Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block

• Decision Date: 14 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 51066,51066
• Parties: , 27 Ill.Dec. 465 ILLINOIS GAMEFOWL BREEDERS ASSOCIATION, Appellee, v. John BLOCK, Director of Agriculture, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 529

389 N.E.2d 529

75 Ill.2d 443, 27 Ill.Dec. 465

ILLINOIS GAMEFOWL BREEDERS ASSOCIATION, Appellee, v. John BLOCK, Director of Agriculture, Appellant.

No. 51066.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 14, 1979.

Rehearing Denied May 30, 1979.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Paul J. Bargiel and Patricia Rosen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Roger V. Pierson and Matthew A. Maloney, Princeton, for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice:

Plaintiff, Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association, a not-for-profit Illinois corporation, filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to section 57.1 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 57.1) seeking a declaration that certain provisions of the Humane Care for Animals Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 8, par. 701 Et seq.) were unconstitutional. Following the submission of cross-motions for summary judgment, the Bureau County circuit court declared the challenged provisions unconstitutional. Defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a). 58 Ill.2d R. 302(a).

The Association exists for the purpose of uniting breeders and fanciers of gamefowl into a common organization, thereby benefiting its members by exchanging and distributing information and ideas concerning the perpetuation and improvement of the various breeds of gamefowl. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that it has a proprietary interest in the breeding, raising and selling of gamefowl and owns gamefowl. Finally, although the parties stipulated that the term "gamefowl" refers to chickens, plaintiff did allege in its complaint that "gamefowl are animals within the scope, meaning, intent and application" of the Act.

Section 4.01 of the Act provides in part:

"Sec. 4.01(a) No person may own, capture, breed, train, or lease any animal which he or she knows or should know is intended for use in any show, exhibition, program, or other activity featuring or otherwise involving a fight between such animal and any other animal or the intentional killing of any animal for the purpose of sport, wagering, or entertainment.

(b) No person shall promote, conduct, carry on, advertise, collect money for or in any other manner assist or aid in the presentation for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment, any show, exhibition, program, or other activity involving a fight between two or more animals or the intentional killing of any animal.

(c) No person shall sell or offer for sale, ship, transport, or otherwise move, or deliver or receive any animal which he or she knows or should know has been captured, bred, or trained, or will be used, to fight another animal or be intentionally killed, for the purpose of sport, wagering, or entertainment. " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 8, pars. 704.01(a), (b), (c).)

Plaintiff challenged subsections (a) and (c) of section 4.01 and the corresponding penalty provisions in section 16 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 8, par. 716). These sections essentially prohibit owning, breeding, training, selling, shipping or receiving animals which one knows or should know are intended to be used for fighting purposes. Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of subsection (b) of section 4.01, which actually prohibits animal fighting for sport, wagering or entertainment.

A preliminary question which must be addressed is whether plaintiff has standing to maintain an action for declaratory relief. This court discussed the two requirements for standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Underground Contractors Association v. City of Chicago (1977), 66 Ill.2d 371, 5 Ill.Dec. 827, 362 N.E.2d 298:

"First, there must be an 'actual controversy.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 57.1(1).) 'Actual' in this context does not mean that a wrong must have been committed and injury inflicted. Rather, it requires a showing that the underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or premature, so as to require the court to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events. (Citations.) The case must, therefore, present a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the parties' rights, the resolution of which will aid in the termination of the controversy or some part thereof. (Citations.)

The second, and somewhat related requirement, is that the party seeking the declaration must be 'interested in the controversy.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 57.1(1).) The word, 'interested' does not mean merely having a curiosity about or a concern for the outcome of the controversy. Rather, the party seeking relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected. (Citations.) The dispute must, therefore, touch the legal relations of parties who stand in a position adverse to one another." (66 Ill.2d 371, 375-76, 5 Ill.Dec. 827, 829, 362 N.E.2d 298, 300.)

In order to preclude those persons having no interest in a controversy from bringing suit, it is necessary that one who challenges the constitutionality of a statute bring himself within the class as to whom the law is allegedly unconstitutional. (Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 510-11, 349 N.E.2d 61; People v. Bombacino (1972), 51 Ill.2d 17, 20, 280 N.E.2d 697; Jaffe v. Cruttenden (1952), 412 Ill. 606, 613, 107 N.E.2d 715.) To have standing, therefore, one must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the challenged statute. Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill.2d 543, 550, 3 Ill.Dec. 703, 359 N.E.2d 113; People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill.2d 1, 6, 345 N.E.2d 97.

Despite a lack of clarity and directness in plaintiff's complaint and the use of conclusional allegations, we believe that plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient interest to maintain this declaratory judgment action. Plaintiff has alleged that it owns gamefowl which are, admittedly, "animals" within the meaning of this Act. Since the Act only applies to animals which one knows or should know are intended to be used for animal fighting, plaintiff has, albeit indirectly, brought itself within the class allegedly aggrieved by the statute and is, therefore, "interested in the controversy" within the meaning of the declaratory judgment statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 57.1(1)).

We also believe an "actual controversy" is present. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 57.1(1).) This requirement is intended to prevent the courts from granting declarations of rights involving only abstract propositions of law. (Underground Contractors Association v. City of Chicago (1977), 66 Ill.2d 371, 375, 5 Ill.Dec. 827, 362 N.E.2d 298; Beck v. Binks (1960), 19 Ill.2d 72, 74, 165 N.E.2d 292; Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook (1955), 6 Ill.2d 419, 421, 129 N.E.2d 1.) It is necessary, however, to keep in mind the legislative purpose, which is to make possible a binding declaration of rights without requiring the parties to make an irrevocable change of position which might jeopardize those rights. Richards v. Liquid Controls Corp. (1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 111, 130, 325 N.E.2d 775; Charleston National Bank v. Muller (1974), 16 Ill.App.3d 380, 382, 306 N.E.2d 358.

The "actual controversy" requirement is meant merely to distinguish justiciable issues from abstract or hypothetical disputes and is not intended to prevent resolution of concrete disputes admitting of a definitive and immediate determination of the rights of the parties. (A. S. & W. Club of Waukegan v. Drobnick (1962), 26 Ill.2d 521, 524, 187 N.E.2d 247.) The declaratory judgment remedy should be liberally applied and not restricted by unduly technical interpretations. (Saline Branch Drainage District v. Urbana-Champaign Sanitary District (1948), 399 Ill. 189, 192, 77 N.E.2d 158; Department of Illinois Disabled American Veterans v. Bialczak (1976), 38 Ill.App.3d 848, 853, 349 N.E.2d 897.) Plaintiff has alleged that it owns "animals within the scope, meaning, intent and application" of the challenged statute. Such ownership raises the threat of potential criminal prosecution, and, in our judgment, is sufficient to entitle plaintiff to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the statute.

We turn, then, to the constitutional issues. The trial court held subsections (a) and (c) of section 4.01 and the companion penalty provisions in section 16 of the Humane Care for Animals Act unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of both the Federal and State constitutions. Both the trial court in its order and the plaintiff in its brief cited only one case in support of their...