Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Engle

• Decision Date: 09 December 1912
• Citation: 60 So. 1,102 Miss. 878
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. ELIZA ENGLE

60 So. 1

102 Miss. 878

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. ELIZA ENGLE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 9, 1912

October 1912

APPEAL from the circuit court of Attala county, HON. G. A. MCLEAN Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Eliza Engle against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Mayes &amp Mayes for appellant.

Now it appears from the testimony of plaintiff that this crossing was blocked about fifty-four minutes in all, going and coming. It must be manifest to the court from the testimony in this record, as it is to us, that the only damage which Mrs. Engle suffered, if any was from the delay merely. The amount of her recovery in this case exceeded any possible actual damage which she could have suffered and is largely in excess of any sum which ought to be imposed upon the railroad company as a penalty for their neglect in not opening this crossing. There is nothing in the testimony which goes to show that the railroad company knew these people were waiting at the crossing, except the fact that Ben Washington testifies that he spoke to the agent about it. All that Ben says on this point, however, is denied by everybody to whom he claims to have spoken in reference to opening the crossing; and it must not be forgotten that Ben Washington himself has a case pending against the railroad company about this very thing.

There is testimony in the record which goes to show that one of plaintiff's witnesses spoke "to some young fellow" about opening the crossing before it was done; and that this employee, if he was an employee, did not do so immediately, but did open the crossing soon afterward. Why it was not done at once does not appear in the record; but when punitive damages are sought to be recovered, it is fair to suppose that it took some few minutes of delay in order to acquaint those in control of the train with the fact that the crossing was closed. Ben Washington, the colored man who is suing the railroad company, testified that he went up and saw one of the employees on the train and asked for the crossing to be opened; and as it was not done, went to the depot agent and called his attention to it, and that the agent replied that he would have it done as soon as possible, or something to that effect. The agent testified that no one had spoken to him.

If punitive damages are recoverable in this case, the right must depend largely upon the testimony of Ben Washington, who himself is suing the company for the same cause, and is thus interested in making out the case.

As to whether or not the damages are excessive is largely a matter of discretion with the court, but we beg to submit herewith a few authorities upon this subject.

Before calling the court's attention to the authorities in reference to when it is proper for the court to reduce the amount of recovery on account of excess of damages, we desire to analyze for a moment this judgment.

We think we have shown from the record that Mrs. Engle did not suffer any actual damage, or, if so, it was very slight and immeasurable. We think the record is conclusive as to this.

It cannot be when the train was standing still that there was anything in her exclamation as to stopping the train and holding the horse which showed that the negligence of the railroad company had caused or aggravated this condition. As a matter of fact it was the horse because, when she reached the crossing, the train was standing still both times and the testimony shows that she was driving a very wild horse and this, and this alone, caused the excitement.

These things may have had their influence with the jury, and doubtless did, as also the frail condition of this woman.

Now let's see as to this recovery. The statute allows the crossing to be blocked five minutes. The total time of the income and outgoing trips of Mrs. Engle, after the crossing was blocked, was fifty-four minutes. Taking five minutes that the crossing could be blocked each time that she approached it, making ten minutes in all, going and coming, the railroad crossing was blocked unlawfully, according to the testimony, only forty-four minutes. The recovery is one thousand dollars for this forty-four minutes. This is twenty-four dollars a minute which it cost the railroad company. Analyzing it a little further it is about thirty-five or forty cents a second.

Surely, the imposition of so great a penalty as this, for so slight a negligence on the part of the railroad company, as punitive damages, shows that the jury was influenced by some purpose other than merely to sub-serve the public good; and this is the only theory upon which punitive damages can be allowed at all.

We say that the amount of the recovery in this case is shockingly gross. It would not be imposed as a fine upon any individual or corporation unless the facts showed some insult. There was nothing of that sort in this case. If anything, it was mere negligence, willful negligence, if you want to call it so from the facts. But in no phase of this cause should this recovery be allowed to stand for this amount.

In the case of Hardin v. Y. & M. R. R. Co., 100 Miss. 146, is found a discussion of the object the law has in allowing punitive damages, and the circumstances when proper. It is there declared that "such damage is allowed for the public good, and for the purpose of deterring others from like offences;" and to this may be added, and for the purpose of deterring the same corporation or person from repetition of the offence.

In the above case, and on the page cited, are found a number of authorities from this state, on this subject. Let us concede that an act is willful, but unaccompanied by humiliation and insult. And there must be a difference in recovery when the act is merely willful, and when it is insulting and humiliating. In this case there was no actual damage, no insult; mere negligence; and surely two hundred dollars, five dollars a minute, is enough punishment to guarantee this good lady, and all the public, that the railroad company will not allow this to happen any more. This accomplishes the purpose of the law, and prevents the company from being compelled to respond to the sympathies of the jury for this frail and delicate woman.

S. L. Dodds and Flowers, Alexander & Whitfield, for appellee.

It has been settled beyond question in this state that the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages in a proper case is something peculiarly within the province of the jury to fix. There is no measure. The discretion of the jury must determine the amount. As long as that discretion operates alone the finding of the jury is final. Unless prejudice or bias comes in and influences the verict the finding of the jury is the last word on the subject. Railroad Company v. Williamson, 87 Miss. 344, 39 So. 489; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 74 Am. Dec. 785; Sedgwick on Damages, secs. 388, 1318; Southerland on Damages, sec. 1092; Thompson on Trials, sec. 2065.

In Railroad Company v. White, 87 Miss 120., there was a verdict for seven hundred and fifty dollars which the court did not find to be excessive. White was at a flag station to take a train and he had to get into Vicksburg about ten miles away. He flagged the train but it would not stop for him and it was denied by the men on the engine that they saw him flag although they were on the lookout.

In Railroad Company v. Mitchell, 83 Miss. 179, there was a verdict for one thousand dollars which was found to be not excessive. Mitchell was at the station of Glass and his case was based upon the same facts involved in White's case supra. The parties, Mitchell and White, were at the station to go to Vicksburg and did their best to stop the train and the men on the train did not stop it. They claim that they did not see the flag. The court said that the question of punitive damages was properly left to...