Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Bd.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 98351.,98351. |
| Citation | 216 Ill.2d 315,837 N.E.2d 88 |
| Parties | Philip N. CRUSIUS, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Terrance A. Norton, of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, L.L.P., Jay E. Stewart, Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Mary E. Welsh, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees The Illinois Gaming Board et al.
William R. Quinlan, James R. Carroll, James A. Niewiara, Nicholas G. Grapsas, of Quinlan & Carroll, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee Village of Rosemount.
Joseph U. Schorer, Robert D. Snow, Jr., Scott M. Edenfield, Chicago, Robert R. Gasaway, Ashley C. Parrish and Sookyoung Shin, Washington D.C., all of Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P., for intervenor-appellee Emerald Casino, Inc.
Gordon B. Nash, Jr., Harold L. Kaplan, Patrick S. Coffey, Jeffrey M. Schwartz, of Gardner, Carton & Douglas, L.L.P., Chicago, for intervenor-appellee Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Emerald Casino, Inc.
Plaintiff, Philip N. Crusius (Crusius), filed suit on behalf of all Illinois taxpayers and the State of Illinois against the Illinois Gaming Board (Board), seeking a declaratory judgment that section 11.2(a) of the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West 2000)) violates the Illinois Constitution's special legislation clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 13). The Cook County circuit court dismissed Crusius' action with prejudice and the appellate court affirmed (348 Ill.App.3d 44, 283 Ill.Dec. 366, 807 N.E.2d 1207). The sole issue before this court is whether section 11.2(a) violates the special legislation clause. We hold it does not and affirm the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court.
This case arose from the application by Emerald Casino, Inc. (Emerald), to renew its riverboat gambling license and relocate its operations pursuant to section 11.2(a) of the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West 2000)). The Act, which took effect in 1990, created the Board to regulate riverboat gambling throughout Illinois (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 2405(a)(1)) and authorized the Board to issue up to 10 riverboat gambling licenses (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 2407(e)). Four licenses were to be issued for riverboat gambling on the Mississippi River, one was to be issued for riverboat gambling on the Illinois River south of Marshall County, one was to be issued for riverboat gambling on the Des Plaines River in Will County, and locations for the other four licenses were to be determined by the Board. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 2407(e).
In 1992, the Board issued a license to Emerald, then known as H.P., Inc., to operate a riverboat casino on the Mississippi River in East Dubuque, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, Emerald began operating the Silver Eagle Casino. After the initial three-year duration of Emerald's license elapsed, it renewed the license for one year in 1995 and again in 1996. In April 1997, Emerald applied for a third renewal, but the Board denied its application. Emerald and the Village of Rosemont (Rosemont), as defendants in this case, maintain that by early 1997, the East Dubuque site had become economically infeasible, due in part to strong competition from nearby Iowa riverboats. Emerald further asserts that it was seeking to move its operations to a new location away from the Mississippi River at the time it applied to renew its license in 1997.
After the Board denied Emerald's 1997 renewal application, Emerald pursued an administrative appeal of the Board's decision before an administrative law judge (ALJ). In May 1999, the ALJ affirmed the Board's denial of Emerald's application. The ALJ also denied Emerald's two motions for reconsideration.
In July 1997, while Emerald's administrative appeal was pending, Emerald stopped operating its riverboat casino. Emerald maintains that, during the first two years after its casino became nonoperational, it continued to seek the Board's approval to move its business to a new location.
In June 1999, while Emerald's operations lay dormant and before the Board could take final action on the ALJ's May 1999 order, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 91-40. Public Act 91-40 added section 11.2 to the Riverboat Gambling Act, which provides in part that:
"A licensee that was not conducting riverboat gambling on January 1, 1998 may apply to the Board for renewal and approval of relocation to a new home dock location authorized under Section 3(c) and the Board shall grant the application and approval upon receipt by the licensee of approval from the new municipality or county, as the case may be, in which the licensee wishes to relocate pursuant to Section 7(j)." 230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West 2000).
