Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Comm'rs of East Lake Fork Drainage Dist

• Decision Date: 15 June 1889
• Citation: 21 N.E. 925,129 Ill. 417
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. v. COMMISSIONERS OF EAST LAKE FORK DRAINAGE DIST.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

129 Ill. 417

21 N.E. 925

ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

v.COMMISSIONERS OF EAST LAKE FORK DRAINAGE DIST.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 15, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Champaign county; C. B. SMITH, Judge.J. S. Wolfe, for appellant.

Francis M. Wright, for appellees.

WILKIN, J.

This is an action at law by appellees against appellant, brought under the provisions of section 72 of the drainage act of 1885, to recover special assessments made against its railroad under section 40 of that act. The declaration avers, in substance, that plaintiff, being then a duly-organized special drainage district under the provisions of said act, through which the railroad of the defendant passed, and said commissioners being of the opinion that said railroad would be benefited by the work in the district, assessed the defendant such sums as would be just and equitable for it to pay in proportion to the benefits received, determined by estimating the amount of benefits to the entire district, including the benefits to said railroad, and also the benefits to said railroad. They determined and fixed the fractional figure 1-175 to express the ratio between the sum of the benefits for the work on the main ditch in the whole district, and the sum found to be the benefit to said railroad, and in like manner fixed the fractional figure of 1-100 for the work in subdistrict No. 1. That said fractional figures express the proportional part of the corporate taxes to be paid by said railroad. Said figures were duly entered against the defendant upon the classification made and filed by the commissioners with the county clerk. That time and place of hearing objections were duly fixed, of which due and legal notice was given, at which meeting of the commissioners the defendant appeared and objected to said classification. That on due consideration the commissioners did confirm said classification, and duly file with said clerk their order of confirmation, from which the defendant did not appeal,and the same remains in full force and effect,-all of which proceedings are duly recorded in the drainage record in the office of said clerk. They filed their certificate, requiring $35,000 to be levied for work on main ditch in the whole district, and $3,378 to be levied for work in subdistrict in No. 1, upon computations duly made by said clerk. The commissioners made and duly filed a tax-list, which was and is duly recorded in the drainage record in said clerk's office, in which said tax-list, on the basis of said figures of classification and the said respective certificates, $200 is assessed against the defendant for benefits to said railroad for work in main district; $33.78, for benefits for work in subdistrict No. 1. That said tax-list was duly confirmed, and the assessments ordered paid, as required by law. That defendant has not paid the same, etc. To the declaration defendant below filed a general demurrer.

It is not denied but that the declaration states a good cause of action under section 40. The attack is upon that section of the statute, rather than upon the declaration. The objections to the law, as we understand them, may be grouped under three propositions, and thus stated: (1) The track and right of way of a railroad from the very nature of the property cannot be benefited ‘for agricultural and sanitary purposes,’ and is not, therefore, within the scope of the drainage act of 1885, as shown by its title. Hence section 40, as applied to railroads, is void. (2) That said section 40 violates the rule that special assessments shall not exceed benefits. (3) That section 40 denies the rule that the whole cost of the improvement must not exceed the benefits, and in effect authorizes special taxation.

The first of these objections is decided adversely to appellant in the case of Commissioners v. Commissioners, ante, 206.

The second and third are based on a misconception of the power conferred upon the commissioners by section 40. It does not, as is said, authorize unlimited expenditure to be...