Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Health Sys.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 11 -cv-02752-LHK |
| Parties | MIGUEL ILAW, an individual, Plaintiff, v. DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY HEALTH SYSTEM, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Miguel Ilaw ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, a former employee of Defendants Daughters of Charity Health System ("Daughters of Charity"), Caritas Business Services ("Caritas"), and O'Connor Hospital, brings suit under Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), in addition to the claims of gender discrimination and retaliation alleged in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), alleges pay discrimination and hostile work environment. See ECF No. 32. Defendant Daughters of Charity Health System ("Defendant") moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss all four claims in Plaintiff's SAC for failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a sufficient basis for equitable tolling.1 See ECF No. 40. The Court held a hearing on the motion on February 2, 2012. Having considered the parties' submissions and argument and the relevant law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice.
Plaintiff was employed as an "insurance verifier/financial advisor/patient services" by Daughters of Charity and Caritas from March 2007 to September 2010. SAC at 4:10-13. In May 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to work at O'Connor Hospital. Id. at 10:7-9. Plaintiff alleges that, throughout his employment with Defendants, he was the only male in his department and that his hourly rate was less than similarly situated female employees. Id. at 4:13-17. Plaintiff further alleges that on July 27, 2010, his Department Director, Ms. Mary Ellen Swigert, berated Plaintiff for not following instructions, which required Plaintiff to be in two places at one time. See id. at 10:21-24. Plaintiff alleges that he was "being solely questioned . . . and targeted" when Swigert sent an email only to Plaintiff that questioned his patient accounts. Id. at 27:14-20. Plaintiff complained to Julie Hatcher, O'Connor Hospital's Director of Employment, and to Don Briones, Caritas's Executive Director. Id. at 27:23-26, 28:4-7. Briones assured Plaintiff that an investigation would be conducted and that Plaintiff would be transferred from O'Connor Hospital in San Jose to Caritas in Redwood City. Id. at 28:8-10.
Due to the workplace stress caused by his two supervisors, Plaintiff went to the emergency room on August 4, 2010, complaining of severe heart palpitations. Id. at 28:15-18. Later that day, Plaintiff found photos of a female co-worker wearing a bracelet Swigert gave her, which led Plaintiff to question the "boss-to-employee" relationship. Id. at 28:22-26, 29:1-17. Plaintiffshowed the photos to Hatcher and asked her to conduct an investigation because it implied favoritism and bias. Id. at 29:12-25.
On August 24, 2010, Plaintiff spoke to EEOC Investigators, Jerold Mars and Rosa Salazar, to complain about the hostile work conditions of his job. Id. at 30:20-25. Salazar recommended to Plaintiff that he ask for a "remedy and resolution" of his workplace problems. Id. The next day, Dr. Daniel Shin, Plaintiff's primary physician, prescribed him Valium for work-related anxiety. Id. at 31:6-11. Dr. Shin then referred Plaintiff to another doctor, Dr. Solis, for "mental therapy." Id.
On August 26, 2010, Plaintiff took the advice of the EEOC Investigators and emailed Hatcher and Kris DeCossio, O'Connor Hospital's Labor Relations Manager, to request an investigation and a resolution to his workplace problems. Id. at 30:6-10, 31:15-18. Neither Hatcher nor DeCossio replied to Plaintiff's email. Id. at 31:19-20. About a week later, on September 3, 2010, Doctors Shin and Solis began more extensive treatments of Plaintiff's "severe anxiety from work-related stress." See id. at 31:23-26. In the course of these treatments, Plaintiff took time off from work and resumed his duties on September 14, 2010. See id. That same day, Plaintiff was asked to meet with Hatcher and Ms. Odena, Caritas' Director of Employment, who gave Plaintiff his last paycheck and presented him with a termination agreement to sign. Id. at 32:1-17. They informed Plaintiff that he could not "work along with Swigert's style" and that "today [was his] last day whether [he signs] it or not." Id. at 32:11-21. Plaintiff refused to sign and left. Id. at 32:23.
On November 5, 2010, Dr. Mohan Nair performed a medical examination of Plaintiff in conjunction with a worker's compensation claim Plaintiff filed against Defendants. Id. at 35:17-24; 38:13-24. Thereafter, Dr. Nair issued a Qualified Medical Evaluation Report, which diagnosed Plaintiff with "Temporary Psychiatric Disability" caused by "work-related disparate treatments" and "HIV illness." Id. at 38:13-24. Dr. Nair also recommended psychotherapy treatments for Plaintiff. Id. at 38:21-22. Subsequently, Dr. Nair performed another examination of Plaintiff on August 22, 2011, and again diagnosed Plaintiff with psychiatric disability. Id. at 38:23-24. At some point, Plaintiff's health insurance was terminated, which was a source of concern for Plaintiff because Plaintiff was HIV positive. See id. at 60:19-22.
Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2011, he met with EEOC Officer Mars to request a "re-opening" of his case and renewed investigation on the merits of Plaintiff's claims. SAC at 62:20-24, 63:19-21. Plaintiff returned on June 2, 2011 to speak with EEOC Officer Salazar, making the same requests. Id. at 62:20-23. Both officers denied Plaintiff's requests. Id. at 64:15-16.
On September 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination against O'Connor Hospital with the EEOC, based on alleged discriminatory acts that occurred between May 2010 and September 14, 2010. See Compl. at 17, ECF No. 1. On October 20, 2010, Plaintiff requested a Notice of Right to Sue authorization with respect to his EEOC charge. See Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Ex. A. Plaintiff's Right to Sue Notice was issued on October 22, 2010. See Compl. at 18.
On November 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit in Santa Clara County Superior Court against the same defendants named in this action, among others, seeking damages under California Government Code § 12940 for alleged gender discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See RJN Ex. B. Plaintiff did not raise his federal claims in the state court action. The case settled at court-ordered mediation with a neutral mediator, but Plaintiff changed his mind a few days later and withdrew from the settlement agreement. See SAC at 39:14; 40:6-24. Plaintiff thereafter fired his attorney and continued to proceed pro se in the state action. SAC at 43:14-17. Plaintiff eventually moved to dismiss his state court action without prejudice, which the state court granted on May 31, 2011. See RJN Ex. C.
On June 7, 2011, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant in federal court. See ECF No. 1. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on July 7, 2011, ECF No. 11, to which Plaintiff responded by filing a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ECF No. 20. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, ECF No. 27, to which Plaintiff failed to file an opposition. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's FAC as time-barred, but granted leave to amend to give Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, opportunity to allege facts supporting equitable tolling. See ECF No. 31 at 4-6. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on October 4, 2011, ECF No. 32, and Defendant again moved to dismiss, ECF No. 40. Plaintiff filed a three-sentence opposition to which he attached a newrequest for a right to sue letter, and a new charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC, this time naming Defendant Daughters of Charity, both dated October 20, 2011.3 ECF No. 41.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to allege "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citations omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
Nonetheless, the Court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, and the "[C]ourt may look beyond the plaintiff's complaint to matters of public record" without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment. Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 964 (1995); see Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor is the Court required to "'assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.'" Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) . Mere "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted...
To continue reading
Request your trial