Illingsworth v. Boston Elec. Light Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1894
• Citation: 161 Mass. 583,37 N.E. 778
• Parties: ILLINGSWORTH v. BOSTON ELECTRIC LIGHT CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

161 Mass. 583

37 N.E. 778

ILLINGSWORTH

v.BOSTON ELECTRIC LIGHT CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 22, 1894.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk county; P. Emory Aldrich, Judge.

Action by Edward M. Illingsworth against the Boston Electric Light Company. To a judgment for defendant, plaintiff excepts. Exceptions sustained.

It was in evidence that on or about the 11th day of May, A.D.1891, the defendant was a corporation doing business in the city of Boston. Its business was that of furnishing electricity over wires for the purposes of electric lighting and motive power in buildings. On said date the wires of the defendant, charged with electricity, were strung over the building numbered 114 Sudbury street, Boston, and were fastened upon the arms of an upright frame structure about 20 feet above the roof of said building. Said frame and arms were the property of the defendant. The building was owned by Arioch Wentworth, but the plaintiff did not then know who owned it. Upon another arm fastened on said upright frame, and above the defendant's wires, were the wires of the fire alarm of the city of Boston. Other wires, of another corporation, were below defendant's wires. The plaintiff was in the employ of the city of Boston, as a lineman in the fire-alarm department, and ascended said frame, through the wires of the defendant, to the wires of said city, and had been engaged a part of said day in removing the wires of said city from the arm on said frame. When descending through the wires of the defendant, the plaintiff's pliers, which were in his belt, caught on one of the electric light wires. The plaintiff reached round with one hand to clear the pliers, and testified that he must have made a contact, somewhere or other, whereby he received a shock of electricity from one of the electric light wires.

Salem D. Charles, for plaintiff.

H.N. Sheldon and Charles A. Snow, for defendant.

FIELD, C.J.

The exceptions recite that the court ruled that there was no evidence for the jury, and ordered a verdict for the defendant. The questions argued relate to the liability of the defendant on the evidence, under Pub.St. c. 109, § 12, and St.1883, c. 221; under St.1890, c. 404, § 1; and at common law. There is no evidence of any liability under Pub.St. c. 109, § 12, and St.1883, c. 221. Hector v. Electric Light Co., 37 N.E. 773. We have no occasion to consider whether it was the intention of St.1890, c. 404, to give a private person a cause of action for any violation of the first section of that statute, if, in consequence of such violation, such person suffers damage in his person or property. The only provision of that statute which, it is contended, applies to this case, is the requirement that such a corporation as the defendant should suitably and safely attach its wires to strong and sufficient supports, “and insulate them at all points of attachment.” This must mean at the points of attachment to the supports. The provision probably relates to the pins or insulators, or other equivalent devices by which electric wires are usually attached to supports. There is no evidence recited in the exceptions of any defect in the insulation of the wires of the defendant at the points of attachment to the support. There was evidence of “two bad joints” on these wires, about 12 or 15 inches from the frame, to one arm of which the defendant's wires were attached. These joints were “not taped or insulated.” “The rest of the wire was insulated.” We infer that this is evidence that these joints never had been insulated in any manner. As the evidence was that “the plaintiff's hands were severely burned by the electricity,” it was competent for the jury to find that the plaintiff's hands had touched a wire or wires of the defendant. On all the evidence in the case, we think they might have found that his hand or hands touched the defendant's wires at one or both of the joints where the wire was not insulated. It was true that a witness for the defendant-an electrical expert-testified “that this accident might have happened if the wires of the defendant had been in as good condition as skill and knowledge could have made them;” but the jury might have disbelieved this testimony, or, if they believed it, might also have believed that although such an accident was possible, under certain conditions, if the wires had been properly insulated, yet it was much more likely to happen if the wires were not insulated. The same witness testified “that a person taking hold of a perfectly insulated wire would not receive sufficient electricity to injure...