Illes v. Jones Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 22 August 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 174497
• Parties: John S. ILLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JONES TRANSFER COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant. (On Remand)
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 382

539 N.W.2d 382

213 Mich.App. 44

John S. ILLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JONES TRANSFER COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Defendants-Appellees and Second Injury Fund, Defendant. (On Remand)

Docket No. 174497.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 16, 1995, at Detroit.

Decided Aug. 22, 1995, at 9:25 a.m.

Released for Publication Nov. 17, 1995.

Charters, Heck & O'Donnell, P.C. by Margaret A. O'Donnell, Troy, for John S. Illes.

Coticchio, Zotter, Sullivan, Molter, Skupin & Turner, P.C. by Donald N. Payne, II, Detroit, for Jones Transfer Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Leonard J. Malinowski, Assistant Attorney General, for Second Injury Fund.

Before JANSEN, P.J., and CORRIGAN and KAVANAGH, ^* JJ.

ON REMAND

KAVANAGH, Judge.

Plaintiff was awarded worker's compensation benefits by a magistrate who found that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled because of various physical disabilities that were causally connected to his employment as a truck mechanic. Plaintiff's employer, Jones Transfer Company (hereinafter defendant) appealed, and the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission reversed the magistrate's decision, ruling that plaintiff's disabilities were not work-related. Plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to this Court was originally denied, but our Supreme Court, on reconsideration, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. See 444 Mich. 977, 518 N.W.2d 480 (1994). We now reverse the WCAC's decision and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant for twenty- five years as a truck mechanic. His job duties, which are not disputed, are described in the magistrate's decision as follows:

As a diesel mechanic, plaintiff described many tasks and various functions performed by him while working in defendant's garage on tractor trailers; including, but not limited to repairing flat tires, changing tire rims, removing rear axle shafts, straightening bumpers, removing water pumps, springs, transmissions, king pins, taking out drive lines, repairing engines, water pumps, brakes and brake lines, removing and replacing alternators, pulling and repairing heaters, drive lines, heater coils, making electrical repairs and generally performing all mechanical work on defendant's trucks.

In order to perform his mechanical work, plaintiff used various hand tools, impact tools, vibrating tools, wrenches and some of them were air driven. He further described the tools as being light and small, and others weighed 50 pounds and upwards, and having as much as 900 pounds of torque. For some tasks, he used a sledge hammer weighing 10 pounds or more to break away bolts and rims when repairing tires.

Often plaintiff had to lift truck parts weighing as much as 150 pounds. He indicated that hydraulic devices and chain falls were available to assist him with some tasks.

Further, much of plaintiff's work required him to lift, bend, stoop, reach, stretch, climb, to lay on his back or stomach, work in awkward positions, stand off balance, walk and carry various equipment as the job required.

On May 1, 1986, plaintiff injured his right hand at work while installing a heater into a truck. Plaintiff received medical treatment and was off work for three weeks because of that injury. On July 10, 1986, plaintiff was injured again at work when he fell from a trailer onto a cement floor. Plaintiff complained of pain in his legs, ankles, knees, shoulders, and back. He was examined by a series of doctors and did not return to work because of continuing pain in his back and lower extremities, and also numbness and collapsing of his right leg.

On January 10, 1987, plaintiff fell and broke his left foot while walking in his yard at home. According to plaintiff, he fell because his right leg "gave away" because of numbness. Plaintiff continued to seek treatment for his back and lower extremity conditions and, about the same time, began seeking treatment for problems associated with his right hand and weakness of grips in both hands. The medical diagnoses generally attributed plaintiff's physical complaints to advanced degenerative arthritis affecting his extremities, neck, and lower back, to carpal tunnel syndrome involving his wrists, and to ulnar nerve root entrapment at the elbow.

