Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 01 November 1897
• Citation: 48 N.E. 492,169 Ill. 329
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

169 Ill. 329

48 N.E. 492

ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 1, 1897.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county; Theodore Brentano, Judge.

Proceedings by the city of Chicago against the Illinois Central Railroad Company to condemn land for a street. From a judgment awarding defendant nominal damages, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. V. Gwin, for appellant.

Collins & Fletcher and John D. Adair, for appellee.

By this proceeding the appellee sought to condemn the right of way of appellant for the extension of Seventy-First street across the same. The street sought to be opened was 66 feet wide, and the right of way of appellant was 200 feet wide, and at that point is occupied by 8 tracks, with 50 feet on the west side and 40 feet on the east side unoccupied. The contention of appellant was that the verdict was against the evidence; that the land was valuable for other purposes than laying tracks thereon, and had a special value to the appellant for building structures required for the use and operation of a railroad, such as station buildings, warehouses, coal sheds, coal chutes, lumber yards, coal yards, and the like. Numerous witnesses called by appellant placed the value of the land for such special purposes at prices varying from $1,200 to $16,000, while two witnesses called for appellee placed the compensation at merely nominal prices. A verdict and judgment fixing the compensation at one dollar were entered. Appellant insists that the witnesses for appellee were incompetent to express an opinion as experts, because they had no experience in the operation and management of railroads, and knew nothing about the necessities and requirements of railroad companies, or the special value of land to railroads; and it was not proper to express opinions as to damage, as that was a question for the jury. Appellant also insists that the court erred in overruling a motion entered by it to dismiss the petition upon the ground that it did not appear from the petition and ordinances that the land was situated within the limits of the city of Chicago. The assignments of error involve these three propositions.

PHILLIPS, C. J. (after stating the facts).

The ordinance attached to the petition in this case, on its face, purports to be enacted by the city council of the city of Chicago. A general presumption operates in favor of the regularity and validity of official acts, and, in the interpretation of statutes, it will be presumed, not only that the legislaturé has not intended to exceed its territorial jurisdiction, but that it has not intended to go beyond its legislative functions. End. Interp. St. § 171. The rules for the construction of ordinances of municipal corporations are the same as for statutes enacted by the legislature. In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 9 Pac. 139;Mayor, etc., v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 264; Stanton v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. 23, 39 N. E. 987. Under such construction, the resulting conclusion would be that the city council was dealing with a matter within its jurisdiction; and it was not error to overrule the motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that it did not appear from the ordinance that the land was situated within the city limits. Meadowcroft v. People, 154 Ill. 416, 40 N. E. 442;Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co. v. City of Chicago, 158 Ill. 9, 41 N. E. 1102; Stanton v. City of Chicago, supra.

The witnesses for appellee were cognizant of the value of lands and lots in the vicinity where the street was proposed to be opened, and the rule adopted in this state is that witnesses will be permitted to state their opinions as to the amount of damage or benefits that may result to property by reason of works constructed under the power of eminent domain. In Spear v. Commissioners, 113 Ill. 634, it is said: ‘It is also objected that the court erred in permitting witnesses to give their opinions as to how much the lands of plaintiff in error would be benefited by the proposed drainage, without its being shown that they had some special knowledge or training on that subject; and the cases of Railroad Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120, and Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464, cited by the plaintiff in error, seem to support the position. The reasoning of the court in those cases seems to be that to admit such testimony ‘would put the witnesses in the places of the jurors, and commit them to the amount of recovery.’ If this reasoning were to be extended, it would certainly lead to the exclusion of this kind of testimony in many cases where the right to introduce it has never been questioned. It is a matter of everyday experience to introduce testimony of this kind in condemnation cases, and in other cases where the question is how much an adjacent piece of land has been injured by some improvement, such as the excavation of a ditch or throwing up an embankment, and the like; and the right to do so is fully recognized by this court. Green v. City of Chicago, 97 Ill. 370. Indeed, the right to introduce in evidence the opinions of nonprofessional witnesses about the ordinary affairs of life is admissible in all cases where, from the nature of the question involved, its answer necessarily depends upon mere matter of opinion or judgment. This is particularly so in respect to questions of value. It is only in questions where a previous habit or study is essential to the formation of the opinion sought to be put in evidence that all but experts are excluded. It is the standing practice to permit nonprofessional witnesses to give their opinions upon matters relating to time, distance, weight, value, etc. * * * It may be conceded that, if the question had simply been whether the system of drainage indicated by the plans and specifications of the work would be successful or not, the opinions of these witnesses would not have been competent; but that was not the question upon which their opinions were received in evidence.' In Railroad Co. v. Haslam, 73 Ill. 496, it was said: ‘Witnesses were allowed to give their opinions as to the damages sustained by the several claimants by reason of the construction of the railroad, notwithstanding the objection of appellant. This practice is warranted by the rule stated in Coke Co. v. Graham, 35 Ill. 346,’ in which case it is said: ‘It is again urged that the court erred in permitting witnesses to give their opinions as to the amount of damages which was sustained. It is usual, and the law permits witnesses to give their opinions as to the value of property, and a variety of other matters. Such is also the case of whether mechanical skill has been exercised in the construction of work, as to the cultivation of agricultural crops, as to the care and diligence in the management of stock, as well as a large variety of matters about which disputes arise. In such cases, the opposite party has always the right, by cross-examination, to test the value of the opinion, by ascertaining the grounds upon which it is based. Nor are the jury bound by such opinions, if contrary to the evidence. It is only one of the modes of arriving at the true measure of the damages, and is only valuable as it is sustained by the evidence, the means of knowledge of the witness, and his general intelligence and fairness.’ The contention of the appellant that the question put to the witnesses called for their opinions upon the question to be decided and found by the jury, and therefore was objectionable, is not well founded. Neither were the witnesses for appellee incompetent. Whenever the question of compensation or damage is dependent on value, if a witness is possessed of knowledge of values of land in the vicinage, he is competent to testify. It may be that he is not acquainted with speculative values, or a possible use to which the land may be put; yet that does not render him incompetent to testify, and to give his opinion of the value of the land, and the benefits or damages by reason of the proposed taking under eminent domain. That other witnesses might express the idea that it would be valuable for purposes for which he might not regard it as valuable, would not destroy his competency; and although a witness may not have had experience in operating a railroad, and may not know the various uses to which lands may be put to in its legitimate operation, still the want of that knowledge would not destroy the competency of a witness who was acquainted with the value of lands in the...