Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 09 January 1905
• Citation: 85 Miss. 349,37 So. 643
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. JOHN H. SMITH

37 So. 643

85 Miss. 349

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. JOHN H. SMITH

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 9, 1905

FROM the circuit court of Attala county, HON. WILLIAM F. STEVENS Judge.

Smith the appellee, was plaintiff, and the railroad company appellant, defendant in the court below. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor for $ 575 and costs, the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

Mayes &amp Longstreet, and J. M. Dickinson, for appellant.

Since the final decision in the case of Zachary v. Railroad Co., 75 Miss. 752, the law of this state is that a blind person, familiar with travel and its conditions, and well qualified to take care of himself, being in possession of all his faculties and strength, save the one infirmity of blindness, cannot, on the sole ground of blindness, be denied transportation on a railroad train. The rule of the railroad company providing in this case that a person suffering from physical infirmities, or in any wise disabled, should be accompanied by an escort to give him attention and care, is a reasonable one, as this honorable court has practically declared in the two opinions in the Zachary cases, and it is only when the person with the infirmity brings himself within the exception, it is only when the person under disability proves that he is entitled to travel on the train unaccompanied, that he is entitled to transportation.

The court will observe that transportation was not refused to this plaintiff, and that, notwithstanding the refusal of the agent to sell him a ticket, quick and convenient transportation was still open to him at the time and on the day of this occurrence.

Ordinarily the refusal of a ticket agent to sell a prospective passenger a ticket might be treated as a practical refusal of transportation, and while this construction would be justified with one unfamiliar with conditions and unadvised as to the custom and usage of the company, yet in this instance Mr. Smith well knew that he could travel on the local passenger train without a ticket; that he would not be required to exhibit a ticket in order to obtain admission to the train or transportation on it; and he states that many times he had used that train without having purchased tickets for transportation. He, therefore, was not justified in standing on the technical refusal of the station agent to let him have a ticket. The burden of proof was on him to do all he could to reduce his damages and to save himself from inconvenience, and by merely embarking on the local passenger train he could have gone to Durant with a loss of only thirty minutes.

Mr. Smith was not entitled, on the facts of this case, to recover punitive damages. It is not contended that the rule of the company requiring people under an infirmity to have an escort is unreasonable; in fact, this honorable court in the Zachary cases has declared practically that the rule is not improper, and that in many instances its application would be rightful. But they make exceptions to the rule, and say that in each instance a case coming within the exception must stand on its own circumstances. In other words, the rule is reasonable and proper, and imposes prima facie a disability on the passenger who applies for the ticket, and shifts the burden to him to demonstrate that he is qualified to travel unattended, even though he may assure the station agent that he is. After all, the station agent would have nothing but his mere word to be guided by, and we insist that a mistake of judgment on the part of a station agent in obeying his duty to conform to the rules and regulations of the company, and especially to a regulation reasonable and justly imposable in many cases, such as was the rule obeyed by the station agent in this instance--that the action of an agent doing this lacks entirely that element of wanton or malicious wrong or reckless indifference to the rights of the passenger as would warrant the imposition of punitive damages.

That this verdict, except to an infinitesimal amount, is for punitive damages is shown by the fact that the plaintiff, as a witness, in stating his actual damages, says: "I estimate my actual loss of time and money by refusal of defendant company to sell me a ticket at Winona, as above stated, at $ 25 or $ 30."

Certainly there is no room for punitive damages in this case, where there was no insult, and only observance in good faith of a reasonable regulation, and when the person aggrieved knew that the declination of the agent did not prohibit him from enjoying the privilege of transportation.

The court below refused instruction No. 7 requested by the defendant, which told the jury that they should allow only actual damages on the facts. The instructions granted plaintiff in this case were in many respects erroneous, and, taken as a whole, did not properly state the law.

Teat & Teat, for appellee.

"A common carrier of passengers cannot refuse to carry a person otherwise qualified upon the sole ground that he is blind; and a rule of the carrier forbidding the transportation of all unattended blind persons is unreasonable in its application to such a person who is competent to travel alone and take care of himself." Zachary v. Railroad Co., 75 Miss. 746.

The court admitted, of course, that instances might arise in which a carrier might be warranted in refusing to sell a blind person a ticket, just as it might be warranted or not warranted in doing or not doing any other thing. The question of the reasonableness of the rule denying transportation to the unattended blind was settled. It was declared to be unsound, inapplicable, and unreasonable; and the question of whether or not a blind person was to be allowed to travel on the cars was by the court declared to be not a proper subject to be regulated by a rule at all, but the railroad company was put on notice that it was required to deal with all blind persons applying for transportation strictly in the individual capacity, and not in any instance regarding the issuance or refusal of transportation are they to be dealt with as a class nor proscribed against by any rule.

If this is the true interpretation of the opinion of the court, then there is no rule against the sale of tickets to blind people recognized by the court; and when a blind person applies to a ticket agent for a ticket, the natural and legal presumption is that he is entitled to it, just as other people are, because blindness, ipso facto, is no disqualification, and the law imposes a general duty upon all common carriers of passengers to carry all intending passengers; and if the railroad company does not sell an intending passenger a ticket for any reason, or if it refuses to sell such intending passenger a ticket for any reason whatever, it certainly assumes the burden of showing that he is not entitled to it.

In the case at bar there is much proof that the plaintiff was clearly qualified to travel on the appellant's cars. Many disinterested witnesses and officers of the county testified that he could travel and take care of himself almost as well as any person possessed of sight. Other proof shows that he had been a student for many years at the state institution for the blind at Jackson, Mississippi, and had attained a high degree of skill in the art of locomotion. This evidence in the record, coupled with the verdict below settling the fact that he was qualified to take care of himself, clearly settles his right of recovery.

Smith was entitled on the facts of this case to recover punitive damages for two reasons. Because the conduct of the agent toward the plaintiff was...