Illinois Hotel and Lodging Ass'n v. Ludwig

• Decision Date: 18 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1-06-2228.,1-06-2228.
• Citation: 869 N.E.2d 846
• Parties: The ILLINOIS HOTEL AND LODGING ASSOCIATION, an Unincorporated Association, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Art LUDWIG, Director, The Department of Labor, and Unite Here Local 1, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

869 N.E.2d 846

The ILLINOIS HOTEL AND LODGING ASSOCIATION, an Unincorporated Association, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Art LUDWIG, Director, The Department of Labor, and Unite Here Local 1, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-06-2228.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

May 18, 2007.

Franczek Sullivan P.C., Chicago (James J. Zuehl, Edward N. Druck & Scott Cruz, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

State of Illinois, Attorney General, Chicago (Gary Feinerman & Jerald S. Post, of

counsel), for Defendant-Appellee, Art Ludwig.

Davis Cowell & Bowe LLP, San Francisco, CA (Richard G. McCracken & Paul L. More, of counsel), Allison Slutsky & Kennedy, P.C., Chicago (Wesley Kennedy & N. Elizabeth Reynolds, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee, Unite Here Local 1.

Presiding Justice SHEILA M. O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the Illinois Hotel and Lodging Association, filed a declaratory judgment action against defendant, the Director for the Illinois Department of Labor, seeking to have section 3.1 of the One Day Rest in Seven Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 140/3.1 (West Supp.2005)) declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against special legislation, as well as the equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution and United States Constitution, and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. The trial court granted defendant Unite Here Local 1 leave to intervene. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that section 3.1 of the Act passes constitutional muster and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff is a statewide trade association of Illinois hotels with members operating hotels in Cook County. Plaintiff's purpose is to promote the welfare and interests of its members and of the hospitality industry in general.

Unite Here Local 1 represents approximately 1,722 room attendants in Cook County and the Chicago metropolitan area. The room attendants' job is to clean guest rooms. Generally, all room attendants change bed linens, remove dirty sheets and towels, clean bathrooms, vacuum, replace amenities in bathrooms (i.e., soap, tissue, shampoo, etc.), dispose of garbage, and dust and tidy guests' clothes.

Hotel room attendants essentially work on a piece-rate system. Both union and nonunion hotels require room attendants to clean a quota of rooms each work shift. Although they are paid by the hour, room attendants are required to deliver a quantified amount of work during their shift and can be disciplined if they fail to do so.

The quota system forces many room attendants to skip breaks. In a published survey of room attendants, two-thirds stated that they had skipped or shortened lunch or rest breaks, or worked longer hours, to complete assigned rooms.

The workload pressure facing room attendants has contributed to injury. Ergonomic research conducted by the Ohio State University Biodynamics Laboratory found that the typical tasks performed by hotel housekeepers put these workers at a very high risk for lower back disorder.

Hotel room attendant work has become more strenuous in recent years. Hotel chains have engaged in so-called "bedding wars," adding heavier mattresses, more pillows and additional amenities to compete for travelers' dollars. A published survey of room attendants found that work intensification over the previous five years, measured by the increased number and intensity of tasks required to clean a room, had led to a statistically significant increase in neck pain and lower back pain among room attendants.

Section 3.1 of the Act was introduced and passed to protect hotel room attendants from overwork. Section 3.1(c) (820 ILCS 140/3.1(c) (West Supp.2005)) requires employers to provide hotel room attendants with two 15-minute breaks and one 30-minute meal period in each workday in which the room attendant works at least seven hours. Section 3.1(d) also requires the employers of hotel room attendants to make available a room with adequate seating and tables for room attendants to enjoy the break. 820 ILCS 140/3.1(d) (West Supp.2005). The room shall have clean drinking water provided without charge. 820 ILCS 140/3.1(d) (West Supp.2005). Hotel room attendants who have been denied the mandated break periods have a private cause of action for treble damages and are protected against retaliation for invoking the Act. See 820 ILCS 140/3.1(f),(g) (West Supp. 2005). Section 3.1 applies only to hotel room attendants employed in counties with a population greater than 3 million, i.e., to employees of hotels located in Cook County. See 820 ILCS 140/3.1(b) (West Supp.2005).