On February 17, 1987, plaintiff filed a petition for worker's compensation benefits, asserting total and permanent disability due to the loss of the industrial use of his hands, arms, and legs. Defendant challenged plaintiff's entitlement to benefits, in part, on the basis that plaintiff's numerous physical complaints were not work-related. At a hearing before a worker's compensation magistrate in June 1987, defendant introduced evidence that plaintiff was sixty-nine-years old and diabetic, that he had operated a twenty-acre farm since 1954, that he was off work for nine months in 1975 after injuring his foot on a farm combine, that he was receiving medication for an irregular heartbeat, and that he had a history of colon cancer. Defendant maintained that plaintiff's numerous physical complaints were attributable to activities and medical conditions unrelated to his work.

After receiving testimony from several doctors concerning the nature, extent, and cause of plaintiff's injuries and physical complaints, the magistrate found that plaintiff's hand pathology, elbow pathology, and carpal tunnel condition were all causally related to his work as a truck mechanic. Additionally, the magistrate found that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to his shoulders, back, legs, ankles, and knees arising from his fall at work on July 10, 1986, that plaintiff's ongoing lower extremity and back pathologies were causally related to the fall at work, and that plaintiff's fall at home on January 10, 1987, resulted from his ongoing lower extremity pathology. The magistrate concluded that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled because of the loss of the industrial use of both lower extremities, but that plaintiff had not lost the industrial use of his upper extremities. The magistrate, however, denied plaintiff's request for nursing care benefits.

Both parties appealed the magistrate's decision to the WCAC, raising several issues. The WCAC reversed the magistrate's decision, finding that the evidence before the magistrate was insufficient to show that plaintiff's injuries and disabilities were work-related. Although acknowledging that plaintiff had presented medical testimony "asserting work-relatedness," the WCAC ruled that "[t]he record in this case firmly establishes that plaintiff had a history of non-work-related physical exertions and problems ... [which] easily and directly explains the sources for plaintiff's physical complaints." The WCAC concluded that, "[i]n the context of this strong causal evidence, plaintiff failed to provide substantial evidence by which to attach any contributing relationship to his work, whether cumulatively over time or through the two specific injuries plaintiff had in 1986." In light of its reversal on the basis that the injuries were not related to work, the WCAC found it unnecessary to address the other claims raised by the parties.

Plaintiff now argues, and we agree, that the WCAC erred in reversing the magistrate's findings of work-relatedness.

In reviewing a magistrate's decision, the WCAC must perform both a qualitative and quantitative review of the record. M.C.L. § 418.861a(13); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(13). The WCAC's review is not de novo, however, and the WCAC may not merely substitute its opinion for that of the magistrate. Kovach v. Henry Ford Hosp., 207 Mich.App. 107, 111, 523 N.W.2d 800 (1994). A magistrate's findings of fact are to be regarded as conclusive if supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." M.C.L. § 418.861a(3); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(3).

On review by this Court, findings of fact by the WCAC are conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them. M.C.L. § 418.861a(14); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(14); Holden v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 257, 263, 484 N.W.2d 227 (1992). However, a decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal if the WCAC operated within the wrong legal framework or its decision was based on erroneous legal reasoning. O'Connor v. Binney Auto Parts, 203 Mich.App. 522, 527, 513 N.W.2d 818 (1994). In Holden, supra at 269, 484 N.W.2d 227, our Supreme Court stated:

If it appears on judicial appellate review that the WCAC carefully examined the record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the magistrate, did not "misapprehend or grossly misapply" the substantial evidence standard, and gave an adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the magistrate, the judicial tendency should be to deny leave to appeal or, if it is granted, to affirm....

In this case, we find that reversal of the WCAC's decision is justified because the WCAC's finding that "plaintiff failed to provide substantial evidence by which to attach any contributing relationship to his work" is not supported by competent evidence and because other reasons given by the WCAC for reversing the decision of the magistrate are not grounded in the record.

An employee bears the burden of proving the relationship between an injury and the workplace by a preponderance of the evidence. Morris v. Soloway, 170 Mich.App. 312, 315, 428 N.W.2d 43 (1988). An employee is entitled to compensation where the nexus between the employment and the injury is sufficient to conclude that the injury was a circumstance of the employment. Collier v. J.A. Fredman, Inc., 183 Mich.App. 156, 161, 454 N.W.2d 183 (1990). Worker's compensation benefits are payable not only for a disability caused solely by working conditions, but also for any preexisting...