Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission

• Decision Date: 04 January 2016
• Docket Number: HHBCV146025838S
• Court: Superior Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Joseph Maturo, Jr. v. State Employees Retirement Commission

Joseph Maturo, Jr.
v.
State Employees Retirement Commission

No. HHBCV146025838S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

January 4, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Carl J. Schuman, Judge, Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Joseph Maturo, Jr., appeals from the declaratory ruling of the defendant state employees retirement commission (commission) concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive a disability pension while serving as mayor of East Haven. The court affirms the commission and dismisses the appeal.

I

In its December 18, 2014 decision and declaratory ruling, the commission found the following facts. (Return of Record (ROR), pp. 790-94.) The plaintiff served as a firefighter for the town of East Haven (town) from 1973 to 1991. During this time, he participated in the Connecticut Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS).

In September 1991, the town separated the plaintiff from service on the basis of a service-connected disability. A January 22, 1992 letter from the commission informed the plaintiff that it had approved his application for early retirement, effective October 1991, and that, if he again accepted employment with the town, his retirement payments would be suspended.

The plaintiff appeared before a medical examining board in January 1993.

In February 1993, the commission gave final approval to the plaintiff's application for early retirement and for service-connected disability retirement benefits, retroactive to October 1991. A March 1993 letter from the commission advised the plaintiff that " his eligibility retirement allowance is contingent on [his] being permanently and totally disabled from performing any gainful employment in the service of your former employer [and that] you may not accept reemployment with that municipality." (ROR, p. 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

In 1997, the plaintiff nonetheless won election as mayor of the town. He served in that position until 2007, when he lost a reelection bid. During this time period, the plaintiff received both a salary from the town and his disability retirement benefits.

In June 2010, the assistant director of the retirement services division at the office of the state comptroller sent the plaintiff a letter advising him that he " cannot serve in a paid position in/for East Haven and still be eligible to collect [his] MERS disability retirement benefit and that the prior interpretation of the Connecticut General Statutes that permitted Petitioner to receive the disability benefit while he received a salary in a non-MERS participating position was an 'erroneous interpretation.'" (ROR, p. 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

The plaintiff again won election as mayor of the town in November 2011. Shortly thereafter, a MERS supervisor informed the plaintiff that he was " no longer considered to be disabled under the statutes" because 1) " [t]he position of Mayor of East Haven is a full-time position which is expected to exceed ninety days per calendar year, " and 2) " [t]he fact that [he was] performing the duties of [Mayor] indicates that [he is] neither permanently nor totally disabled from engaging in gainful employment in the service of the municipality." (ROR, p. 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).) The letter also notified the plaintiff that, as of November 19, 2011, he would no longer receive disability benefits.^[1]

At this point, a long and somewhat complicated administrative review process began. (ROR, pp. 790, 793-94.) In January 2012, the plaintiff requested that the retirement services division reconsider its decision to terminate his retirement benefits. The division declined to change its position.

The plaintiff then appealed to the commission.^[2] In June 2012, the petitioner testified at an informal hearing before a subcommittee of the commission. The subcommittee referred the matter to the full commission, which scheduled a second informal hearing. At the February 2014 hearing, the plaintiff's lawyer presented a summary of the argument, the plaintiff provided testimony, and State Senator Leonard Fasano spoke on the plaintiff's behalf. In May 2014, the commission voted to deny reinstatement of the plaintiff's retirement benefit.

The plaintiff next filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the commission seeking reversal of the commission's decision and reinstatement of the plaintiff's service-connected disability benefits retroactive to the date of termination. On December 18, 2014, the commission issued its final decision denying the relief sought in the declaratory ruling.

The plaintiff next appealed to this court. The plaintiff thereafter obtained a stay of the appeal while the General Assembly considered legislation that would allow persons in the plaintiff's position to collect retirement benefits while employed or reemployed by a participating municipality in a non-MERS participating position. The legislature passed the bill but, on July 2, 2015, Governor Malloy vetoed it. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15-188; Commission's brief, Exhibit A. The parties then briefed the case and the court heard the appeal on December 18, 2015.

II

Under the UAPA, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., judicial review of an agency decision is " very restricted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 136-37, 778 A.2d 7 (2001). Section 4-183(j) of the General Statutes provides as follows: " The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

Stated differently, " [r]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable . . . Neither [the appellate] court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 304 Conn. 317, 324, 39 A.3d 1095 (2012). " It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [agency], on the facts before [it], acted contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn. 333, 343, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).

Our Supreme Court has stated that " [a]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Longley v. State Emples. Ret. Comm'n, 284 Conn. 149, 163, 931 A.2d 890 (2007). " Even for conclusions of law, [t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse if its discretion . . . [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts . . . [Similarly], this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is . . . involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion . . . Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference . . . We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation . . . [When the agency's] interpretation has not been subjected to judicial scrutiny or consistently applied by the agency over a long period of time, our review is de novo." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, 310 Conn. 276, 281-83, 77 A.3d 121 (2013). These principles apply fully to appeals from declaratory rulings. See MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, supra, 257 Conn. 129-30, 136-37; Connecticut Business & Industry Ass'n, Inc. v. CHHC, 218 Conn. 335, 344, 589 A.2d 356 (1991).

III

The court first discusses the statutory scheme. The principal statute is General Statutes § 7-438. The...