Illinois Chiropractic Soc. v. Giello
| Decision Date | 22 January 1960 |
| Docket Number | 35308 and 35391,Nos. 35257,s. 35257 |
| Citation | 164 N.E.2d 47,18 Ill.2d 306 |
| Parties | ILLINOIS CHIROPRACTIC SOCIETY et al., Appellees, v. J. A. GIELLO, Appellant. ILLINOIS CHIROPRACTIC SOCIETY et al., Appellees, v. Fred ODUM et al., Appellants. John R. WASEM et al., Appellees, v. W. D. KRIEGER, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Baird, Latendresse & Jones, Decatur (Lloyd F. Latendresse, and Donald A. Jones, Decatur, of counsel), Harold N. Lingle, of Anna, for appellants.
Mills, McDowell & Brandvik, Chicago, R. W. Deffenbaugh, Springfield, for appellees.
The Illinois Chiropractic Society, together with certain individual licensed chiropractors, brought suit in the circuit court of Cook County seeking to enjoin J. A. Giello from practicing chiropractic without a license and in violation of the Medical Practice Act. A similar suit was brought in the circuit court of Union County against Fred Odum and Don Odum, and in the circuit court of Macon County against W. D. Kriger. An injunction was granted in directly to this court on the ground that directly directly to this court on the ground that constitutional questions are involved. It is contended on each appeal that injunctive relief is improper because plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law; and that the statute is unreasonable and discriminatory, in its educational requirements, against persons seeking a license to treat human ailments without drugs or operative surgery. Since all three cases present substantially the same questions they have been consolidated for disposition by this court.
The contention that the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law, and hence that injunctive relief should not have been granted, is based upon the fact that the statute provides criminal penalties for practicing without a license and no showing has been made that criminal prosecution is an inadequate remedy. In Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill.2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59, this court held that the practice of chiropractic by one not licensed to do so infringes the rights of those who are properly licensed, and that injunctive relief may be granted even though the conduct objected to is also a crime. A contention identical to the one made in these cases was again rejected in Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Berns, 17 Ill.2d 356, 161 N.E.2d 334, and no reasons have been advanced which would justify a reconsideration of the question here.
In the Berns case the constitutional questions were likewise decided adversely to contentions of the kind made here. As in the Berns case, the objections now raised are directed at section 5(2)(b) of the Medical Practice Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 91, par. 5. In prescribing educational requirements for issuance of a license under the act, section 5 distinguishes between the practice of medicine in all its branches and the practice of treating human ailments without the use of drugs or operative surgery. Subparagraph 2 applies to the latter class, which includes chiropractors; and subparagraph 2(b) requires, as to applicants who were graduates of a professional school after July 1, 1926, that they be graduates of a school having an entrance prerequisite of four years' instruction in a high school. It is argued that this requirement is arbitrary and unreasonable; that an unjust discrimination is made because applicants for an unlimited license to practice medicine need only be a graduate of a medical college having as a prerequisite for admission a two-year course of instruction in a college of liberal arts or its equivalent; and that further unlawful discrimination exists, in educational requirements, as between applicants graduated after July 1, 1926, and those graduated prior thereto. It is also urged that persons seeking a limited license are prejudiced because 'there are no chiropractors on the Medical Examining Board.' We have considered each of the contentions raised in these cases, and the arguments advanced to support them, and find they are fully answered by our opinion in the Berns case. It is unnecessary to set forth again the reasons and authorities sustaining validity of the present provisions.
At the oral argument in these cases defendants claimed the benefit of Senate Bill 782, enacted by the General Assembly at the 1959 session and approved by the Governor on July 9, 1959, subsequent to entry of the present decrees. The bill amends the Medical Practice Act by adding thereto section 9a. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 91, par. 9a.) This section provides that the requirements of section 5, insofar as they relate to the minimum standards of professional education for persons undertaking to practice chiropractice, shall be waived where an applicant, having the educational qualifications described in section 9a, successfully passes an examination given by the Department of Registration and Education on or before July 1, 1963. The section further declares that to be eligible for its benefits a person shall register with the Department on or before October 31, 1959, submit proof that he has been a resident of the State of Illinois for at least one year immediately prior to July 1, 1959, and certify that he desires to avail himself of the provisions of the act. It is then provided that 'Any such applicant shall not be subject to prosecution for failure to have a license under the provisions of the Medical Practice Act during the period covered by this Section, provided that nothing herein shall be deemed to affect any suit pending in any Court on the effective date of this amendatory Act.'
At the time the decrees were entered in these cases the circuit courts properly held that the plaintiffs were entitled to immediate injunctive relief. The rule is well established, however, that where the legislature has changed the law pending an appeal the case must be disposed of by the reviewing court under the law as it then exists, and not as it was when the decision was made by the trial court. Fallon, v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 402 Ill. 516, 84 N.E.2d 641; People ex rel. Hanks v. Benton, 301 Ill. 32, 133 N.E. 700; People ex rel. Askew v. Ryan, 281 Ill. 231, 117 N.E. 992; People ex rel. Law v. Dix, 280 Ill. 158, 117 N.E. 496. We are bound, accordingly, to review the present decrees in the light of the 1959 amendment, to determine whether defendants may be entitled to the benefits thereof and to determine its applicability to the present proceedings.
By section 9a the General Assembly has recognized the hardship to chiropractors who are ineligible to take the examination for a license solely because the professional school or college from which they were...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Woodard
...N.E.2d 1238 (1989). An amendment is to be construed together with the original act to which it relates. Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello, 18 Ill.2d 306, 164 N.E.2d 47 (1960). Every amendment to a statute is presumed to have a purpose, and a court must consider the language of an amen......
-
McDunn v. Williams, 74613
...to presume that absurd consequences were not contemplated by the legislature * * *." (Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello (1960), 18 Ill.2d 306, 312, 164 N.E.2d 47.) Moreover, "[t]he equitable powers of a court may not be exercised to direct a remedy in contradiction to the plain requir......
-
Iwan Ries & Co. v. City of Chi.
...of the relevant provision of the Municipal Code as we find it to be both helpful and instructive. See Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello , 18 Ill. 2d 306, 312, 164 N.E.2d 47 (1960) (when a statute has been amended, courts are to construe the language of the amendment together with the ......
-
People v. Crete
...unjust result. See, e.g., People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill.2d 310, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300; Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello (1960), 18 Ill.2d 306, 312, 164 N.E.2d 47. I cannot believe that the legislature intended the exercise of the statutory right to seek reduction or mo......