Section 7(j), Public Act 91-40, authorizes the Board to allow a relocation under section 11.2(a) only if the local governing body approves it by majority vote. 230 ILCS 10/7(j) (West 2002).
In July 1999, Rosemont approved the relocation of Emerald's home dock to the Village of Rosemont. Shortly thereafter, in September 1999, Emerald applied to the Board for renewal of its license and relocation of its operations pursuant to section 11.2(a). The Board denied Emerald's application in January 2001, and in March 2001, it issued Emerald a written notice of denial and a disciplinary complaint seeking to revoke Emerald's license. Among other things, the disciplinary complaint alleges Emerald failed to follow the Board's rules regarding disclosures and transfers of ownership. The license revocation proceedings against Emerald are ongoing as of the date of this decision. In re Disciplinary Action of Emerald Casino, Inc., Ill. Gaming Bd., No. DC-01-05.
After the Board denied Emerald's application for renewal and relocation, Emerald filed an action in the Cook County circuit court seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to approve its application. See Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 346 Ill.App.3d 18, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914 (2003). The action was commenced in May 2001. In cross-motions for summary judgment, Emerald and the Board, through the Attorney General, disputed whether the Board had the discretion to deny Emerald's application when Emerald met the criteria of section 11.2(a). Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 22, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 22, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914.
On appeal, Emerald and Rosemont, which was granted permission to intervene in the lawsuit after the circuit court ruled in favor of the Board (Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 22, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914), argued that the language of section 11.2(a) is mandatory and therefore required the Board to grant Emerald's application (Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 26-27, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914). The appellate court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. It held the legislature intended "shall" to be mandatory when it enacted section 11.2(a). Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 32, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914. The court reasoned, in part, that a mandatory construction of the statute is consistent with the Act's stated purpose of assisting economic development and promoting tourism, because by requiring the Board to approve Emerald's application for renewal and relocation, the legislature ensured that Emerald's license would be put back to use. See Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 33, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914. Furthermore, the court concluded that even though a mandatory reading of "shall" creates an exception to the license renewal requirements of the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10/7 (West 2000)), the plain language of section 11.2 indicates the legislature's intent to create such an exception. See Emerald Casino, 346 Ill.App.3d at 35-36, 281 Ill.Dec. 293, 803 N.E.2d 914. The Board in Emerald Casino filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was denied. Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 209 Ill.2d 579, 286 Ill.Dec. 165, 813 N.E.2d 222 (table).
In May 2002, while the Emerald Casino action was still pending, Illinois citizen and taxpayer Philip N. Crusius filed the lawsuit that is the subject of this appeal in the Cook County circuit court on behalf of all Illinois taxpayers and the State of Illinois. The Board, its individual board members, the State Comptroller, and the State Treasurer were named as defendants. Crusius sought a declaratory judgment that section 11.2(a) violates the Illinois Constitution's special legislation clause.1 He also sought to enjoin the expenditure of any state funds or the transfer of any state property in the administration of Public Act 91-40, which contains section 11.2(a).
Crusius filed a motion for summary judgment on the special legislation issue (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000)). The Board, through the Attorney General, filed a combined motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2000)), arguing that Crusius lacked standing to file suit (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)) and that he failed to state a cause of action (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). Subsequently, the circuit court granted Rosemont leave to intervene as a defendant (735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West 2000)), and it too filed a combined motion to dismiss. In an oral ruling, the circuit court found that Crusius had standing to bring the action, but that section 11.2(a) is constitutional. Accordingly, it dismissed Crusius' complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.
The appellate court affirmed. 348 Ill.App.3d 44, 283 Ill.Dec. 366, 807 N.E.2d 1207. Initially, it upheld the circuit's court's decision on standing (348 Ill.App.3d at 48-53, 283 Ill.Dec. 366, 807 N.E.2d 1207), which is not at issue...
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