Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. McLain

• Decision Date: 30 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2013–CA–01660–SCT.,2013–CA–01660–SCT.
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY d.b.a Canadian National/Illinois Central v. Luther W. McLAIN.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

174 So.3d 1279

ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY d.b.a Canadian National/Illinois Central

v.Luther W. McLAIN.

No. 2013–CA–01660–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 30, 2015.

Charles Henry Russell, III, George H. Ritter, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.

David Neil McCarty, Robert Walter Schmieder, attorneys for appellee.

Before DICKINSON, P.J., PIERCE and COLEMAN, JJ.

Opinion

COLEMAN, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Luther W. McLain filed suit in 2004 against Illinois Central Railroad. He alleged that Illinois Central's negligence caused his degenerative back injury. At trial, McLain had improper contact with a juror, committed perjury on the stand, and solicited a witness to commit perjury on the stand to corroborate his story. The trial judge reserved sanctioning McLain until after the jury verdict. The jury found for McLain, assessed his damages as $150,000, and judgment was entered accordingly. Thereafter, the trial judge sanctioned McLain $500 for juror contact and $10,000 for solicitation of a witness. We affirm the existing sanctions, but we hold that the trial judge abused her discretion in failing to impose further sanctions. Given the severity of committing perjury and solicitation and the cumulative effect of the violations taken as a whole, we reverse the judgment against Illinois Central, and we render judgment here in favor of Illinois Central.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2. Luther McLain began working for Illinois Central Railroad (d/b/a Canadian National/Illinois Central) in 1970 and retired in 2002.¹ In 2001, McLain was diagnosed with spondylolisthesis

, disc degeneration, and a disc rupture. In 2004, McLain brought the instant suit against Illinois Central claiming that Illinois Central was negligent in failing to provide McLain a safe place to work, safe methods for working, safe tools, and enough manpower. Illinois Central denied the allegations.

¶ 3. During discovery, in his deposition, McLain stated the heaviest thing he had lifted while working at Right of Way Consultants was a flag. The following exchange took place:

Q. ... [W]hat is the heaviest thing you've had to pick up while working for Right of Way Consulting?

A. We have flags that we talked about the time before we set.

Q. Right. I remember that. Is the heaviest things you've had to pick up—

A. Yes.

Q. —while working for Right of Way?

A. Yes, sir. They—they not heavy.

When the trial began, a juror was excused because, against the trial judge's explicit instructions, McLain started a conversation with the juror on the elevator. The juror testified to the following:

We got on the elevator together, and [McLain] said good morning. I said good morning and said it was a good day to be alive. And he made a comment and said that—I said we know what's on this side, but we don't know what's on the other side. And he said that you've got to be stayed up, packed up and ready to go. And I said yes, sir, and that was the end of the conversation.

The trial judge reserved sanctioning on the issue until the verdict was returned. During McLain's testimony, the following exchange took place between Illinois Central's attorney and McLain:

Q: Now, you were telling Mr. Schmieder that it's not a very physical job working for Right of Way Consultants, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And what's the heaviest thing you have to lift; your flag?

A. Yes, the flag goes along with the job.

Q. All right. So you're saying the heaviest thing that you have to lift for Right of Way Consultants on the job is just the flag that you use to flag people with?

A. You've got, you know, a small hammer you drive in the ground with.

Q. A small hammer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And that's what you said in your deposition when we asked that question also, isn't it?

A. I believe that's right, yes.

Q. Just a small hammer and a flag, that's the heaviest thing that you have to lift, right?

A. That's right.

Q. All right. Now, do you recall talking to Mr. Cecil Coker here recently over the phone?

A. Pardon?

Q. You're aware Mr. Coker is going to be testifying in this trial, aren't you?

A. Yes, sir, as far as I know.

Q. You're aware that he was going to be a witness in this trial, right?

A. That's what I hear.

Q. And do you remember within the last month placing a phone call to Mr. Coker?

A. We talked. We talked.

Q. And do you remember asking him not to mention that you actually have to lift and move a 40–pound portable derail? You remember asking Mr. Coker—

A. As a matter of fact I did.

Q. —not to mention that?

A. I sure did.

Q. So you asked Mr. Coker, who's going to be testifying here, not to tell the jury that you actually have to pick up this 40–pound metal derail? That's what you asked him to do?

