Holden v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 01 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | 90144,Nos. 8-9,Nos. 90345,s. 90345,s. 8-9 |
| Citation | 484 N.W.2d 227,439 Mich. 257 |
| Parties | Emaline F. HOLDEN, Widow of Carl Holden, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Vera WEISS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEWISH HOME FOR THE AGED, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar, |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Caleb B. Martin, Jr., Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Detroit, for amicus curiae.
Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Listman & Chuhran, P.C. (Martin L. Critchell, of counsel to Murray R. Feldman, Supervising Counsel), Detroit, for defendant-appellant Jewish Home For The Aged.
Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. by A. Donald Kadushin, Granner S. Ries, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Mark Granzotto, Detroit, Monica Farris Linkner, Berkley, Charles P. Burbach, Southfield, amicus curiae, for Michigan Trial Lawyers Assn.
The question presented concerns the scope of administrative appellate review by the Workers' Compensation Appellate Commission of a decision of a magistrate, and the scope of judicial appellate review on leave granted by the Court of Appeals or this Court.
We conclude that the WCAC did not, on administrative appellate review, exceed its authority in reversing the decisions of the magistrates and in awarding benefits, and that the Court of Appeals panel in Holden 1 erred in reversing, and the panel in Weiss 2 did not err in affirming, the WCAC.
Before the reforms enacted in 1985, 3 hearings in workers' compensation cases were conducted by a referee, also referred to as an administrative law judge, with de novo review by the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board. Judicial review was obtainable on application, not as of right, in the Court of Appeals and this Court.
In an effort to address the large number of backlogged appeals, the Department of Labor considered proposals for changes in the administrative appellate review process. In 1980, the Lesinski Report, summarizing the results of the department's Workers' Compensation Adjudication Project, proposed that decisions of a magistrate be made conclusive "unless fraudulently obtain[ed] or contrary to the great weight of the evidence." 4 No procedural reform legislation was, however, enacted.
In 1984, Theodore J. St. Antoine, the Governor's Special Counsel on Workers' Compensation, recommended significant changes in the decision-making process. Like the Lesinski Report, St. Antoine recommended that de novo review of the hearing officer's decision be eliminated. He proposed that the question, on administrative appellate review, should be whether the decision of the hearing officer is supported by "substantial ... evidence on the whole record." He said that this standard was "deliberately designed to allow the Appeal Board a bit more latitude" than it would have had under the "great weight of the evidence" standard proposed in the Lesinski Report. St. Antoine said this would enable the reviewing panel to "remedy any serious misstep by [a hearing officer] in assessing the evidence and making factual findings." 5
St. Antoine's proposals were in general adopted by the Legislature when it enacted 1985 P.A. 103. 6 Magistrates replaced referees, and the WCAC replaced the WCAB. 7
Under Act 103, beginning October 1, 1986, de novo review was eliminated. Henceforth, findings of fact by a workers' compensation magistrate were to be considered conclusive, on administrative appellate review by the WCAC, if supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." M.C.L. Sec. 418.861a(3); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(861a)(3).
This substantial evidence standard provides for administrative appellate review more deferential to the hearing officer's decision than de novo review, but for more searching review by the WCAC than judicial review under the "any evidence standard." The constitution provides for such limited judicial review:
"Findings of fact in workmen's compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law." Const.1963, art. 6, Sec. 28.
Act 103 did not change the standard for judicial review of final decisions in workers' compensation proceedings. 8 The Legislature had provided, under former law, that it was the findings of fact made by the WCAB that were to be conclusive on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud. 9 Act 103 provides that the findings of fact made by the WCAC, not the findings of the magistrate, are to be conclusive, on judicial appellate review, in the absence of fraud. 10 The Legislature, by employing the language of the constitution in stating that the fact finding of the WCAC is final subject to limited judicial review, made clear that judicial review by the Court of Appeals or this Court of a WCAC decision is to be of the findings of fact made by the WCAC and not the findings of fact made by the magistrate. And the findings of fact made by the WCAC are conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them. As under prior law, judicial review is obtainable on application, not as of right, to the Court of Appeals and this Court. 11
The substantial evidence standard, like the standard for judicial appellate review, is rooted in Const.1963, art. 6, Sec. 28, which provides that administrative agency decisions subject to judicial review following a hearing shall be minimally reviewed to determine whether the decision is "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record." (Emphasis added.) 12
As originally introduced in the Senate, the 1985 legislation would not have defined what constitutes "substantial evidence on the whole record." 13 The House Substitute, which became Act 103, retained the "substantial evidence on the whole record" standard, 14 but added definitions of "substantial evidence" and "whole record" 15 taken from MERC v. Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich. 116, 223 N.W.2d 283 (1974), where this Court considered the meaning of "substantial evidence" in the context of judicial review of findings of fact by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission pursuant to the labor mediation act. 16 The House Substitute also added language, again taken from Detroit Symphony, providing that the WCAC's review of a magistrate's decision should include both a "qualitative and a quantitative" analysis of the evidence to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review. 17
As enacted, the "substantial evidence on the whole record" standard largely parallels the description of substantial evidence in MERC v. Detroit Symphony Orchestra. The statute provides that findings of fact made by a magistrate shall be considered "conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material, and substantive evidence on the whole record":
-- " '[S]ubstantial evidence' means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion." (Emphasis added.)
-- " '[W]hole record' means the entire record of the hearing including all of the evidence in favor and all the evidence against a certain determination." (Emphasis added.)
-- WCAC review of the evidence "shall include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence and ensure a full, thorough, and fair review thereof." (Emphasis added.)
-- The WCAC "may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the workers' compensation magistrate as the order and opinion of the commission." 18
(Emphasis added.)
In apparent recognition of the difference between judicial appellate review of an administrative agency's decision, and administrative appellate review by the WCAC of a magistrate's decision, the Legislature did not enact, as part of the substantial evidence standard for workers' compensation administrative appellate review purposes, the MERC language that review by the WCAC is to be "undertaken with considerable sensitivity" to provide "due deference to administrative expertise" and to avoid displacing a "choice between two reasonably differing views." 19 MERC v. Detroit Symphony Orchestra, supra, p. 124, 223 N.W.2d 283.
The question on judicial appellate review is, in each case, whether the WCAC acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than de novo review in finding that the magistrate's decision was or was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In judging, on judicial appellate review, whether the WCAC acted properly, this Court and the Court of Appeals begin with the words of the Legislature. This Court and the Court of Appeals consider whether there are issues of credibility of live witnesses to be determined by the magistrate, the evidence considered and ignored by the magistrate and the WCAC, the care taken by the magistrate and the WCAC, and the reasoning and analysis of the magistrate and the WCAC.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in Weiss that the stringent constitutional and statutory limitations on judicial appellate review suggest that some latitude must be given the WCAC, should it find that the magistrate's findings of fact are not supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record," if there is to be any effective appellate review, administrative or judicial, at all. And that if the appellate courts were not to allow such latitude to the WCAC, they would find that they were increasingly called upon to perform the appellate reviewing function so that there would be effective appellate review at some level.
Due deference should be given to the...
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