Ihnen v. Western Forge

• Decision Date: 20 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96CA0819,96CA0819
• Citation: 936 P.2d 634
• Parties: 21 Colorado Journal 410 Catarina IHNEN, Petitioner, v. WESTERN FORGE; The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado; and Director, Division of Workers Compensation, Respondents. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 634

936 P.2d 634

21 Colorado Journal 410

Catarina IHNEN, Petitioner, v. WESTERN FORGE; The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the

State of Colorado; and Director, Division of

Workers Compensation, Respondents.

No. 96CA0819.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. V.

March 20, 1997.

Jon C. Thomas, P.C., Jon C. Thomas, Colorado Springs, for Petitioner.

Ritsema & Lyon, P.C., Carol A. Finley, Colorado Springs, for Respondent Western Forge.

No Appearance for Respondents Industrial Claim Appeals Office.

Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.

Petitioner, Catarina Ihnen (claimant), seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel), which determined that Western Forge (employer) was entitled to a 50% offset for the social security insurance disability benefits (SSDI) that were payable to her. We affirm.

The facts are undisputed. Claimant's spouse died in early 1990. On account of his death, claimant was awarded $380 per month in mother's benefits by the Social Security Administration and her daughter received a like amount in survivor's benefits. Claimant also suffered a work-related injury in August 1990, and was awarded temporary total disability benefits of approximately $663 per month. Employer requested that claimant apply for SSDI.

Commencing October 1994, claimant was awarded SSDI of $411 per month, and pursuant to § 8-42-103(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.), employer reduced claimant's temporary total disability benefits by one-half of those benefits, or roughly $205 per month. However, the SSDI award rendered claimant ineligible for the mother's benefits that she had been receiving, claimant subsequently withdrew her application for SSDI benefits and obtained reinstatement of the mother's benefits.

Employer then petitioned to modify the temporary disability benefits by $205, based upon the $411 in SSDI that would have been payable to claimant if she had not withdrawn her application for those benefits. The effect of employer's request would have reduced claimant's overall family income by $175 per month.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the purpose of the statutory offset, to avoid duplication of benefits, was not met because the employer here had not contributed to the mother's benefits. The ALJ therefore denied employer's request.

On review, the Panel set aside the ALJ's order and determined that the fact that the mother's benefits did not constitute a "double recovery" for the same disability was not dispositive. Rather, under the language of the statute, the employer was entitled to reduce its liability for temporary total disability benefits based upon the amount of SSDI payable to the claimant, even though the claimant did not realize an economic gain.

Claimant contends that because she was entitled to the mother's benefits as a result of her spouse's death prior to, and independent of, the work-related injury, the offset statute should not have been applied. We disagree.

Section 8-42-103(1)(c)(I) provides that "where it is determined that periodic disability benefits granted by the federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance act are payable" to the claimant, temporary total disability benefits shall be reduced by one-half of the federal periodic benefits. The statute also provides that:

Upon request of the insurer or employer, the employee shall apply for such federal periodic benefits and respond to requests from the insurer or employer as to the status of such application. Failure to comply with this section shall be cause for suspension of benefits.

Our primary task in construing a statute is to discern the intent of the General Assembly. In doing so, words and phrases should be given effect according to their plain and obvious meaning. L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo.1994).

The phrase "where it is determined" in the 1963 version of a predecessor to § 8-42-103(...