Iglehart v. State

• Citation: 837 S.W.2d 122
• Decision Date: 24 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 229-91,229-91
• Parties: Helen Louise IGLEHART, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Page 122

837 S.W.2d 122

Helen Louise IGLEHART, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 229-91.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

June 24, 1992.

Roger D. Shipman, Denton, for appellant.

Jerry Cobb, Former Dist. Atty., Gwinda Burns, Ronald T. Wilson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Denton, Robert Huttash, State's Atty. and Matthew W. Paul, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant, Helen Louise Iglehart, was indicted for felony theft. Tex.Penal Code § 31.03. Appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, asserting former jeopardy for the crime alleged in the indictment. The trial court held a hearing on appellant's claim and subsequently denied the relief sought. Appellant appealed the denial of habeas relief, and the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed, ordering the indictment dismissed and appellant discharged from custody. Ex Parte Iglehart, 802 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1990). We granted the State's petition for discretionary review in accordance with Tex.R.App.Pro. 200(c)(3), (4) and (6). ¹ We will reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

The essential facts of this case are undisputed. On January 8, 1990, the home of Robert LaVaye, in Flower Mound, Texas, was burglarized. The items taken included a pistol, typewriter, fox-fur coat and three pieces of stereo equipment. Robert was the record owner of the pistol and typewriter, while his daughter, Valerie LaVaye, was the record owner of the fur coat and the stereo equipment. At the time of the theft, Valerie did not reside at the residence of her father. Both Robert and Valerie filed separate complaints regarding the theft of their respective property. However, Robert then filed a claim under his homeowner's insurance policy that requested reimbursement for all of the stolen items. Robert's insurance company concluded that the homeowner's policy covered all the items stolen from his residence.

On February 7, 1990, appellant was charged by information with the misdemeanor theft of Robert's pistol and typewriter. ² On February 10, 1990, appellant was indicted for the felony theft of Valerie's fur coat and stereo equipment. ³ On April 10, 1990, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the misdemeanor theft charge. The trial court found her guilty and she was sentenced to forty days confinement in the Denton County Jail. On April 18, 1990, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus with the district court. In her application, appellant asserted the felony theft prosecution would constitute double jeopardy, as prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After conducting a hearing on appellant's application, the trial court denied her requested relief.

On appeal to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, appellant's sole point of error was that "the double jeopardy clause ... prevents her subsequent prosecution for items stolen from Valerie LaVaye after [she] received a misdemeanor conviction for items stolen from Robert LaVaye during the same criminal act." Ex Parte Iglehart, 802 S.W.2d at 352-53. The court of appeals found that, under the facts of this case, only one "owner" was deprived of property. Consequently, both prosecutions comprised but one "offense." The court of appeals' conclusion was premised on several factors. First, the court cited § 1.07(a)(24) of the Penal Code, which defines "owner" as "a person who had title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to the possession of the property than the actor." Second, the court of appeals noted that it was the position of Robert's insurance company that all of the property stolen from his residence was considered his property for purposes of recovery under the homeowner's policy. The court of appeals then held:

Under the facts of the instant case and under the definition of "owner" set out by § 1.07 of the Texas Penal Code, Robert LaVaye should be treated as the "owner" of all of the items taken from his home on January 8, 1990. Since only one "owner" was deprived of his property during applicant's criminal act, only one offense was committed.

Ex Parte Iglehart, 802 S.W.2d at 353.

In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals cited Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2087, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), for the proposition that, "The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution, if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." Ex Parte Iglehart, 802 S.W.2d at 353. The court of appeals also cited § 31.09 of the Penal Code, which provides: "When amounts are obtained in violation of this chapter pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, whether from the same or several sources, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the amounts aggregated in determining the grade of the offense."

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals found that there was only one "owner" and, therefore, one offense under § 31.03. Thus, that court held:

Prosecution under the subsequent felony indictment would require proof of an unlawful appropriation of all of the property taken with intent to deprive the owner of such property, thus proving the very conduct that constituted the offense for which applicant has already been prosecuted. Since applicant has already received a conviction for theft against Robert LaVaye, we cannot properly allow her to be prosecuted once more for this same offense.

Id.

In its brief to this Court, the State argues that the court of appeals erred in its double jeopardy analysis. First, the State avers that the court of appeals erroneously relied on the position taken by Robert LaVaye's insurance company that he was the "owner" of all of the property stolen from his premises. The State contends that this position was irrelevant to the court of appeals' resolution of this case. Second, the State argues that the court of appeals opinion is in direct conflict with previous cases from this Court, holding that it is not violative of the double jeopardy clause to prosecute successively a defendant for more than one crime arising out of a single course of conduct when the criminal conduct affects two different victims. Third, the State argues that the court of appeals misconstrued Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. 2084. Fourth and finally, the State asserts that the court of appeals misconstrued § 1.07(a)(24) by creating a "hierarchy of ownership", in violation of the plain language of the statute and without any supporting authority.

In response, appellant asserts that the court of appeals correctly applied the Grady double jeopardy analysis to the facts of the instant case. Appellant argues that the cases cited by the State are distinguishable from the instant case, in that the cited cases dealt with multiple victims. Appellant contends that here there was only one victim in reality--Robert LaVaye--since he was the "owner" of all of the stolen property. Appellant further asserts that the State had the option of consolidating all the thefts into a single offense and charging appellant with that one crime, but, "[f]or whatever reason, be it mistake, miscommunication, or separation of duties amongst the various officials of the Denton County Attorney's Office, the State charged two offenses from the same conduct." As a final argument, appellant directs this Court to a line of Texas cases holding that a theft from multiple owners must be construed as only one offense, if such theft occurs at one time and at one place.

I.

We will first address the court of appeals holding that because there was only one "owner" of the stolen property, appellant committed but one offense. We find that the court of appeals was incorrect, both in its reliance on the position taken by Robert LaVaye's insurance company and in its construction of § 1.07(a)(24) of the Penal Code.

As regards the court of appeals' reliance on the insurance company's position that Robert LaVaye was the "owner" of the stolen property for purposes of his homeowner's insurance policy, the court of appeals cites no authority in its opinion for this proposition. Moreover, our own independent research has failed to uncover any statute, case or other persuasive authority capable of supporting the position taken by the court of appeals. An insurance policy, in essence, constitutes an agreement between insurer and insured, and is governed by various civil law doctrines, most of which are grounded in contract law. We do not presume to pass on the extent to which an insurer's policy statement would be of merit in resolving an insurance contract dispute; however, we can confidently say that it has no relevance to the criminal jurisprudence of this State.

We also find that the court of appeals' construction of § 1.07(a)(24), ⁴ is flawed. When construing a statute, a court must focus on the literal text of the statute. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). When the literal text of a statute is clear, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of such text. Id. It is apparent to this Court that the text of Subsection (a)(24) plainly defines an "owner" of property as either of three things: (1) a title owner, (2) a possessor, or (3) one with a greater right to possession than the actor. The use of the disjunctive in the statute patently indicates that whenever "owner" is used in the Penal Code, it may be construed to encompass any of the statutory definitions, unless otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere. Thus, we hold that the State was correct in asserting that Valerie--as title owner of the fur coat and stereo equipment--was an "owner" of such property under Penal Code § 31.03. Having determined that...