment bag, rolling cases and a duffel. The bellman deposited the luggage in the common area along a wall near the entrance to the bedroom, leaving one-to-three bags protruding into the doorway connecting the common area and bedroom. Iden knew the bellman had delivered the luggage, but did not know where he put it. No one moved any luggage from the spot where the bellman left it.

When the luggage was delivered, Iden and Ms. Fernandez were conversing in the bedroom. The two women stood near the doorway leading from the bedroom into the common area. Iden had her back to the common area, facing her friend. As the conversation ended, Iden either "stepped backwards" or "began turning" toward the doorway. As she did, her left foot hit a piece of luggage. She tripped and fell, breaking her wrist.

Iden sued the hotel for general negligence and premises liability. In pertinent part, she alleged that, while she was a patron of the hotel, its agent, the bellman, "acting within the course and scope of his employment with [the hotel], brought [her] luggage to the room and, negligently set one or more bags in a walkway area creating a dangerous condition." As a result, while walking from one room to another, Iden tripped, fell and sustained injuries.

In due course, the hotel moved for summary judgment. It argued the bellman's placement of the luggage did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law and, even if it did, the dangerous condition was "open and obvious," and a condition for which the hotel could not be liable. The court agreed and granted the motion. Iden appeals.

DISCUSSION

Iden insists the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. She maintains she should be permitted to prosecute her claims because a factual dispute exists as to whether the bellman's allegedly negligent placement of the luggage constituted a dangerous condition. She also argues the court erred in concluding the placement of the luggage constituted an "open and obvious" danger, absolving the hotel of any duty to warn or remedy the situation. Both assertions have merit.¹

Dangerous condition

The trial court found the placement of the luggage did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law. Iden contends that finding was erroneous. Iden's causes of action for general negligence and premises liability are predicated on the identical allegations that, by placing one or more pieces of luggage in a walkway area in the hotel suite, the bellman created a dangerous condition, and, as a direct result of the bellman's negligence — imputed to the hotel under the theory of respondeat superior — Iden tripped over the luggage while walking from one room to another, fell and sustained injuries.

To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, breached that duty, and that the breach was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. (Gordon v. Havasu Palms, Inc. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 244, 252.) Premises liability is a form of negligence, in which an owner has a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing its property to avoid exposing persons to unreasonable risk of harm. Failure to fulfill this duty is negligence. (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.)

Like any landowner, an innkeeper's liability for injuries sustained by guests on its premises is governed by ordinary negligence principles, as set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a). (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 (Rowland.) In such cases, the pivotal question is whether the proprietor acted as a reasonable person in managing its property in view of the probability of injury to others. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

Innkeepers are not insurers of the safety of their premises or of the equipment thereon, and are not absolutely liable for injuries sustained. (Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 416, 420-421.) No suggestion of negligence arises merely because an accident happens. (Edwards v. California Sports, Inc. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1284, 1287.) Sometimes an accident is just that, and no one is responsible for the unfortunate injury that occurs as a result. Liability will not attach in the absence of negligence. A landowner is negligent for failure to use reasonable care to discover any unsafe conditions on the property and to repair, replace or give adequate warnings of anything that could reasonably be expected to harm others. (Alcarez v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156 [property owners must maintain land in reasonably safe condition]; Lucas v. George T.R. Murai Farms, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1590 ["an owner of property is not an insurer of safety, but must use reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and must give warning of latent or concealed perils"]; Chance v. Lawry's, Inc. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 368, 373 [proprietor's duty to warn extends to conditions he knows are dangerous, as well as conditions that an exercise of ordinary care will reveal to be dangerous].) Whether a property owner has acted as a reasonable person in the management of the property depends on several factors including the likelihood of injury and the probable seriousness of an injury. (Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 371-372.)

Here, by concluding the bellman's placement of luggage did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law, the trial court found, in essence, the hotel acted reasonably toward Iden (that is, it did not breach its duty to exercise due care) even though the bellman failed to warn the occupants to avoid tripping on the luggage or to take precautions by placing it in a safer location. The hotel contends that, taken together, the fact that any obstruction posed by the luggage was obvious to a reasonably foreseeable user exercising due care (watching where she was going), the lighting was sufficient to make the bags visible, and Iden's admission that she did not know where the bags were when she stepped back into the common area, demonstrate the placement of the luggage did not create a dangerous condition, i.e., a substantial risk of injury, had the property been used with due care in a manner reasonably intended.

Relying on Akins v. County of Sonoma (1967) 67 Cal.2d 185, and Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, the trial court agreed and found there was no dangerous condition, as a matter of law. Both cases stand for the indisputable principle that a condition may be considered dangerous only if it presents an unreasonable risk of harm to persons using the premises in a foreseeable manner. (See Akins v. County of Sonoma, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 196). Put slightly differently, a "dangerous condition" is "one which a person of ordinary prudence should have foreseen would appreciably enhance the risk of harm." (Constance B. v. State of California, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 209.) Whether a particular condition is dangerous is a question of fact, unless the evidence points unerringly to a single conclusion. (Matthews v. City of Cerritos (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1382; Edwards v. California Sports, Inc., supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1288; Wallace v. Speier (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 387, 391 [question of an innkeeper's negligence in maintaining or operating its premises, resulting in injury to a guest, is ordinarily for the trier of fact].)

The hotel argues the issue of whether the placement of the luggage constituted a dangerous condition was properly resolved as matter of law because Iden's "sole evidence" of the dangerousness of the condition "was the fact that she fell," an argument improperly premised on the inapplicable doctrine of strict liability. (See Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 777 [property owner's liability may not be based in strict liability].)...