On August 16, 2005, one day after section 3.1's effective date, plaintiff filed a verified complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Art Ludwig, the Director of the Illinois Department of Labor. In its four-count complaint, plaintiff alleged that section 3.1 was special legislation in violation of article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution; violated the equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution; and was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000)).

Plaintiff concurrently moved for a temporary restraining order. On August 18, 2005, the circuit court granted the restraining order, enjoining the Director from enforcement of section 3.1. The court granted Unite Here Local 1 leave to intervene.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 28, 2006, the circuit court rejected plaintiff's special legislation, equal protection, and preemption arguments, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dissolved the temporary restraining order that previously had been entered. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.

First, plaintiff contends that section 3.1 constitutes unconstitutional special legislation. The special legislation provision of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 states:

"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 13.

"All statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the party challenging the statute bears the burden of clearly rebutting this presumption." County of Cook v. Illinois Labor Relations Board Local Panel, 347 Ill.App.3d 538, 549, 283 Ill.Dec. 8, 807 N.E.2d 613 (2004). The special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege upon one group while excluding other similarly situated groups. In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill.2d 510, 519, 264 Ill.Dec. 642, 771 N.E.2d 346 (2002). The legislature has broad discretion in making statutory classifications, and the special legislation clause prohibits only those that are arbitrary. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill.2d 64, 86, 270 Ill.Dec. 724, 783 N.E.2d 1024 (2002). Where, as here, the statute under consideration does not affect a fundamental right or implicate a suspect class or quasi-suspect class, the appropriate standard of review is the rational basis test. County of Cook, 347 Ill.App.3d at 550, 283 Ill.Dec. 8, 807 N.E.2d 613. Under the rational basis test, the court must determine whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate public interest. County of Cook, 347 Ill.App.3d at 550, 283 Ill.Dec. 8, 807 N.E.2d 613. "If this court can reasonably conceive of any set of facts that justifies distinguishing the class the statute benefits from the class outside its scope, it will uphold the statute." Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill.2d 315, 325, 297 Ill.Dec. 308, 837 N.E.2d 88 (2005).

Our supreme court has further defined the rational basis test when reviewing legislative classifications based on population or territorial differences. Such a classification will survive a special legislation challenge only: (1) where founded on a rational difference of situation or condition existing in the persons or objects upon which the classification rests; and (2) where there is a rational and proper basis for the classification in view of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill.2d 117, 123, 212 Ill.Dec. 883, 658 N.E.2d 365 (1995). We review de novo the circuit court's determination of section 3.1's constitutionality. Crusius, 216 Ill.2d at 324, 297 Ill.Dec. 308, 837 N.E.2d 88.

Plaintiff contends that section 3.1 of the Act, which provides hotel room attendants with two 15-minute breaks and one 30-minute meal period in each workday in which the room attendant works at least seven hours, violates the special legislation clause because it applies only to employees of hotels located in Cook County. Plaintiff contends that there is no rational basis to distinguish room attendants in Cook County from those in other counties. Plaintiff also contends that section 3.1's distinction between room attendants in Cook County from those in other counties does not bear any rational relationship to the purpose of the Act, which was to diminish the work burden placed on hotel room attendants.

Plaintiff's argument is unavailing, as the record indicates that in lobbying against the passage of section 3.1, plaintiff itself raised distinctions between hotels in Chicago versus hotels located outside of Cook County. As initially proposed, section 3.1 applied statewide. In lobbying materials used before section 3.1 was amended to apply only to Cook County, plaintiff stressed the effect that the imposition of "Chicago work rules" would have on smaller hotels in other parts of the state. Specifically, in a 2005 lobbying letter to its members, plaintiff asked legislators to vote against "Statewide Imposition of Room...