Ikner, In re
| Decision Date | 15 September 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-7526,88-7526 |
| Citation | 883 F.2d 986 |
| Parties | , Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,079 In re Clinton Melvin IKNER, Jr., Debtor. Linda L. LEE, f/k/a Linda Miller and Robert Peters, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clinton Melvin IKNER, Jr., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Theodore L. Hall, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Reid, Friedman & Perloff, Barry A. Friedman, Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Before CLARK and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by two judgment creditors from the judgment of the district court, affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court in an adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court held that an Alabama judgment in favor of plaintiffs, resulting from an automobile accident, was dischargeable in bankruptcy.
In January 1981, Linda L. Lee, formerly known as Linda Miller, and James Robert Peters filed suit against Clinton Melvin Ikner in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, for injuries caused by a collision between Ikner's car and that of Lee. Peters was driving Lee's car at the time and Lee was a passenger. The complaint contained two counts, one on negligence and the second on wantonness.
After a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs on the second count and, without making findings of fact, entered judgment for plaintiffs on October 24, 1984. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision on October 4, 1985. Thus, Ikner became liable for a judgment in favor of Lee and Peters in a total amount of $57,500. On May 1, 1986, Ikner filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Lee and Peters then instituted an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, seeking a determination that under section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, the judgment debt was not dischargeable, because it was "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor," Ikner. 1
Admitted in evidence in the adversary proceeding were the pleadings, the transcript of testimony and the judgment from the state court trial and the opinion of the state supreme court. In addition, the bankruptcy judge heard testimony regarding each party's version of the collision. The bankruptcy court held that the state court judgment was merely that Ikner's conduct was "wanton" and that there was not clear and convincing evidence before the bankruptcy court that the accident resulted from the debtor's willful and malicious or deliberate and intentional conduct. The court found the following:
In this case, the evidence clearly established that the debtor and Linda Lee had engaged in an often abusive relationship over a period of time. At the time of the accident, this relationship had ended, with the evidence proving that the parting was on amicable, if delicate, terms.
This Court does not doubt that Linda Lee saw the debtor driving alongside her car or that the two cars collided as a result of which the occupants of Lee's car suffered personal injuries.
In a case under Section 523(a)(6), this Court cannot measure degrees of culpability.... While the debtor's past relationship with Linda Lee and his past conduct to her is reprehensible, this Court cannot find from inference or innuendo that in the specific instance of the automobile accident, the debtor deliberately and intentionally collided with Linda Lee's car and intended to cause the accident and subsequent injury to the vehicle's occupants.
Here, both parties gave plausible explanations as to the cause of the accident, but there is no clear and convincing evidence that the accident resulted from the debtor's intentional conduct.
The court held that the "willful and malicious" standard under the Bankruptcy Code thus was not met and the debt was, therefore, dischargeable.
Appellants moved for a new trial, amendment of judgment, and amendment or addition to findings of fact, principally claiming that the Alabama state court judgment precluded reconsideration by the bankruptcy court of the evidence and facts established in the state court proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied the motion. On appeal to the district court, the decision establishing the debt to be dischargeable was affirmed. In discussing whether the bankruptcy court erred by not applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the Alabama court's finding of wantonness, the district court stated:
Had the state court made specific findings of fact which, to use the language of In re Latch, [820 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir.1987),] "unambiguously establishe[d] 'wilfulness' and 'maliciousness' " on the debtor's part the result would be different. There does seem to be a distinction between wantonness, requiring an intent to do an act, and willful and maliciousness which requires an intent to cause or produce an injury. As such, a finding of wantonness with no further factual findings does not satisfy the aforementioned requirements [for applying the doctrine of issue preclusion].
The court further upheld the bankruptcy court's determination that plaintiffs did not prove willful and malicious injury, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, by clear and convincing evidence. From the district court's decision, plaintiffs appealed to this court.
In order to except from discharge in bankruptcy an individual's debt under section 523(a)(6), the party seeking the exception must prove the willfulness and maliciousness of the act from which the debt arose by clear and convincing evidence. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir.1988). Willful means intentional or deliberate and can not be established merely by applying a recklessness standard. Id. at 1262-63 ().
Appellants contend that the bankruptcy court was bound by the findings of the state trial court as to how the collision occurred, and is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from retrying the issue of willful and malicious injury. They maintain that the state court's finding of wantonness is proof that Ikner's conduct was "willful and malicious." The bankruptcy court was precluded from retrying an issue allegedly litigated in a prior proceeding only if:
(1) the issue at stake was identical to the one involved in the prior litigation;
(2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior litigation; and
(3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987). 2
In asserting that a finding of willful and malicious injury was essential to a determination of wantonness, appellants rely predominantly upon the statement made by the Alabama Supreme Court in reviewing the judgment of the trial court:
There are two possible conclusions which could be drawn from the evidence presented in this case. Either the defendant [Ikner] intentionally injured the plaintiffs in a fit of jealousy or the plaintiffs, for no apparent reason other than inattention or intoxication, negligently ran into an innocent defendant.... We are not in a position to weigh the evidence.... Since there was credible evidence to support the trial court's findings, we must presume them to be correct.
Ikner v. Miller, 477 So.2d 387, 389 (Ala.1985).
The Supreme Court simply held that it presumed the findings of the trial court to be correct on the issue of wantonness. Since the trial court did not make specific findings of fact, the Supreme Court's speculations as to what those findings were can hardly be considered conclusive findings of fact, as appellants argue.
The issue at stake in the Alabama trial was wantonness. The Alabama Supreme Court defined the standard for wantonness in Lynn Strickland Sales and Service, Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So.2d 142 (Ala.1987), in which the court stated:
Implicit in wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct is an acting, with knowledge of danger, or with consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some act will likely result in injury.
Id. at 145. The court then continued, citing Smith v. Roland, 243 Ala. 400, 403, 10 So.2d 367, 369 (1942):
Before one can be convicted of wantonness, the facts must show that he was conscious of his conduct and conscious from his knowledge of existing conditions that injury would likely or probably result from his conduct, that with reckless indifference to consequences, he consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty which produced the injury.
510 So.2d at 145 (emphasis added). In describing the distinction between wantonness and negligence, the Strickland court cited Dooley's Modern Tort Law, sec. 4.22 (1982) at 117:
Willful and wanton conduct has a well-defined meaning at law. It is sometimes expressed in terms of 'reckless disregard of the safety of another.'
The Supreme Court of Alabama again addressed the issue of wantonness in McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534 So.2d 228 (Ala.1988). The court stated: " 'Wantonness' is defined by the Court as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result." Id. at 231. The court found that the driver of a vehicle had engaged in wanton conduct by pulling out in front of an oncoming truck "without regard for the present danger." Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
Thus, although wantonness involves a conscious act and knowledge that injury is...
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