Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crider

• Decision Date: 10 May 1892
• Parties: Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crider. Newport News & M. V. R. Co. v. Barbour. Same v. Turner. Same v. Claybrook.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

19 S.W. 618

91 Tenn. 489

Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crider.

Newport News & M. V. R. Co. v. Barbour.

Same v. Turner.

Same v. Claybrook.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 10, 1892

Error from circuit court, Weakley, Tipton, and Lauderdale counties.

This comprises four actions, the first brought by R. A. Crider against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, the second by N.W. Barbour against the Newport News & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company, the third by G. B. Turner against the same and the fourth by W. M. Claybrook, also against the same, to recover for injuries to live stock. There were judgments for plaintiffs. Defendants bring error. The cases were consolidated. Modified and affirmed.

Doctrine re-affirmed and illustrated that where a statute is of doubtful meaning, it should receive that construction which is in harmony with the Constitution.

Jas. E Jones, for plaintiff in error Illinois Cent. R. Co.

Chas M. Ewing, for defendant in error R. A. Crider.

Sanford & Yound and John G. Miller, for plaintiff in error Newport News & M. V. R. Co.

Baptist & Boals, for defendant in error N.W. Barbour.

Thos. Steele and Holmes Cummings, for plaintiff in error Newport News & M. V. R. Co.

John P. Gause, for defendant in error G. B. Turner.

W. E. Lyon, for defendant in error W. M. Claybrook.

LURTON J

These four cases have been heard together. They present but one question,-the constitutionality of the act of 1891, c. 101, making unfenced railroads liable for all damages to owners of live stock killed or injured by moving trains of cars or engines.

The first objection which has been urged is that the act embraces more than one subject. The title is as follows: "An act to require the section master of railroads to give notice of the killing or injury of live stock by the trains or locomotives of railroads in Tennessee; to provide for the appointment of appraisers to ascertain and fix the value of such stock, or the amount of injury thereto; and to provide for the collection of such appraisements; to make railroad companies liable for all damages by reason of the killing or injuring of live stock upon or near their unfenced tracks by their moving trains, cars, or engines." The subject of this act is the liability of unfenced railroads for all damages resulting to live stock killed or injured by moving engines or cars. This subject is clearly indicated by the last clause in the title, which we have indicated by italics. The preceding clauses of the title were unnecessary. They are but statements as to the subdivisions of the act, and point out the measure of the damages and the manner in which these damages are to be ascertained and enforced. When the object of an act is to subject railroad companies operating unfenced tracks to absolute liability for all damages resulting from their unfenced condition, we can see no reasonable objection to embodying in the same act the means by which this liability may be ascertained and enforced, as well as provision for the increase of such damages under conditions named in the act. If the means are in themselves valid, their inclusion in the act will not subject it to the inhibitions of the constitution concerning bills containing more than one subject. So, if these subdivisions relating to details be germane and relating to the subject of the act, their inclusion in the title, while unnecessary, will not operate to make it an act having more than one subject. The well-settled rule is that this provision of the constitution should be construed liberally, otherwise it would operate to embarrass legislation without advancing the beneficial purpose intended, which was to prevent combinations of incongruous subjects in one bill, with the object of drawing to the support of the whole bill members who might wish to support but a part. Only the general object of an act need be stated in the title, but under such title all the details by which that object is to be attained may be included. Luebrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea, 425; Ex parte Griffin, 88 Tenn. 547, 13 S.W. 75.

2. It is next objected that the act is void, as being class legislation, and obnoxious to article 11, § 8, of the constitution, which prohibits the passage of any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land; and as prohibited by section 8 of article 1, as not being due "process of law," or "the law of the land." Under this head it is urged (1) that it is applicable only to a limited class of persons,-unfenced railroads; (2) that it operates in favor of owners of live stock only; (3) that it provides for an ex parte appraisement of values by a tribunal unknown to the law, which is to sit in secret, and judge without a hearing; (4) that it makes the offending corporation liable for the fee of adversary counsel if it shall unsuccessfully contest its liability for the appraised value. Many of these objections are predicated upon the assumption that the statute is a mere piece of machinery for the more speedy collection of live stock claims against railroads. If this view of the act be the true one, then it does present many very serious questions of constitutional law. In our judgment, the act has a wider purpose, and rests upon much higher and broader consideration. The end sought by this legislation is the prevention of accidents on railroads, by compelling the inclosure of the track in such manner as will prevent live stock from going on the roads. Failure to fence is made conclusive evidence of negligence whenever live stock is killed or injured upon such an unfenced road by moving engines or cars. The liability of the company for actual damages is made the consequence of the failure to fence; and, if the offending company refuses to pay the prima facie value of such stock as ascertained in the mode prescribed by the act, then it is made liable for an increase in the damages to the extent of reasonable attorney's fee in the event it shall unsuccessfully litigate its liability for such prima facie value. The duty of fencing, and the resulting liability for failure to perform such duty, is imposed not so much in the interest of the owner of animals which may go upon an unfenced road, as in the interest of the general public, who are concerned that accident shall be avoided, and public travel be made as safe as the exigencies of that manner of transportation will permit. The authority for requiring railroads to fence in their tracks is found in the general police power of the state. The duty may be imposed by an affirmative statute, and enforced by fines, forfeitures, and penalties; or it may be indirectly imposed, as in the act under consideration, by subjecting unfenced roads to liabilities and penalties from which roads recognizing the duty are exonerated. The enormous power and great momentum of railway engines render such protection a reasonable requirement against the unnecessary destruction of private property and accidents to persons traveling by such conveyance. "This police power of the state," says an eminent judge, "extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state, according to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which, being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of the legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others." By this general police power of the state "persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state, of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." Redfield, C.J., in Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140 The constitutionality of such statutes has often been questioned, but they have been, it is believed, unfairly sustained as a valid exercise of the police power. Gorman v. Railway Co., 26 Mo. 441; Wilder v. Railroad Co., 65 Me. 333; Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140; Railroad Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 522, 6 S.Ct. 110; Blair v. Railroad Co., 20 Wis. 267; Railroad Co. v. Dumser, 109 Ill. 402; Railroad Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164; Spealman v. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 434; Small v. Railroad Co., 50 Iowa, 338, and many other cases; 7 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 910, and cases cited.

The objection that the act creates a new judicial tribunal for the appraisement of values of stock killed upon an unfenced road is not well founded. If the valuation fixed by the board of appraisers was made conclusive evidence against the company, the act would be subject to severe criticism. But by the express terms of the statute this appraisement is only made " prima facie evidence of the value of said stock, or damage as to that crippled." If the company admits its liability, and pays this value, that is the end of the matter. If it choose to contest either the valuation or its liability, it may do so, and every opportunity is afforded it to present its defense. In such contests this appraisement is only prima facie evidence of the single fact of value. It is not made evidence as to the ownership of the stock, nor that the stock was killed by the moving engine or cars of the defendant, nor that the track of the defendant road was unfenced. As prima facie evidence of value it will stand in line of proof until some evidence contradicting it is submitted. When this is done, the question of value, like all other questions of fact necessary to make out the plaintiff's case, must be determined upon the preponderance of proof. The fact that three sworn and disinterested appraisers,...