Idol v. Street
| Citation | 233 N.C. 730,65 S.E.2d 313 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 745,745 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | IDOL et al. v. STREET et al. |
Buford T. Henderson, Winston-Salem, for plaintiffs, appellants.
Womble, Carlyle, Martin & Sandridge, Winston-Salem, for defendants, appellees.
The ordinance under attack was adopted by the City-County Board of Health of the City of Winston-Salem and the County of Forsyth, which was created under Chapter 86 of the 1945 Session Laws of North Carolina. Hence, this question arises at the threshold of the appeal: Is Chapter 86 of the 1945 Session Laws repugnant to the provision of Article II, Section 29, of the North Carolina Constitution, which forbids the General Assembly to 'pass any local, private, or special act or resolution * * relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances'?
The organic law of the State was originally drafted and promulgated by a convention which met at Halifax in December, 1776. During the ensuing 140 years, the legislature of North Carolina possessed virtually unlimited constitutional power to enact local, private, and special statutes. This legislative power was exercised with much liberality, and produced a plethora of local, private, and special enactements. As an inevitable consequence, the law of the State was frequently one thing in one locality, and quite different things in other localities. To minimize the resultant confusion, the people of North Carolina amended their Constitution at the general election of 1916 so as to deprive their legislature of the power to enact local, private, or special acts or resolutions relating to many of the most common subjects of legislation.
The amendment is embodied in Article II, Section 29, of the State Constitution, and is couched in this language:
In thus amending their organic law, the people were motivated by the desire that the General Assembly should legislate for North Carolina in respect to the subjects specified as single united commonwealth rather than as a conglomeration of innumerable discordant communities. To prevent this laudable desire from degenerating into a mere pious hope, they decreed in emphatic and express terms that 'Any local, private, or special act or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be void', no matter how praiseworthy or wise such local, private, or special act or resolution may be.
A 'local act' is one operating only in a limited territory or specified locality. State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that Chapter 86 of the 1945 Session Laws is a local act, for it operates only in Forsyth County and its county seat, the City of Winston-Salem.
Chapter 86 of the 1945 Session Laws of North Carolina undertakes to confer power upon the Board of Aldermen of the City of Winston-Salem and the Board of Commissioners of Forsyth County to do these things through joint action: (1) To consolidate their respective public health agencies and departments; (2) to name a joint city-county board of health for regulating the public health interests of Winston-Salem and Forsyth County; and (3) to appoint a joint city-county health officers for administering public health laws and regulations in Winston-Salem and Forsyth County. Moreover, Chapter 86 of the 1945 Session Laws expressly declares that 'All laws and clauses of laws * * * in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict', and in that way attempts to abrogate as to Winston-Salem and Forsyth County only various provisions of general state-wide statutes creating county boards of health, authorizing county boards of health and the authorities of municipalities to regulate public health interests in their respective counties and municipalities, and requiring the separate election of county and municipal health officers. See Articles 3 and 5 of Chapter 130 of the General Statutes.
These things being true, it is clear beyond peradventure that Chapter 86 of the 1945 Session Laws is a local act relating to health. It necessarily follows that it is void for repugnancy to Article II, Section 29, of the State Constitution, no matter how praiseworthy or wise its provisions may be. Board of Health of Nash County v. Board of Com'rs of Nash County, 220 N.C. 140, 16 S.E.2d 677; Sams v. Com'rs of Madison County, 217 N.C. 284, 7 S.E.2d 540.
Inasmuch as the statute purporting to create their offices is unconstitutional, the members of the City-County board of Health for the City of Winston-Salem and the County of Forsyth were not lawful officers at the time of the adoption of the ordinance in question.
The defendants assert, however, that the judgment dismissing the action must be upheld even if Chapter 86...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Town of Boone v. State
...Shield of N.C. , 357 N.C. 170, 185–86, 581 S.E.2d 415, 426–27 (2003) (first alteration in original) (quoting Idol v. Street , 233 N.C. 730, 732–33, 65 S.E.2d 313, 314–15 (1951) (quoting N.C. Const. of 1868, art. II, § 29 (1917) (now art. II, § 24(3) ))). It was the purpose of the amendment ......
-
City of Asheville v. State
...provisions of this section shall be void." Id. at 185-86, 581 S.E.2d at 426-27 (omission in original) (quoting Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732-33, 65 S.E.2d 313, 314-15 (1951)). Thus, the Court [i]t was the purpose of [Article II, Section 24] to free the General Assembly from the enormous......
-
Standley v. Town of Woodfin
...communities.'" Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 189, 581 S.E.2d 415, 428 (2003) (quoting Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951)). The same would be true As our Supreme Court recognized in Bryant, our sex offender regulatory scheme depends in pa......
-
City of Asheville v. State
...Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C. , 357 N.C. 170, 185–86, 581 S.E.2d 415, 426–27 (2003) (quoting Idol v. Street , 233 N.C. 730, 732–33, 65 S.E.2d 313, 314–15 (1951) (first alteration in original) (quoting N.C. Const. of 1868, art. II, § 29 (1917) (now art. II, § 24(3) ))).It was th......
-
"garbage In, Garbage Out": the Litigation Implosion Over the Unconstitutional Organization and Jurisdiction of the City Court of Atlanta - Edward C. Brewer Iii
...389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); State v. Blancett, 174 P. 207 (N.M. 1918); In re Quinn, 46 N.E. 175 (N.Y. 1897); Idol v. Street, 65 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. 1951); In re Wingler, 58 S.E.2d 372 (N.C. 1950); Farrington v. New England Inv. Co., 45 N.W. 191 (N.D. 1890); Koch v. Keen, 255 P. 690 (......