Iii v. Town of Middlebury

• Decision Date: 06 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32271.,32271.
• Citation: 25 A.3d 728,131 Conn.App. 289
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Stephen R. FERRUCCI IIIv.TOWN OF MIDDLEBURY et al.

131 Conn.App. 289

25 A.3d 728

Stephen R. FERRUCCI III

v.TOWN OF MIDDLEBURY et al.

No. 32271.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 26, 2011.Decided Sept. 6, 2011.

Thomas G. Moukawsher, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).Nicole D. Dorman, West Hartford, for the appellee (named defendant).GRUENDEL, LAVINE and BEAR, Js.GRUENDEL, J.

This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of a municipal retirement plan. The plaintiff, Stephen R. Ferrucci III, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the town of Middlebury.¹ He claims that the court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to (1) his eligibility for a “normal retirement” benefit pursuant to the provisions of the defendant's retirement plan (plan) and (2) his claim of promissory estoppel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; see Martinelli v. Fusi, 290 Conn. 347, 350, 963 A.2d 640 (2009); reveals the following facts. The plaintiff was born on November 2, 1949, and was hired by the defendant as a full-time police officer on December 1, 1974. He was a member of a bargaining unit comprised of police officers that negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements with the defendant, including one effective July 1, 1988, to June 30, 1990. That agreement required, inter alia, the defendant to “maintain in effect for the duration of this [a]greement the [plan] dated July 1, 1967, as amended on February 14, 1973.”

The plaintiff retired as a full-time police officer at the age of thirty-eight on October 24, 1988. At that time, he had attained almost fourteen years of credited service with the defendant. In his deposition testimony, which was submitted in support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff averred that he “left that job [with the defendant] for ... a better working schedule” and further that he had secured a position with “Local 760 of the ... Service Employees International Union,” with whom he subsequently worked for more than two decades.

Seven years after terminating his employment with the defendant, the plaintiff contacted the defendant's finance director seeking information about his retirement benefit under the plan. The finance director, in turn, contacted the plan's actuary, who, in a letter dated December 4, 1995, calculated that the plaintiff would become eligible for a monthly benefit of $658.89 pursuant to the normal retirement provisions of the plan beginning December 1, 2004. Once informed of that calculation, the plaintiff met with a financial advisor, modified certain contributions to a variable annuity contract and made plans to retire from his current employment at a date certain.²

In 2002, the defendant's retirement committee consulted with the plan's actuary. In response, the actuary prepared a December 12, 2002 letter, a copy of which was provided to the plaintiff, which stated that the plaintiff would not be entitled to a monthly benefit pursuant to the normal retirement provisions of the plan on December 1, 2004. Rather, it stated that the plaintiff could receive a reduced monthly benefit of $263.56 pursuant to the early retirement provisions of the plan on that date and would qualify for the $658.89 normal retirement benefit on December 1, 2014. On October 15, 2004, the plaintiff agreed to receive the reduced benefit while reserving his right to contest the denial of the normal retirement benefit.³

The plaintiff commenced the present litigation in 2006. His March 21, 2007 amended complaint contained two counts against the defendant alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. On June 8, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, to which it attached in support thereof a copy of the plan and portions of the plaintiff's deposition testimony. See Practice Book § 17–45. Following argument thereon, the court rendered summary judgment in the defendant's favor, and this appeal followed.

Before considering the precise claims presented on appeal, we note the well established standard of review. “Practice Book § [17–49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.... The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.... The party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Practice Book §§ [17–44 and 17–45]. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.... A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiffs claim and involves no triable issue of fact.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiner v. Clinton, 106 Conn.App. 379, 382–83, 942 A.2d 469 (2008).

I

The plaintiff first contends that the court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to his eligibility for a normal retirement benefit under the plan. We disagree.

Resolution of the plaintiff's claim involves interpretation of the plan. “It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract.” D'Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn.App. 834, 838, 898 A.2d 228, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905, 907 A.2d 88 (2006); see also O'Connor v. Waterbury, 286 Conn. 732, 743–49, 945 A.2d 936 (2008) (interpreting collective bargaining agreement under contract law principles). Similarly, our Supreme Court has held that statements contained in a written retirement plan give rise to an employer-employee contract. See Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 503, 144 A.2d 312 (1958).

“The law governing the construction of contracts is well settled. When a party asserts a claim that challenges the ... construction of a contract, we must first ascertain whether the relevant language in the agreement is ambiguous.... A contract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself.... Accordingly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.... When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties' intent is a question of fact.... If a contract is unambiguous within its four corners, intent of the parties is a question of law requiring plenary review.... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Connor v. Waterbury, supra, 286 Conn. at 743–44, 945 A.2d 936.

The plan specifies four kinds of retirement: normal retirement, early retirement, automatic retirement and disability retirement. The plaintiff concedes that he is not eligible for either an automatic retirement or a disability retirement. Accordingly, the salient inquiry is whether he qualifies for a normal requirement or early retirement under the plan.

As a preliminary matter, Article II of the plan sets forth various definitions to be used therein. In Article II, § 20, “normal retirement date” is defined in relevant part as follows: “[T]he ‘Normal Retirement Date’ of a policeman means the first day of the month coincident with or next following the later of (i) the date on which he completes twenty-five (25) years of Credited Service or (ii) the date on which he attains age fifty-five (55), but in no event later than (iii) his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday.” (Emphasis added.) The term “normal retirement date” is used in both the normal retirement and early retirement sections of the plan.

The requirements for a normal retirement are set forth in Article V, § 1, of the plan. That section provides in relevant part that “[a]ny [m]ember who on or after the [e]ffective [d]ate (i) shall attain his [n]ormal [r]etirement [d]ate, (ii) shall have completed at least ten (10) years of [c]redited [s]ervice and (iii) shall thereafter retire, shall be entitled to receive a monthly normal retirement benefit upon application therefor.... Such monthly normal retirement benefit shall be equal to 11/2 [percent] of the [m]ember's [a]verage [m]onthly [s]alary, multiplied by his years and tenths-of-a-year of [c]redited [s]ervice, not in excess of thirty (30) years.”

The requirements for an early retirement are set forth in Article V, § 2, of the plan, which provides in relevant part that “[o]n or after the [e]ffective [d]ate, any [m]ember whose employment with the [defendant] terminates prior to his [n]ormal [r]etirement [d]ate, and who has attained age fifty-five (55) and who has ten (10) or more years of [c]redited [s]ervice may retire.... A member so retired will receive, upon application therefor, a benefit commencing at time of early retirement computed in accordance with [s]ection 1 of this Article V on the basis of his [c]redited [s]ervice and [a]verage [m]onthly [s]alary at the time of early retirement, but reduced by 1/2 of 1 percent for each complete calendar month by which the date of commencement of such [m]ember's early...