A. As a matter of fact I did. I remember that.

Q. You asked Mr. Coker to lie to this jury? You asked Mr. Coker to lie to the jury?

A. If that's what it amounts to, I guess.

Again, the trial judge reserved sanctioning McLain until the verdict was returned.

¶ 4. The jury returned a verdict in McLain's favor for $150,000. The trial judge sanctioned McLain for two different violations: first, for McLain's improper contract with an empaneled juror, and second for McLain's unlawful solicitation of perjured testimony from a trial witness. For the improper contact, the trial judge sanctioned McLain $500, and for the solicitation, the trial judge sanctioned McLain $10,000.

¶ 5. Illinois Central filed a motion for additional sanctions. Illinois Central claimed that the sanctions were not harsh enough to deter others from committing solicitation and perjury, that McLain had committed perjury by stating that the heaviest thing he lifted at Right of Way was a flag, not a forty-pound derail, and that McLain was loud and argumentative when Illinois Central's witnesses were on the stand. The trial judge denied the motion based on the sole reason that McLain was not loud and argumentative. Illinois Central then filed a supplement to its motion to dismiss, stating that McLain had lied in his response to its original motion to dismiss and for additional sanctions. Illinois Central attached affidavits claiming that McLain first raised a forty-pound derail in 2009. The trial court again denied the motion, even though McLain did not respond to it. The order stated: “Being thoroughly advised in the premises, the Court finds that the motion is not well taken and should be denied.” Illinois Central appealed.

Analysis

¶ 6. On appeal, Illinois Central brings twelve issues. McLain responds with five more concise issues. Both parties address whether the trial judge appropriately sanctioned McLain based on his misconduct at trial. Given that we hold the issue on sanctions to be dispositive, we do not address the remaining issues.

Whether the trial judge appropriately sanctioned McLain.

¶ 7. The instant appeal is brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). 45 U.S.C. § 56 (Rev.2012). The Court has stated the following in regard to the applicable law for FELA cases:

FELA creates a tort remedy for railroad workers injured on the job and serves as the exclusive remedy for a railroad employee injured as a result of his or her employer's negligence. What constitutes negligence for [FELA] purposes is a federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state or local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law formulating and applying the concept governs. Accordingly, this Court is bound to enforce the federal law as Congress has provided and as the federal courts have read it. However, FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are subject to state procedural rules.

Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Brent, 133 So.3d 760, 766–67 (Miss.2013) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985) (“FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are subject to state procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them is federal.”). Whether a party was appropriately sanctioned constitutes a procedural matter; thus Mississippi law applies. Allen v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 934 So.2d 1006, 1014 (¶ 22) (Miss.2006).

A. Whether Illinois Central is procedurally barred from appealing the sanctions imposed.

¶ 8. McLain argues that Illinois Central is procedurally barred from claiming on appeal that the trial judge did not impose the appropriate sanctions because Illinois Central failed to object at trial to the sanctions at trial. McLain cites Rubenstein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 751 (Miss.2006), and InTown Lessee Associates, LLC v. Howard, 67 So.3d 711, 718 (Miss.2011), arguing that a failure of a party to make a contemporaneous objection waives an argument on appeal. Illinois Central counters that the issue is not evidentiary, as in Rubenstein and Howard; ergo, the rules set forth by Rubenstein and Howard do not apply.

¶ 9. We agree with Illinois Central. The rule McLain cites addresses the need for evidentiary objections to preserve an argument for appeal. While we do not discredit the rule cited by McLain, it does not apply to the instant facts because the issue is not an evidentiary one. The correct question is whether the issue was presented to the trial judge, not whether it was objected to contemporaneously. Purvis v. Barnes, 791 So.2d 199, 202 (Miss.2001) (“The law is well settled in Mississippi that appellate courts will not put trial courts in error for issues not first presented to the trial court for resolution, and that issues not presented in the trial court cannot be first argued on appeal.”).

¶ 10. In the instant case, sanctioning was the last issue addressed by the trial judge, as it was reserved for after the verdict was returned. After sanctioning McLain, the trial judge asked if there was anything further. Illinois Central responded in the negative, and the trial ended. Following trial, before appealing, Illinois Central moved to dismiss and for additional sanctions, stating that the sanctions...